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Prisoners are essentially taken out of the national economy upon incarceration.
-Vanskike v. Peters
1
Let the prisoners pick the fruits. We can do it without bringing in millions of foreigners.
-U.S. Rep. Dana Rohrabacher
2
INTRODUCTION
The "who" question is prominent in recent legal scholarship
about work: Who is recognized as a worker, and who is left out?
Roughly speaking, two distinct conversations pursue this
question. One analyzes the centrality of market work and questions
whether other activities-nonmarket work-should be incorporated
into legal regimes of worker support and protection. This inquiry
emerges from feminist scholarship, focuses on families and caregiving,
and primarily considers reforms in who counts as a worker for the
purposes of family, welfare, social insurance, and tax law. 3 The
1. 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992).
2. Carl Hulse & Rachel L. Swarns, Conservatives Stand Firm on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2006, at A12.
3. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004) [hereinafter
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH]; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Kathryn Abrams, The
Second Coming of Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1605 (2001); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing
Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77
TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1403 (2001); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491
(2005); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2005); Gillian
Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Distribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335 (2001)
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boundaries of employment largely are taken for granted, and the
problem is whether to go beyond employment and recognize unpaid
work performed outside the market's boundaries. 4  A second
conversation responds to the proliferation of contingent work,
outsourcing, and workforce intermediaries like temporary staffing
agencies, and it proceeds to question how yesterday's employment
statutes engage today's restructured labor market. This inquiry
emerges from labor and employment relations scholarship, focuses on
firms in conventional labor markets, and primarily considers
reforming the employee/independent contractor distinction or
reconfiguring labor protections to be less dependent on a single, or
even any, employer. 5 In this second case, the restriction of work to the
[hereinafter Lester, Unemployment Insurance]; Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment
of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 61; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1994);
Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The
First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J.
1073 (1994); Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 1 (1996); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996); Joan Williams,
From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1441 (2001) [hereinafter Williams, From Difference to Dominance]; Joan Williams, Is
Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994); Noah D. Zatz, What
Welfare Requires From Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373 (2006) [hereinafter Zatz, What Welfare
Requires].
For important work in a similar vein by scholars in other disciplines, see generally JEANNE
BOYDSTON, HOME & WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC (1990); NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART (2001); NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE
INTERRUPTUS (1997); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR (1999); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM
BONDAGE TO CONTRACT (1998); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 56-57 (2005);
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990); Ann
Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender
Relations and Welfare States, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 303 (1993).
4. The major exception is scholarship that connects nonrecognition of family labor to the
ambiguous position of paid domestic and caring work within employment law. See sources cited
infra note 464.
5. See generally BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW (Guy Davidov & Brian
Langille eds., 2006); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004); Mark Barenberg,
Workers, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 563 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds.,
2003); Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (1996);
Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2003); Guy
Davidov, Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships, 42 BRIT. J. INDUS.
RELATIONSHIPS 727 (2004); Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A
Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357 (2002) [hereinafter
Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment]; Mark Freedland, From the Contract of Employment to
the Personal Work Nexus, 35 INDUS. L.J. 1 (2006); Judy Fudge, Fragmenting Work and
Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation, 44
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 609 (2006); Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the
Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 983 (1999); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor
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market largely is taken for granted, and the problem is whether the
employment relationship includes enough paid work.
6
This Article brings these two conversations together 7 by
identifying a fundamental problem in employment law that has
escaped scholarly attention. The boundary between market and
nonmarket work is central to legal definitions of employment.
Determining who is an employee requires deciding where to draw that
boundary, or whether to do so at all. The opening quotation from
Vanskike v. Peters reveals this dynamic. There, the Seventh Circuit
decided that prison inmates could not demand the minimum wage for
their work as janitors, kitchen aides, and garment workers in an
Illinois prison.8 The penal context of their labor rendered it nonmarket
work; this nonmarket character rendered the relationship
noneconomic; and absent an economic relationship to the prison,
inmates could not be employees, bearers of labor rights. 9
This Article uses legal disputes over prison labor as a window
onto the much larger field of employment's economic character. 10
Scholars of contemporary employment law take for granted
employment's place within "the labor market." But, as I will show,
Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187 (1999); Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability:
Contracting for Flexible and Triangular Employment Relationships in the New Economy, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 109 (2003); Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a
Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, Report for the Law Commission of
Canada, The Legal Concept of Employment: Marginalizing Workers 105-06 (Oct. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.atkinson.yorku.ca/ace/publications/Law_Commissionof Canada.pdf
(defining "workers" as "persons economically dependent on the sale of their capacity to work,"
and arguing for "extending labour regulation to all contracts for the performance of work"). In a
recent article, Mark Freedland suggests that loosening this restriction may become an important
component of his research. Freedland, supra note 5, at 14-18 (developing the umbrella concept of
a "personal work nexus" to avoid unduly confining attention to contractual forms of work); see
also Colin Fenwick, Regulating Prisoners' Labour in Australia: A Preliminary View, 16 AUSTL. J.
LAB. L. 284, 286, 317 (2003).
7. See also Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file
with Vanderbilt Law Review). Notably, the Supiot Report on the future of European labor and
employment law addresses both the scope of the employment relationship and the inclusion on
nonmarket work within a broader concept of "membership in the labour force." ALAIN SUPIOT,
BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE 24-51
(2001). Nonetheless, the Report treats these as analytically distinct issues. Id.
8. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2002).
9. Id. at 812.
10. For a full catalog of the more than 60 such cases, see infra notes 101-104. Included are
all reported opinions deciding federal employment law claims-predominantly for the minimum
wage, but occasionally for employment discrimination-brought by inmates serving a criminal
sentence of incarceration or by individuals in others forms of involuntary confinement. Also




employment law systematically faces disputes over both how to draw a
market/nonmarket distinction and whether that distinction matters
legally. Moreover, employment law helps to create the very divide
between economic and noneconomic relationships to which it purports
to respond. Thus, this Article identifies employment law as an
important site where the market and its boundaries are produced.
Understanding employment law's economic dimension allows
us to make sense not only of prison labor but also of a broader class of
doctrinal controversies. In these overshadowed and undertheorized
disputes regarding what I call "paid nonmarket work," individuals
receive pay directly linked to their labor in welfare work programs,
graduate student teaching and research assistance, and rehabilitative
programs for individuals with disabilities, among other institutional
settings. When these workers assert employment rights, they face
fierce resistance on the ground that their work lies outside of the labor
market. The dispositive legal question always is whether an
employment relationship exists. Courts determine the answer by
asking whether the relationship is economic in nature.
I aim to make two principal contributions by analyzing these
disputes over employment's economic dimension. First, by
demonstrating that controversies over paid nonmarket work form a
coherent class with a consistent structure, the Article shows that
work's location inside "the economy" is a fundamentally important,
and systematically contested, aspect of the modern employment
relationship.' These disputes cannot be understood with the
11. In contrast, the limited existing legal literature generally treats the employment status
of each form of paid nonmarket work as a separate problem specific to its institutional setting
and sometimes to a particular statute. It overlooks both the systematic connections among these
contexts and the links to broad questions about the boundaries of the economy, and it does not
clearly differentiate the issue at hand from the traditional questions of control. Colin Fenwick's
excellent article on Australian prison labor briefly suggests connections among some of these
work settings, see Fenwick, supra note 6, at 319-20, but he grounds these connections in a
concept of involuntariness that I think captures only part of what is at stake. See discussion
infra Part II.A.1.
On prison labor, see generally Fenwick, supra note 6; James J. Maiwurm & Wendy S.
Maiwurm, Minimum Wages for Prisoners: Legal Obstacles and Suggested Reform, 7 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 193 (1973); Alexander B. Wellen, Prisoners and the FLSA: Can the American Taxpayer
Afford Extending Prison Inmates the Federal Minimum Wage?, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 295 (1994); Paul
R. Comeau, Comment, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal for the
Organization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 963 (1972); James K. Haslam, Comment, Prison
Labor Under State Direction: Do Inmates Have the Right to FLSA Coverage and Minimum
Wage?, 1994 BYU L. REV. 369; Matthew J. Lang, Comment, The Search for a Workable Standard
for When Fair Labor Standards Act Coverage Should Be Extended to Prisoner Workers, 5 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191 (2002).
On graduate student labor, see generally Grant M. Hayden, 'The University Works Because
We Do": Collective Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 (2001);
862 [Vol. 61:3:857
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traditional tools used to analyze the scope of the employment
relationship-tools derived from agency law and focused on the issue
of organizational control over the worker. 12 The economic dimension of
the employment relationship concerns matters analytically distinct
from these familiar questions of control, and so new tools are needed.
Employment's economic dimension, however, is as confused as
it is important. What precisely makes a relationship "economic"? Here
begins conflict over the role of the market. Judges vacillate between
two competing accounts of employment's economic character, each
suggesting a different result. According to what I label the "exclusive
market" view, market relations provide the essence of economic life,
and thus nonmarket relations necessarily are noneconomic. Implicit
here is a familiar view of the market economy as asocial. 13 Insofar as
prison labor does have a social character-because it is part of a
"rehabilitative or penological" relationship between prison and
Martin H. Malin, Student Employees and Collective Bargaining, 69 KY. L.J. 1 (1980); Sheldon D.
Pollack & Daniel V. Johns, Graduate Students, Unions, and Brown University, 20 LAB. LAW. 243
(2004); Ryan Patrick Dunn, Comment, Get a Real Job! The National Labor Relations Board
Decides Graduate Student Workers at Private Universities are Not "Employees" Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 851 (2006).
On student internships, see generally Cynthia Grant Bowman & MaryBeth Lipp, Legal
Limbo of the Student Intern: The Responsibility of Colleges and Universities to Protect Student
Interns Against Sexual Harassment, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 95, 96-97 (2000) (focusing primarily
on Title IX education discrimination, not Title VII employment discrimination); David L.
Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLY 227 (1998); David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student
Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215 (2002). See also Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian
McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV.
71 (2006).
Two analyses of workfare programs discuss some connections to FLSA cases involving other
forms of nonstandard work, including prison labor, but they treat these cases as involving an ill-
defined "totality of the circumstances" alternative to a control-oriented test, rather than seeing
them as raising a distinct and coherent set of issues. Nan S. Ellis, Work Is Its Own Reward: Are
Workfare Participants Employees Entitled to Protection Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 1, 4, 13-16 (2003); Kevin J. Miller, Comment, Welfare and the
Minimum Wage: Are Workfare Participants "Employees" Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (1999).
On the closely related questions raised by volunteer labor, see generally Mitchell H.
Rubinstein, Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 147 (2006).
12. To see the incompleteness of an agency analysis, it is enough to note that agency law-
unlike statutory employment law-will label someone an "employee" based on a principal's
control over her work, regardless of whether that individual gets paid at all. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(b) (2006); see also discussion infra Part III.B.2 (addressing the
volunteer/employee distinctions).
13. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE 51, 51-52 (Mark Granovetter & Richard
Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2001); Greta R. Krippner, The Elusive Market: Embeddedness and the
Paradigm of Economic Sociology, 30 THEORY & SOC'Y 775, 778 (2001).
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prisonerl4-inmates' work must be noneconomic and therefore not
employment. The second account emphasizes the value of the goods
and services that workers produce. According to this "productive
work" view, inmate labor is employment because production provides
employment's economic character; determining whether the work lies
inside or outside the market becomes irrelevant.
I offer a provocation by way of illustration: prisons are like
families. The claim is preposterous in some ways, but in at least one
way it is not.
Like the more familiar housework and caregiving performed by
family members at home, prisoners' labor is located outside the
economy on conventional maps of social spheres drawn by lawyers,
demographers, and economists. 16 In familiar schemes of separate
spheres, 16 "the economy" typically is identified with "the market" and,
in particular, with the market organization of productive work. 17 The
market's centrality relegates other sites of production-to the extent
that they can be recognized as such-to the common position of
nonmarket work, separated by many particularities but joined by
what they are not.18 The prison and the family both are sites of
nonmarket work.
14. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992).
15. For instance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides a "comprehensive body of data on
the labor force, employment, unemployment, and persons not in the labor force" with its Current
Population Survey. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Home Page,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). This survey excludes "residents of
penal and mental institutions and homes for the aged and infirm." Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook of Methods ch. 1 (Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homchlb.htm; see also
U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, Puerto Rico Community Survey, 2006
Subject Definitions, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/2006/usedata/
SubjectLDefinitions.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (defining institutionalized individuals as "not
in labor force"). But cf. Bureau of Economic Accounts, A Guide to the National Income and
Product Accounts of the United States 9 n.21, available at
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/misc/nipaguid.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2008) (including
"compensation of prison inmates" as "wages and salaries," but not defining which payments to
inmates are included as "compensation").
16. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 232-33 (1983); Fred Block & Peter
Evans, The State and the Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 505 (Neil J.
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498-1502 (1983).
17. See, e.g., John Krinsky, Work, Workfare, and Contention in New York City: The Potential
of Flexible Identities in Organizing Opposition to Workfare, 24 CRITICAL SOC. 277, 277-81 (1998);
Orloff, supra note 3, at 304-06; Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to
Commodify: That is Not the Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS
IN LAW AND CULTURE 362, 364-65 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005); Viviana
Zelizer, Culture and Consumption, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note 16,
at 331, 336.
18. See Andrew Abbott, Sociology of Work and Occupations, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note 16, at 307; TIMOTHY MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS 244-45
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These distinctions among spheres possess ample appeal and
descriptive power. Few people would confuse relationships between
parents and children with those between bosses and their employees,
and few would want to.
Nonetheless, these schemes also cause trouble. A major reason
is labor's fungibility. To keep a suburban lawn trimmed, a parent
might direct her child to mow it as a household chore or, instead, hire
a commercial lawn service that pays an employee to perform the task.
The lawn gets mowed either way, and yet distinct relationships are
mobilized to bring about this result. Similarly, Colorado recently
began to provide its farmers with state prisoners as a substitute for
the customary agricultural workforce of undocumented migrant
workers from Mexico; the latter labor supply had dwindled in the
wake of intensified immigration enforcement. 19 Again, mobilizing two
different relationships can accomplish a single goal-in this case,
getting crops to market.
This coexistence of distinctive relationships and fungible
results creates dilemmas of interpretation and regulation. For the
forms of work I discuss here, these dilemmas are particularly acute.
Unlike most family labor, inmate workers typically receive pay tied
directly to their work, and that work is organized through large,
bureaucratic institutions in forms quite similar to conventional
employment. 20 Paid nonmarket work thus readily brings into view the
conflicting implications of different ways of understanding economic
action.
Conflict over the economic character of employment has deep
roots, and unearthing them leads to reconceptualizing the project of
employment law itself. Neither the exclusive market nor the
productive work approach provides a viable account of employment's
economic character. The former fails because even nominally "market"
relations always are embedded in the social, as sociologists and
historians of work and economic life have demonstrated
persuasively. 21 The productive work approach faces the opposite
problem. Linking employment's economic character to production
alone threatens to proliferate the employment relationship beyond all
(2002); Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 INVL
LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 56 (1995).
19. Dan Frosch, Inmates Will Replace Wary Migrants in Colorado Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 2007, § 1, at 25.
20. On the connections between compensation as a form of payment and bureaucratized,
impersonal employment relationships, see Viviana A. Zelizer, Payments and Social Ties, 11 Soc.
F. 481, 482-83 (1996).
21. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
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the boundaries between social contexts that the law seeks to recognize
and respect. As a matter of meaningful social categories, a worker is
not simply anyone who works.
22
Rather than attempting to solve the existing doctrinal puzzle
by choosing between the exclusive market and productive work
approaches, I argue for a different understanding of how employment
law relates to the social phenomenon of employment. In disputes over
employment status, courts take themselves to be deciding a question
of social fact. They must understand the contours of "employment" as
an extra-legal social category and decide whether the disputed
relationship falls inside or out. Against this view, I show that
employment law also is part of a constitutive legal environment.
23
The Article's second major contribution is to identify this
constitutive role for employment law with respect to the boundaries of
economic life.24 Rather than being external to the economy, law helps
produce employment and the labor market as social fields separate
from other types of relationships. 25 In other words, law does more than
give employment relationships a particular character. It produces
employment as a relationship both coherent unto itself and distinct
from others, coherent and distinct based on its economic character. In
doing so, however, employment law draws on and rearticulates extant
institutional forms and cultural categories. This is, in other words, a
story of "the endogeneity of both law and the economy.
26
Understanding employment law in this way runs counter to the usual
view of employment law as simply regulating a labor market that
exists, and exists as a market, prior to legal intervention.
22. This conclusion complicates arguments by feminist scholars, myself included, who seek
to restructure the legal treatment of nonmarket activities associated with the family by
characterizing them as productive work. See discussion infra Conclusions Part C.
23. Lauren B. Edelman & Robin Stryker, A Sociological Approach to Law and the Economy,
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note 16, at 527; Lauren B. Edelman & Mark
C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 1997 ANN. REV. SOC. 479.
24. As I discuss below, my account draws on but differs from those of other scholars,
primarily labor law historians, who have taken a similar approach to labor and employment law
during other historical moments and with regard to other aspects of the employment
relationship. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993).
25. My argument about the relationship between law and work is akin to analyses of the
relationship between law and race developed by legal scholars working in the Critical Race
Theory tradition. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (rev. ed. 2006); Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946 (2002); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
26. Edelman & Stryker, supra note 23, at 542.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces prison labor
and the conventional tools used to analyze employment status in
terms of control. It traces how courts have concluded that these tools
could not grapple with the problems presented by prisoners'
employment law claims. Part II shows how courts agree that prison
labor is employment only if it is an economic relationship but split
between exclusive market and productive work tests for this economic
character. Furthermore, it illustrates how the same pattern recurs
throughout employment law controversies over paid nonmarket work.
Part III demonstrates that neither the exclusive market nor the
productive work account is viable, although each provides important
insights. Part IV offers an alternative interpretation of the dispute
over employment's economic status, one in which there is no essential
feature that marks employment as an economic relationship. Instead,
employment is a contingent "relational package"27 that is the object of
ongoing struggle over its boundaries and constituent parts.
Employment law helps to bind that package and to differentiate it
from other relationships, in part by generating some of the very
features that courts label "economic."
Exactly how employment law ought to play this constitutive
role is a weighty normative question that I do not attempt to resolve
here. But part of what I show is how unavoidably normative this role
is; it implicates fundamental questions both about the purposes of
employment regulation and about maintaining the integrity of distinct
but interconnected relationships. These difficult normative questions
cannot be avoided by substituting an empirical inquiry into the
boundaries of the economy. I conclude with brief reflections on how to
address these problems and on the broader implications for
employment law, legal analysis of nonmarket work, and the regulation
of work more generally.
I. PRISON LABOR AND CONVENTIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAw ANALYSIS
This Article identifies and characterizes the economic
dimension of the employment relationship. As a preliminary step, this
Part shows how the traditional legal tools for analyzing employment
status perform only part of their task. It explains how courts began to
focus on employment's economic character in the course of deciding a
large number of prisoners' statutory employment claims since the
27. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 56-57.
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1980s.28 The traditional considerations of supervisory control and
statutory exceptions came up short. Most courts agreed that there
were differences between prison labor and ordinary employment-and
among forms of inmate labor-that sometimes indicated that no
employment relationship existed, even though there was sufficient
control and no applicable statutory exception. Importantly, courts
refused to hold that the law strips prisoners of protection simply
because they are prisoners. Instead, they sought answers in the
general nature of employment as a distinct type of social relationship.
Before tracing these doctrinal developments, I provide some basic
background information about prison labor in the contemporary
United States.
A. The Basic Contours of Contemporary Prison Labor
Although laments over the "idleness" of prisoners are not
uncommon, 29 well over 600,000, and probably close to a million,
inmates are working full time in jails and prisons throughout the
United States.30 Perhaps some of them built your desk chair: office
furniture, especially in state universities and the federal government,
is a major prison labor product. 31 Inmates also take hotel reservations
at corporate call centers, make body armor for the U.S. military, and
manufacture prison chic fashion accessories, in addition to the iconic
task of stamping license plates. 32
28. Methodological considerations drive my emphasis on prison labor, which has generated
far more decisions of employment status than other forms of paid nonmarket work. As a result,
courts have refined their approach in the.face of factual variations and open conflict over the
proper analysis. See infra Part II.
29. See Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners' Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 339-40 (1998);
Robert D. Atkinson, Prison Labor: It's More than Breaking Rocks, PROGRESSIVE POLY INST., May
2002, at 1, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/prison -labor_502.pdf.
30. One survey of state and federal prisons counts roughly 650,000 inmates at work,
approximately half of the total prison population. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., THE 2002
CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS 118, 124-25 (Camille Graham Camp ed., 2002).
The total would be approximately one million if similar proportions hold true in jails, where work
programs also exist. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
215092, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2005, at 2 (Nov. 2006),
available at http://www.ojp.govlbjs/pub/pdf/p05.pdf (local jail population of approximately
750,000); ROD MILLER ET AL., DEVELOPING A JAIL INDUSTRY: A WORKBOOK 1 (2002). Participation
has more than doubled in the federal system between 1985 and 2003; it has increased more
slowly in the states. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, supra, at 119; K. Daniel Glover, Inside Job,
NAT'L J., Apr. 10, 2004, at 1113.
31. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 30, at 126; Glover, supra note 30, at 1111; Prison
Industries Survey Summary, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Sept. 2002, at 8, 15-18.
32. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Best Western); GEORGE
E. SEXTON. WORK IN AMERICAN PRISONS 9-10 (1995) (TWA call center); David L. Teibel,
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These "prison industries"33-prison labor programs producing
goods or services sold to other government agencies or to the private
sector-are the highest-profile and most controversial form of prison
labor. Since roughly the New Deal era, prison industries have been
tightly regulated, most prominently through the Ashurst-Sumners
Act's criminal prohibition on the sale of inmate-produced goods in
interstate commerce. 34 Government purchasers always have been
exempted, however, 35 as part of the broader New Deal-era compromise
permitting prison labor for "state use."36 Limits on other purchases
gradually have relaxed over the past thirty years.3 7 Additionally, few
restrictions apply to the growing sale of services performed by
prisoners. 38 Today, prison industries generate $2 billion in revenue
annually.
39
Prison industries operate within a number of different
organizational forms. In the most common one, sometimes known as
the "state account" system, a government agency (usually within the
Prisoners Pound Out Purses As Gifts, TUCSON CITIZEN, Dec. 15, 2006, at 1A; Wayne Woolley,
Prisons'Military Gear Factories Take Flak, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 30, 2006, at 1.
33. See Prison Industries Survey Summary, supra note 31.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (Supp. II 2002).
35. Id. § 1761(b). Indeed, prison industries often receive preferential treatment in bidding
for government contracts. See Glover, supra note 30; Philip C. Mitchell, Federal Prison
Industries: Ending Their Mandatory Source Status, 83 MICH. B.J. 18, 21 (2004).
36. See ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR 160-68 (1996); Garvey, supra
note 29, at 344. But see Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35(c) (2000) (generally barring use of
convict labor in federal contracts for goods).
37. In 1979, Congress created the Private Industry Enhancement ("PIE") program that
allows unrestricted sale of goods produced by inmates under specified conditions. Justice System
Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 827(a), 93 Stat. 1215 (1979) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1761(c)). Originally authorized for only five jurisdictions, PIE expanded steadily to its current
size of 42 participating jurisdictions employing 5,579 inmates. NAT'L CORR. INDUS. ASS'N, PRISON
INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM: CERTIFICATION & COST ACCOUNTING
CENTER LISTING: STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, at 1 (2007),
available at http://www.nationalcia.org/quarterlydata.html; see SEXTON, supra note 32, at 3. In
1996, Congress removed all restrictions on prison production for sale to nonprofit organizations.
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 101(b)
(tit. I, § 136), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1761(b)). The federal government
promotes prison labor through its funding of research and technical assistance designed to assist
the establishment of new prison and jail industries. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 30, at iii
(describing government effort "to identify the range of practices in U.S. jails, learn about
successful programs and strategies, promote interest in the concept [of jail industries], and
provide new resources to help counties develop--or expand-industry efforts"). Much of this work
is done collaboratively with the National Correctional Industries Association, a trade
organization of corrections departments and private firms that operate prison industries. See
National Correctional Industries Association, http://www.nationalcia.org (last visited Mar. 16,
2008).
38. See, e.g., Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg.
17,000, 17,009 (Apr. 7, 1999) (explaining inapplicability of Ashurst-Sumners Act to services).
39. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 30, at 124-25.
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department responsible for operating the prison itself) wholly
manages the facility and work process, sells the products, and receives
the revenue. 40 An alternative "contract" system places these functions
within a private firm that operates the program pursuant to a contract
with the prison.4' The latter system was widespread in the nineteenth
century, largely disappeared by the early twentieth, and now seems to
be reemerging.
42
The most common, but least visible, form of prison labor is
what I term "prison housework." Prison housework is a subset of
"state use" in which a prison manages production and also consumes
its output, as inmates contribute directly to prison operations by
cooking meals, doing laundry, or cleaning the facilities.43 Inmates also
may be used directly by other units of the jurisdiction incarcerating
them, such as the Iowa prisoners who bake cookies for the Governor's
holiday parties and other events. 44 Placing a value on this work is
difficult, but one Kentucky county estimated that inmate labor saved
it $3 million during 2006.
45
Inmates working in these various programs typically are paid
by the day or the hour.46 Wage rates vary widely by program and
jurisdiction, but in 2002, the average statewide rates ranged from
$0.17 to $5.35 per hour.47 Thus, these rates almost always fall below
the federal minimum wage set by the Fair Labor Standards Act
40. See Garvey, supra note 29, at 344; Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program
Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. at 17,008 (describing "customer model" of private sector involvement in
prison industry); CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 30, at 125.
41. See Garvey, supra note 29, at 344; Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program
Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. at 17,008 (describing "employer model" of private sector involvement in
prison industry).
42. For a helpful review of the evolution of prison labor in the United States, see Garvey,
supra note 29. See also SEXTON, supra note 32, at 3; Gordon Lafer, Captive Labor: America's
Prisoners as Corporate Workforce, 46 AM. PROSPECT 66, 66 (1999); Robert P. Weiss,
"Repatriating" Low-Wage Work: The Political Economy of Prison Labor Reprivatization in the
Postindustrial United States, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 253-54, 260 (2001); Brian Hauck, Note,
Prison Labor, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 279-80, 286-87 (2000) (reviewing legislative initiatives
to allow private prison labor in New York and Wisconsin).
43. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 30, at 118. Approximately 550,000 inmates perform
this type of work. Id.
44. William Petroski, Iowa Prison Inmates Bake Up Yuletide Cheer, DES MOINES REG., Dec.
24, 2006, at lB.
45. Inmates Save County $3 Million, GRAYSON COUNTY NEWS-GAZETTE (Ky.), Apr. 2, 2007,
available at http://www.gcnewsgazette.com/articles/2007/04/O2/local-news/news9O.txt. Applying
the same methodology of attributing $7 per hour and estimating conservatively that 550,000
prison inmates work thirty-five hours a week, fifty weeks a year, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., supra
note 30, at 118, yields a very rough national estimate on the order of six to seven billion dollars
per year in prison housework.




("FLSA"); 48 often they are a bare sliver of it. 49 Inmates have observed
the discrepancy and sued. These suits put us on the road to the
economic dimension of employment because the FLSA guarantees
minimum wages only to "employees."
B. Prison Labor and the Control Dimension of Employment
Most controversies about employment status revolve around
the question of which person or organization, if any, exercises control
over the worker. 50 When someone works independently of any
employer's control, she is "in business for herself," an independent
48. 29 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2000).
49. In 2002, the federal minimum was $5.15 per hour. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HISTORY OF
FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE RATES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 1938-2007 (2007),
available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/chart.pdf. In the Kentucky county referenced above,
inmates received sixty-three cents per day. Inmates Save County $3 Million, supra note 45.
50. Most federal employment statutes contain brief, vague, and often circular definitions of
the related concepts of employee, employer, and employment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (f),
2000e-2(a) (2000) (forbidding "employers" from discriminating with regard to "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" or "otherwise adversely affect[ing] [a person's] status as an
employee," and defining an "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer" and an
employer as "a person... who has ... employees"). The Supreme Court has held that, absent
specific provisions to the contrary, such definitions incorporate the common-law test for
employment developed in agency law. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23
(1992). This test emphasizes "the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished." Id. at 323 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 751 (1989)); accord Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,
445-46 (2003). Also relevant are a nonexclusive list of additional factors:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.
The FLSA broadens the traditional agency definition by specifying that " 'employ' includes to
suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2000); accord Darden, 503 U.S. at 326. Nonetheless,
institutional control remains the touchstone under the FLSA. Control simply is understood more
broadly to encompass power over the basic economic terms of the relationship. See Zheng v.
Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (characterizing the requirement as one of
"functional control over workers even in the absence of... formal control"); Martinez-Mendoza v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1212 (11th Cir. 2003) (focusing on control as indicated by
"economic dependence"); see also Goldstein et al., supra note 5, at 1138; Lung, supra note 5.
Courts characterize this broader inquiry as focusing on the "economic reality" of the work
relationship. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1961); Brock v.
Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988). This catch phrase notwithstanding,
FLSA analysis of employee status typically proceeds by examining a non-exclusive list of factors,
most of which also appear in statements of the agency test. Compare Martinez-Mendoza, 340
F.3d at 1208-09, and Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469-70 (9th Cir.
1983), with Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
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contractor rather than an employee. 51 When multiple organizations
exercise power over one worker-such as a temporary staffing agency
and its client where the worker is placed-they may be "joint
employers." 52 The precise contours of these principles, and their
sometimes subtle variations between statutes,53 are the bread and
butter of litigation and scholarship concerning the existence of an
employment relationship.
54
These issues of control once provided the doctrinal basis for
courts' rejection of employment claims by inmate workers. Since the
1980s, however, courts have accepted that prison labor usually
satisfies the relevant tests for control. Therefore, the problem, if any,
with classifying prison labor as employment lies elsewhere.
Until the 1980s, inmates' employment claims usually alleged
FLSA minimum wage violations based on their work for a private
entity with commercial operations located on prison grounds.
Although unusual, this arrangement allowed inmates to name as the
defendant-employer a private entity rather than the government-run
prison. 55 Federal courts consistently analyzed these claims in terms of
the familiar issues of control. For decades, this analysis led to the
conclusion that no employment relationship existed.5 6 For instance, in
51. An employer may also lack control over a worker-thereby precluding an employment
relationship-when the worker herself controls the employer, as in the case of certain high-
ranking executives. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 451.
52. See Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973); Zheng, 355 F.3d at 61; Hunt v. Mo. Dep't
of Corr., 297 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2002); Bonnette, 704 F.2d. at 1469.
53. On the FLSA's "economic realities" test, see supra note 50.
54. See U.S. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 12
(1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key-workplace/2; sources cited supra
note 5. The debate in Europe is similar. See SUPIOT, supra note 7, at 14 (comparing employment
definitions based on "technical submission to someone else's orders in the performance of work"
with those based on "depending on that other person for one's livelihood").
55. Until 1974, most public entities were excluded from FLSA coverage by statute. Between
1976 and 1985, they were excluded by the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (relying on the Tenth Amendment to bar application of the FLSA to
state and local governments), which was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 533-34 (recounting history of
FLSA coverage of public employers). Until recently, prisons were almost exclusively operated by
public agencies, see generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE
L.J. 437, 455-58 (2005), and so before 1985 prisons were not proper FLSA defendants for the
same reasons as other public employers. Today, the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity ruling
in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), sharply limits suits against public prisons under the
FLSA and other employment statutes. Private prison operators and contractors, however,
remain amenable to suit and must rely on specific characteristics of prison labor to avoid
liability. See Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005).
56. See Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1991);
Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 721 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1983); Rhodes v. Schaefer, Civ. A. No. 98-
3323-GTV, 2002 WL 826471, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 2002); Young v. Cutter Biological, 694 F.
2008] PRISON LABOR 873
Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 57 a pharmaceutical research facility did
not employ its inmate workers because the firm could "exercise only
limited control over the inmates and [lacked] authority over hiring
and firing .... As prisoners, plaintiffs were ordered by prison
authorities to perform services for defendant drug companies, just as
they would be ordered to work in any other [state-use] prison
industry."58
Sims acknowledged, however, that "the inmates are supervised
by defendant drug companies in the day-to-day performance of their
work at the clinics," 59 ordinarily a very strong indicator of an
employment relationship. 60 This crack in the control analysis later
widened to a breach, and courts began to hold that prison labor did
satisfy the control test for employment.
The turning point came in 1984 with the Second Circuit's
opinion in Carter v. Dutchess Community College, the first reported
federal ruling in favor of an inmate worker. 61 In keeping with prior
case law, the district court had found no employment relationship
with the private entity (a community college) because the prison
retained "ultimate control" over the work situation.62 The appellate
court, however, objected that requiring "ultimate control" would
"permit[] an employer who exercises substantial control over a worker,
but whose hiring decisions occasionally may be subjected to a third
party's veto, to escape compliance with the [FLSA]. '"63 Instead, the
Supp. 651, 655-57 (D. Ariz. 1988); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 783-87 (E.D.
Mich. 1971), affl'd, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971); Hudgins v. Hart, 323 F. Supp. 898, 899 (E.D.
La. 1971); Huntley v. Gunn Furniture Co., 79 F. Supp. 110, 116 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
57. 334 F. Supp. 774. The inmates worked up to 112 hours per week performing clerical or
maintenance tasks for a pharmaceutical company that was testing drugs on other inmates; they
were paid between $0.35 and $1.25 per day. Id. at 779. At the time, the federal minimum wage
was in the vicinity of $1.25 per hour. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 49.
58. Sims, 334 F. Supp. at 783, 786. This analysis closely followed Huntley v. Gunn
Furniture Co., the first reported FLSA case involving inmate labor. 79 F. Supp. at 110. The
inmates in Huntley were forced to use a state-owned metal-stamping facility to produce shell
casings for a World War II defense contractor. Id. at 111. The court treated the contractor as
essentially a customer of the prison, reasoning that "plaintiffs were employees of the Michigan
prison industries and not of the defendant," because the contractor had "no contractual
relationship or personal dealings with the plaintiffs." Id. at 113, 116 (emphasis added).
59. Sims, 334 F. Supp. at 786.
60. See supra note 50. In nearly identical circumstances, the Fifth Circuit likewise noted
that "[o]n the surface, at least, [the private company's] relationship with the inmates appears to
have all the characteristics of an employment relationship, even though the state agency had the
ultimate authority over the inmates." Alexander, 721 F.2d at 150.
61. 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 14. As the court noted, such an "ultimate control" analysis is incompatible with
the doctrine of joint employment, which was growing in importance during this period. Id. at 12-
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court looked to "how many typical employer prerogatives are exercised
over the inmate by the outside employer, and to what extent" and held
that sufficient indicia of control existed for the plaintiffs claim to
survive summary judgment.
64
Carter's control analysis quickly gained adherents. Most
important was a 1990 opinion that has come to stand for the enduring
proposition that an employment relationship may exist when an
inmate works for a private firm as part of a work release program. In
Watson v. Graves, the Fifth Circuit found an FLSA employment
relationship where a Louisiana sheriff farmed out jail inmates to his
son-in-law's construction company at a rate of $20 a day; when not at
work they returned to the prison.65 Control analysis supported the
inmate's claim because the contractor "not only determined which
inmate would work for him, but also when, how frequently, how long,
and on what projects the inmate would work, as well as what specific
functions the inmate would perform."
66
Unlike Carter, however, Watson suggested that control was
necessary but not sufficient to establish an employment relationship. 67
In particular, the court distinguished, but did not reject, the earlier
cases that had held against inmate plaintiffs.68 It emphasized the
economic significance of inmate labor to the contractor and the local
construction industry by virtue of the labor's competitive impact:
[The defendant contractor] had at his disposal a 'captive' pool of workers whom he had
only to pay token wages .... Obviously, [other] construction contractors in the area
13 (citing Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1973)); see also Speedrack Prods. Group, Ltd. v.
N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting arguments that a prison's
"ultimate control" over inmates in work release program disqualified them from participating in
a union election at their worksite employer).
64. Carter, 735 F.2d at 14.
65. 909 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (5th Cir. 1990). The other case to follow Carter and rule for an
inmate was Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center, 859 F.2d 124, 128 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
Hale v. Arizona, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992) (following Carter), vacated en banc, 993 F.2d 1387
(9th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Carter). More recently, in another Louisiana case raising
suggestions of corruption, a court applied Watson to deny summary judgment against an inmate
FLSA plaintiff alleging that he had performed personal chores for the local mayor and
contributed labor to the police chiefs private businesses. See Williams v. City of DeQuincy, No.
2:04-CV-612, 2006 WL 3747449 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006), dismissed on other grounds 2007 WL
2736224 (W.D. La. July 19, 2007).
66. Watson, 909 F.2d at 1553. Applying a test for employment status widely followed in
FLSA cases addressing joint employment and independent contractor issues, the court asked
whether the putative employer "(1) has the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised
and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate
and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records." Id. (quoting Carter, 735 F.2d
at 12 (relying on Bonette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983))).
67. Id. at 1555-56.
68. Id.
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could not compete with [the defendant's] prices because they had to pay at least
minimum wage for even unskilled labor .... [J]ob opportunities for non-inmate workers
in the area [were] severely distorted by the availability of twenty dollar per day workers
from the parish jail.
6 9
One crucial feature connects the two lines of control analysis
discussed above, despite their opposite results. Neither treats the bare
fact that a worker is serving a criminal sentence as militating against
the existence of an employment relationship. 70 Incarceration affects
the nature and distribution of control, but these control features are
assessed against the standard applicable in employment cases
generally.
C. Prison Labor and Statutory Exclusions
Once Carter and Watson turned control analysis to inmate
workers' favor, courts began to question whether some other aspect of
incarceration sometimes might preclude an employment relationship.
One obvious place to look is another familiar feature of employment
law: the explicit statutory exclusion from legal protection of specific
work relationships that otherwise would qualify as employment.
Perhaps inmates simply have been carved out of statutory protection,
just as the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") excludes employees
performing agricultural or domestic work.
71
Shifting focus from control to exclusions would accomplish
little, however, because neither the FLSA nor any other major
employment statute specifically excludes prisoners from the
"employee" category. 72 Nor are there any broader statutory exclusions
69. Id. at 1555. Carter raised similar issues, though the court did not emphasize them. The
plaintiff complained after learning that, outside the prison, the college employed teaching
assistants at several times his sub-minimum wage. Carter, 735 F.2d at 11.
70. If anything, Watson's reference to a "captive" pool of workers suggests that the coercive
context of prison labor heightens the importance of employment law coverage. Watson, 909 F.2d
at 1555.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) ('The term 'employee'... shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home ... ").
72. Courts routinely acknowledge this point, even when they rely on other grounds to find
no employment relationship. See, e.g., Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1993) (en
banc). Nor do any provisions relieve prisons or other private prison industries of obligations as
employers. All government-operated prisons are covered as employers because they are state or
local governmental agencies. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s)(1)(C); see also supra note 55; cf. Pa. Dept. of
Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (allowing state prisoners to bring ADA Title II claims
against state prisons because the latter are "public entities"). Most privately operated prisons,
prison contractors, and work-program placement sites are covered based on the volume of
business that they conduct, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s)(1)(A).
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into which prisoners plausibly fall. 73 Bills to create such statutory
exclusions have been introduced in Congress, but none has become
law.
7 4
Because there are no explicit exclusions, courts from Carter
onward consistently have rejected the existence of a prisoner
exclusion. Vanskike, for instance, accepted that "prisoners are not
categorically excluded from the FLSA's coverage simply because they
are prisoners."76 Instead, employment law coverage turns simply on
73. In contrast, employment-related federal social insurance and antipoverty programs
typically do have specific provisions excluding prison labor from covered employment. See 26
U.S.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(iv) (2000) (excluding from "earnings" for EITC purposes any "amount
received for services provided by an individual while the individual is an inmate at a penal
institution"); 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(21) (excluding "service performed by a person committed to a
penal institution" from "employment" subject to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act); 42 U.S.C. §
410(a)(6), (a)(7)(D)(i), (a)(7)(E), (a)(7)(F)(ii) (2000) (same for Social Security purposes for service
performed for governmental entities); 42 U.S.C. § 418(c)(6)(B) (same for Medicare); see also 26
U.S.C. § 3121(b)(7)(F)(ii), (u)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (analogous provisions for wages subject to Social
Security and Medicare payroll taxes). The U.S. Department of Labor takes the position that
inmates working for private entities, including private prisons, are covered by Social Security.
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,000, 17,006
(Apr. 7, 1999). Prior to Congressional action in 1997, see Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-33, § 5406, 111 Stat. 251, 605 (1997) (enacting 26 U.S.C. § 3306), it took the same
position with regard to Unemployment Insurance. Letter from Armando Quiroz, Reg'l Adm'r of
the U.S. Dep't of Labor, to Alfred B. Lee, Chief Deputy Dir. of the Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't
(Sept. 6, 1995) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
74. Following the Ninth Circuit's panel decision applying the FLSA to inmate workers, Hale
v. Arizona, 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), Senator Reid introduced legislation to amend the
FLSA and bar such claims. S. 3160, 102d Cong. (1992). Reid and other legislators continued to
promote such an amendment even after the Ninth Circuit reversed course en banc, Hale, 993
F.2d 1387. S.J. Res. 63, 104th Cong. tit. 1, § 105 (1996) (section of appropriations bill); S. 1943,
104th Cong. (1996); S. amend, to H.R. 3755, 104th Cong. § 107 (1996) (amendment inserted by
Senate Appropriation Committee); H.R. 868, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 3705, 103d Cong. (1993);
S. amend. 705 to H.R. 2519, 103d Cong. (1993) (appropriations bill for judiciary); S. 1115, 103d
Cong. (1993); H.R. 5850, 102d Cong. (1992). None of these bills ever came to a vote before either
house of Congress. The bills faced opposition from organized labor and from some businesses
concerned about competition with inmate labor, and the U.S. Department of Labor also was
skeptical. Implications of the Fair Labor Standards Act for Inmates, Correctional Institutions,
Private Industry and Labor: Hearing on S. 1115 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 103d Cong. 26, 32, 40 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing]. In the early 1970s,
Representatives John Conyers, Ron Dellums, and Edward Roybal each introduced legislation
that would have granted inmate workers rights to the minimum wage and, in some cases, to
form labor unions. H.R. 7792, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 6745, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 16534, tit. II,
92d Cong. (1972). Rep. Dellums reintroduced his bill in each session through 1981. H.R. 2583,
93d Cong., 119 CONG. REC. 1759 (1973) (introduced Jan. 22); H.R. 2803, 94th Cong. (1975), 121
CONG. REC. 2430 (introduced Feb. 2); H.R. 341, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 351 (1977)
(introduced Jan. 4); H.R. 256, 96th Cong., 125 CONG. REC. 439 (1979) (introduced Jan. 15); H.R.
4833, 97th Cong.,127 CONG. REC. 19,565 (1981) (introduced Aug. 4). None of these bills advanced
beyond committee.
75. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992).
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whether inmates satisfy the general definition of "employee." 76 This
reflects a broader pattern of insisting that only an explicit exclusion
can remove from coverage someone who otherwise qualifies as an
employee.7 7 Courts avoid ad hoc exceptions based on context-specific
consideration of the statute's policy goals.78 In other words, courts
reject a "purposive"79  approach to defining the employment
relationship and take a "descriptive" one instead.
80
76. Id. at 807-08 & n.2; accord McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994);
Hale, 993 F.2d at 1393-95; Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993); Watson
v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1555 (5th Cir. 1990); Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d
Cir. 1984).
77. See Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950) ("[S]pecificity in stating
exemptions strengthens the implication that employees not thus exempted ... remain within the
Act."); cf. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 524 U.S. at 209 (applying Title II of the ADA to claims by state
prisoners against state prisons based, in part, on the absence of any statutory exceptions).
78. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1992). It is widely
believed, for instance, that the policy rationale for a minimum wage does not a apply to a teenage
worker living in the household of wealthy parents, but there is no question that nonetheless such
workers are protected so long as they are employees and subject only to statutory modifications
in coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(g) (allowing temporary subminimum wage for teenage
employees). The FLSA did not treat teenage employees differently from other employees until
1989. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-157, § 6, 103 Stat. 941
(1989) (providing for a "training wage").
79. Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal
Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2318-19 (1998) (contrasting purposive and descriptive
approaches to legal categorization); Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death are Greatly
Exaggerated: 'Employee' As A Viable (Though Over-Used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND
FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 5, at 133, 151-52 (criticizing U.S. employment law for
rejecting a purposive approach). Under the NLRA, the NLRB acts as an independent agency that
interprets the Act in the first instance through administrative procedures, and it has shown
greater willingness to engage in purposive forms of interpretation than have the courts under
other statutes. See discussion infra Part III.A.4.
80. Some readers have suggested to me that Congress so obviously could not have intended
employment law protections for inmates that an explicit exclusion would have been superfluous.
Courts ruling against inmate workers sometimes sympathize with that view, but never rely upon
it. Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 409 (7th Cir. 2005); Hale, 993 F.2d at 1398; Gilbreath v.
Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1991). This position founders on the well-
established applicability of the FLSA to work release programs under Watson, a result endorsed
by the U.S. Department of Labor and even by those members of Congress who have advocated
amending the FLSA to limit coverage of inmate workers. Watson, 909 F.2d at 1556; H.R. 3755,
104th Cong. § 107 (1996) (Senate version reported out of Appropriations Committee and
incorporating language from S. 1943, 104th Cong. (1996)); Hearings, supra note 74, at 11-12
(statement of Maria Echaveste, Wage and Hour Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Labor). Indeed, in enacting
the PIE program, see supra note 37, Congress apparently anticipated that inmates could be
employees and took care to preserve that possibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(3) (2000) (providing
that participants "have not solely by their status as offenders, been deprived of the right to
participate in benefits made available by the Federal or State Government to other individuals
on the basis of their employment, such as workmen's compensation"). Because coverage of at
least some prisoners is widely accepted, some explanation is owed as to why exclusion of other
prisoners is self-evident, and how to identify the line between these classes.
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A descriptive approach treats the legal category of employment
as having the same content as an extra-legal category of social
relations. Thus, whether someone is an employee is simply a matter of
social fact, absent technical modifications. For example, the FLSA
provides that the statutory term "employee" excludes "employee[s] in
the legislative branch or legislative body."8 1 The structure of this
provision implies that, descriptively, a member of a state legislator's
paid staff ordinarily would be an employee in the general,
nontechnical sense. Starting from that baseline, certain employees
next are removed from the technical statutory definition by explicit
congressional action.82 Thus, if the general descriptive category is
inadequate for Congress's purposes, it falls to Congress to modify the
definition.
The structure of such definitions makes clear that "employee"
is not simply a label attached by courts after they have decided who
should be covered by the statute, as would be the case under a
purposive approach. Instead, "employment" captures some coherent
extra-legal relationship that the statute means to regulate. That is
why statutes use the ordinary language term "employment," rather
than some legalistic jargon, and why courts sometimes look to
dictionaries for help in defining the word.8 3 In Part IV, I criticize this
Underlying the claim of self-evident exclusion is the assumption that FLSA coverage is tied
to the moral desert and economic need of putative employees. Cf. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil,
324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945) (characterizing the FLSA's purpose as "to aid the unprotected,
unorganized and lowest paid of the nation's working population; that is, those employees who
lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage"). The
difficulty is that other rationales for the FLSA also exist. See, e.g., Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v.
Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36 (1987) ("While improving working conditions was undoubtedly one of
Congress' concerns, it was certainly not the only aim of the FLSA. In addition. .. , the Acto
reflects Congress' desire to eliminate the competitive advantage enjoyed by goods produced
under substandard conditions."); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 592 (1944) (characterizing the FLSA as "a statute that is intended to secure to ['human
beings'] the fruits of their toil and exertion"). See generally Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of
Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19 (2000). Once these
considerations are added to the mix, it is far from obvious what conclusion policymakers would
draw. This indeterminacy is part of what led the Supreme Court in Darden to eschew a
purposive approach. See 503 U.S. at 326-27.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(ii)(V) (2006); see also id. § 213(a)(8) (removing from FLSA
protection "any employee employed in connection with the publication of any weekly, semiweekly,
or daily newspaper with a circulation of less than four thousand" (emphasis added)).
82. Such a two-part definition of employment is like a statute that defines "animal" as "any
animal other than a service animal being used by an individual with a disability." "Animal" is a
category that comes to law from outside, notwithstanding subsequent legal tweaking. Cf. 28
C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(1) (2006) (forbidding, under the ADA, a "no pets" policy that excludes service
animals).
83. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995); see also
Darden, 503 U.S. at 327 (characterizing common law definitions of employment as reflecting
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descriptive approach, but it plays an important role in how courts seek
to determine employment status.
D. Moving Beyond Control and Exclusions
Once neither control nor statutory exclusions prevent inmate
labor's classification as employment, two possibilities remain. First,
inmate labor generally could qualify as employment, contrary to the
results of the pre-Carter case law. Second, inmate labor in such cases
might not qualify as employment, but for some reason neither
previously articulated nor applicable to cases like Watson in which
inmates were employees. Courts have followed this second path.
Before charting this path, however, it is instructive to follow
the first one to see how far reaching cases like Watson and Carter
could be. Consider the facts of Vanskike v. Peters, the Seventh Circuit
opinion that reversed the tide in favor of inmate claims.8 4 The inmate-
plaintiff was forced to perform janitorial, kitchen, and garment work
in the Illinois Department of Corrections facility in which he was
incarcerated; his work was assigned, managed, and consumed by the
prison.8 5 This sort of prison housework generally is seen as the
weakest candidate for employment among all forms of prison labor.
Under a control analysis, however, the case for employee status is
even easier than in Watson or Carter because there is no division of
control between the prison and a third party.8 6 Between the presence
of control and the absence of a statutory exclusion, these
considerations suggest that the employment relationship includes
prison labor in almost all of its forms.
Indeed, a similar analysis carried the day in like circumstances
involving work performed by people involuntarily institutionalized
based on their mental or developmental disabilities. As of the early
1970s, tens of thousands of such individuals worked for a pittance or
without any pay at all, providing their institutions with food service,
cleaning, and building maintenance.8 7 The parallels with Vanskike-
style prison housework are manifold: involuntary confinement,
"common understanding"); see also SUPIOT, supra note 7, at 5 ('The general principle, applied
everywhere, is that ascertaining whether or not a given worker is self-employed [rather than
employed] is contingent not upon the existence of a conventional arrangement, but rather on the
circumstances actually prevailing.").
84. 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 806.
86. Id. at 808-10.
87. See Paul R. Friedman, Comment, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and Institutional
Labor, 87 HARv. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1974).
2008] 879
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
involuntary work, work controlled by the confining institution, work
performed inside that institution and in support of its operations, and
work performed by a stigmatized and subordinated population.
88
Litigation established that an FLSA employment relationship
existed between mental institutions and their patient-workers. 89 As in
Vanskike, the leading decision of Souder v. Brennan refused to imply
an exclusion where none existed in the statute, and sufficient control
clearly was present.90 At this point, the court decided that the only
remaining question was whether the plaintiffs were engaged in
"work."91 It answered "yes" because "many of the patient-workers
perform[ed] work for which they [were] in no way handicapped and
from which the institution derive[d] full economic benefit."92 The U.S.
Department of Labor later codified Souder's analysis in regulations
that remain in force.
93
Souder thus made explicit something that Watson had only
suggested: The institutional context of inmate or patient labor could
defeat the existence of an employment relationship, but not because of
inadequate control or an implied exclusion. Instead, that context at
least raised the question whether the activity subjected to control was
work. Souder answered that question affirmatively by finding
"consequential economic benefit" to the employing institution,
notwithstanding any therapeutic value the activity also might have
had for the patient-worker. 94 Watson similarly had emphasized how
economically valuable the inmates' labor was to the employing
construction contractor, though it did not articulate the doctrinal
significance of this fact.
95
The institutionalized workers in Souder provide a close analogy
to inmate workers. The one clear factual distinction is the civil, rather
88. These parallels are a particular instance of the widely recognized similarities between
institutions of penal and medical confinement. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum
to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2006).
89. Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 449 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Souder v. Brennan, 367
F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.D.C. 1973); see also Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (endorsing these cases, but distinguishing civil confinement of sex offenders following
completion of a criminal sentence).
90. 367 F. Supp. at 812-13. But see Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 408 (Ind. 1991)
(doubting "that Congress intended to require states to pay patients in mental hospitals").
91. Souder, 367 F. Supp. at 813 (defining "employ" as including "to suffer or permit to work"
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2000))).
92. Id.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 525.4 (2006).
94. Souder, 367 F. Supp. at 813.
95. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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than criminal, basis for confinement. Inmate status, however, is
precisely the factor on which courts since Carter have refused to rely.
96
A clear argument for inmate employee status thus begins with
work release in cases like Watson and extends all the way to prison
housework in cases like Vanskike and, by analogy, Souder. The
argument relies on the traditional employment considerations of
control and statutory exclusions, and it adds a refinement limiting
employment to economically valuable work. In this way, Watson need
not be read as an exceptional case. Real conceptual work must be done
to limit its wider application.
The Seventh Circuit took up this task of limiting Watson when,
in Vanskike, it produced the first ruling against inmate workers that
eschewed reliance on control issues.97 After acknowledging that
conventional analysis of control and exclusions pointed in the
plaintiffs favor, the court set off in search of a sound theory for why
"9our common linguistic intuitions ... are at least strained by the
classification of prisoners as 'employees' of [the prison]. '"98 Control
analysis, the court reasoned, addresses "just one boundary of the
definition of 'employee,' and we are concerned with a different
boundary."99 Accepting Vanskike's basic approach, subsequent courts
have devoted nearly all their efforts to mapping this "different
boundary" and no longer treat control as an obstacle to classifying
inmate workers as employees. 100 The next Part analyzes these efforts.
96. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
97. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1992).
98. Id. at 807. Note again the invocation of ordinary, nonlegalistic meanings.
99. Id. at 810.
100. The shift away from control analysis was hastened by the rise of cases in which inmate
workers sued prison authorities directly, rather than private entities. Previously, courts had
used the prison's extensive control over inmates' work as a factor weighing against finding an
employment relationship with a private entity. See discussion supra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text. Once inmates named the prison as the employer, however, this control began
to weigh in favor of finding an employment relationship. Issues of control may continue to be
relevant when inmates work under the direct supervision and control of a non-prison entity but
the prison controls who participates in the program and how much the inmates are paid. See,
e.g., Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1996); Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); SEXTON, supra note 32. In such circumstances, the prison performs functions
analogous to those of a temporary placement agency. This division of control between the two
entities might put into question the employer status of either one for reasons analogous to those
that arise in "triangular employment" outside the prison context. See Lafer, supra note 42, at 67
(noting the analogy to temp agencies); Weiss, supra note 42, at 275 (same).
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II. EMPLOYMENT'S DISPUTED ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Employment involves something more than the presence of
employer control and the absence of a statutory exception. This Part
shows that courts also rest employment status on the existence of an
economic relationship. They are, however, of two minds about what
constitutes this economic character. The difference is outcome
determinative.
In the prison labor context, courts generally rely on an
"exclusive market" view of employment's economic character and use
it to classify inmate work as noneconomic. They do so because prison
labor does not fit a paradigm of discrete, financially motivated market
transactions that are independent of any other relationship between
the parties. Under the exclusive market view, the inability to separate
inmate labor from the institutional context of the prison renders it a
nonmarket relationship, and thus a noneconomic relationship, and
thus not an employment relationship. Cases rejecting inmates' claims
for minimum wages under the FLSA develop this analysis most
fully,10 1  but decisions under other statutes adopt the same
approach. 102
101. The following are all the reported cases, as of April 2008, in which inmate FLSA claims
failed for lack of an employment relationship: Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam); Adams v. Neubauer, 195 Fed. Appx. 711 (10th Cir. 2006); Bennett v. Frank, 395
F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2005); Hill v. Johnson, 2000 WL 294051, 210 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (table); Cook v. Lehman, 1999 WL 638647, 188 F.3d 512 (9th Cir. 1999) (table); Rawlins
v. Arizona Dep't of Corr., 1998 WL 231130, 152 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1998) (table); Gambetta v.
Prison Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1997); Nicastro
v. Reno, 84 F.3d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Burleson v. California, 83 F.3d 311 (9th Cir. 1996);
Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1996); Reimonenq, 72 F.3d 472; Phillips v.
Mondragon, 76 F.3d 393, No. 95-2152, 1996 WL 47423 (10th Cir. 1996); Gibson v. Kronzer, 1995
WL 150568, 51 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (table); Jovanovich v. Angelone, 1995 WL 378678, 59
F.3d 175 (9th Cir. 1995) (table); Larum v. Silver State Indus., 1995 WL 29484, 46 F.3d 1142 (9th
Cir. 1995) (table); Seleen v. County of Spokane, 73 F.3d 370, 1995 WL 766268 (9th Cir. 1995)
(table); Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994); McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976
(8th Cir. 1994); Henthorn, 29 F.3d 682; Franks v. Okla. State Indus., 7 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 1993);
Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d
131 (4th Cir. 1993); Vanskike, 974 F.2d 806; Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320
(9th Cir. 1991); Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 721 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Wentworth v.
Solem, 548 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Emory v. United States, 2 C1. Ct. 579 (1983);
Kavazanjian v. Naples, No. 06-CV-3390, 2006 WL 2795220 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006); Lockett v.
Neubauer, No. 05-3209-SAC, 2005 WL 3557780 (D. Kan. Dec. 28, 2005); George v. SC Data Ctr.,
Inc., 884 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Wis. 1995); George v. Badger State Indus., 827 F. Supp. 584 (W.D.
Wis. 1993); Young v. Cutter Biological, 694 F. Supp. 651 (D. Ariz. 1988); Worsley v. Lash, 421 F.
Supp. 556 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd,
453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Hudgins v. Hart, 323 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. La. 1971);
Huntley, 79 F. Supp. 110; Lavigne v. Sara, Inc., 424 So. 2d 273 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
102. The following are all the reported cases, as of April 2008, in which inmate employment
claims have failed under federal statutes other than the FLSA and under state analogues to the
[Vol. 61:3:857
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The competing "productive work" approach to employment's
economic character rises to the fore in the smaller body of cases in
which courts do classify inmate labor as employment.103 These
opinions find an economic relationship because the putative employer
benefits economically from inmates' labor, either by selling the
resulting goods and services or by avoiding the hiring of other
workers.
Furthermore, this conflict over employment's economic
character recurs throughout statutory employment law whenever
institutions organize work in ways that do not fit easily into a market
paradigm. Some examples include work integrated into graduate
education, welfare receipt, and vocational rehabilitation, as well as
work performed by individuals institutionalized under legal authority
other than a criminal sentence. 10 4 In these other contexts, too, courts
FLSA: Banks v. Roberts, No. 1:06-CV-01232, 2007 WL 1574771 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2007) (relying
on lack of FLSA coverage to dismiss claims under the False Claims Act and the Federal Tort
Claims Act); Wade v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 171 Fed.Appx. 601, No. 05-15653, 2006 WL 701135 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Title VII); Battle v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 40 Fed.Appx. 308, No. 02-1599, 2002 WL
1370059 (8th Cir. 2002) (ADA); Portley-El v. Zavaras, 188 F.3d 519, No. 99-1028, 1999 WL
542631 (10th Cir. July 27, 1999) (Title VII); Coupar v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 105 F.3d 1263 (9th
Cir. 1997) (whistleblower claim under Clean Air and Toxic Substances Control Acts); Williams v.
Meese, 926 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Kounelis v. Sherrer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.N.J.
2005) (New Jersey whistleblower statute); Rhodes v. Schaefer, No. 98-3323-GTV, 2002 WL
826471 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 2002) (Title VII); McCaslin v. Cornhusker Indus., 952 F. Supp. 652 (D.
Neb. 1996) (Title VII); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (ADA); Walton v. Fed.
Prison Indus., No. 89-3257-R, 1991 WL 126708 (D. Kan. June 13, 1991) (Title VII); Harris v.
Yeager, 291 F. Supp. 1015 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam)
(challenging prison control over disposition of earnings from prison labor); McGinnis v. Stevens,
543 P.2d 1221 (Ala. 1975) (analyzing Alaska minimum wage statute using FLSA standards);
Manville v. Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ., 272 N.W.2d 162 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
(Michigan minimum wage statute); Pettis v. Danzig, EEOC Dec. No. 1964038 (Mar. 2, 1999)
(Title VII); EEOC Dec. No. 86-7, Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 6865 (CCH) (Apr. 18, 1986) (Title VII).
103. Although there are no reported cases involving a final judgment in favor of an inmate
worker on a federal statutory employment claim, the following decisions have held at the Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal or Rule 56 summary judgment stages that an employment relationship could
be established on the facts of the case: Barnett v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc., No. 98-3625,
1999 WL 110547, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999) (FLSA); Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir.
1990) (FLSA); Baker v. McNeil Island Corr. Ctr., 859 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1988) (Title VII); Carter
v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984) (FLSA); Williams v. City of DeQuincy, No.
2:04-CV-612, 2006 WL 3747449 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006) (FLSA), dismissed on other grounds
2007 WL 2736224 (W.D. La. July 19, 2007); Walker v. City of Elba, 874 F. Supp. 361 (M.D. Ala.
1994) (Title VII); Cleveland v. Iowa, No. CL 82312, 2001 WL 888718 (Iowa Dist. Ct. July 12,
2001) (Title VII). A long line of precedent under the NLRA assumes that inmates working for
private employers through work release programs are employees and holds that they may
participate in NLRB-supervised union elections. See Speedrack Prods. Group, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B.,
114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But see Rosslyn Concrete Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 713 F.2d
61, 63 (4th Cir. 1983) (reserving judgment on the issue of NLRA employee status).
104. A number of FLSA cases apply prison labor precedents to deny claims by individuals
who were not serving a criminal sentence. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236 (3d Cir.
1999) (pre-trial detention); Villarreal v. Woodman, 113 F.3d 202 (11th Cir. 1997) (pre-trial
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find themselves torn between the exclusive market and productive
work approaches.
Insistence on an economic relationship-and uncertainty about
what that entails-is a robust feature of employment law, as
fundamental to employment status as the familiar element of control.
In most employment disputes, however, this economic element is not
controverted, and, perhaps for that reason, scholars and courts have
not recognized this dimension of employment.105 Work at the
boundaries of markets brings the issue to the fore, and recognizing
this dispute over employment's economic character allows us to see
the continuity between controversies previously regarded as distinct.
A. Prison Labor as Noneconomic: The Exclusive Market Approach
The case of Larry George'0 6 illustrates the exclusive market
approach to drawing the "different boundary" of the employment
relationship invoked by Vanskike,10 7 the boundary between economic
and noneconomic relationships. George worked in Racine, Wisconsin
for Badger State Industries ("BSI"), the trade name of Wisconsin
Prison Industries. BSI held a data entry subcontract from SC Data
Center, a private firm that was an information services contractor for
Swiss Colony, Inc., a Wisconsin mail order company. George and his
co-workers entered written catalog requests and customer orders into
a computer. Work at BSI was organized in ways characteristic of a
traditional firm: job applications, interviews and typing tests, a
probationary period, opportunities for performance-based promotion
and pay increases, disciplinary demotions or terminations, time
clocks, and time-and-a-half pay for overtime. The base rate of pay,
detention); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (post-incarceration civil
commitment for sex offenders); Alvarado Guevara v. I.N.S., 902 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (immigration detention); Shaw v. Briody, No. 2:02CV500FTM-33SPC, 2005 WL 2291711
(M.D. Fla. 2005) (post-incarceration civil commitment for sex offenders). But see Weidenfeller v.
Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (commitment to mental health facilities); Souder v.
Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973) (same).
105. My analysis in terms of control and economic dimensions bears a close resemblance to
the typology of work developed by Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly in their masterful book, Work
Under Capitalism (1998). They place all forms of work in a two-dimensional space defined by
dimensions of "time-discipline" and "short-term monetization" and identify employment with
high levels of both. Id. at 30-31. They do not, however, apply their model to forms of paid
nonmarket work like those considered here, and their definition of "short-term monetization"-
"extent to which workers invest effort, or fail to do so, contingent on the prospect of monetary
compensation in the immediate future"-is ambiguous on precisely the point that courts find so
analytically confounding. Id. at 30. See discussion infra notes 292-293 (discussing ambiguities in
the concept of "compensation").
106. George v. SC Data Ctr., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
107. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807 (7th Cir. 1992).
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however, was only $1 per hour, and George sued for FLSA minimum
wage violations.
George's lawsuit named both BSI and SC Data Center as
defendants, but the district court held that neither organization had
an employment relationship with George.108 SC Data Center was not
George's employer for reasons sounding in control: it was simply BSI's
customer and lacked a direct relationship with George. BSI, not SC
Data Center, owned the equipment on which and premises where
George worked, set his pay and schedule, supervised his work, and so
on. In short, SC Data Center did not employ George because BSI
possessed all the traditional indicia of employer status based on
control.
Yet the court held that George was not employed by BSI either,
notwithstanding its control. What stood in the way was "the
essentially penological nature of labor performed by prisoners for a
prison." This penological character negated an essential feature of
employment, the 'bargained-for exchange of labor for consideration."'
This language and reasoning came directly from Vanskike, where the
Seventh Circuit had held that prisoners were "not in a true economic
employer-employee relationship."10 9
Since Vanskike, courts rejecting employment protections for
inmate workers have treated imprisonment and employment as
fundamentally irreconcilable social positions. They are incompatible
because they are located in two separate spheres: the prison and the
economy. Incarceration represents entry into a "separate world of the
prison," such that "[p]risoners are essentially taken out of the national
economy."
11 0
Courts elaborate this distinction between the economic practice
of employment and the penal practice of inmate labor by identifying
economic relationships with contractual relationships. The penal
context is portrayed as inhospitable to contract. This incompatibility
with contract can be broken into three components: first, there is no
"free contract" when prison labor is involuntary; second, there cannot
be a contract when there is no exchange between the parties; third,
whatever exchange exists fails to take the distinctively contractual
form of a discrete bargain.
108. This paragraph and the next reference George, 884 F. Supp. at 329, 332-34.
109. Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 810 & n.5; see also Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994)




Inmates obviously face coercion of a different order than
conventional employees."' Courts denying employment status are
quick to invoke this difference. When the distinctively coercive
character of the work environment becomes questionable, however,
they have been reluctant to reach a different result. Instead, coercion
becomes a proxy for a deeper problem: inmate labor is ineradicably
embedded in a penal institution.
"Free labor" long has been associated with contractual
employment and opposed to chattel slavery and other bound labor. 1
2
Prison inmates have a unique constitutional status under the
Thirteenth Amendment, which bans "slavery or involuntary servitude
except as a punishment for crime."113 Plausibly, this unique situation
might influence inmates' employment status. As one court put it,
"[T]he FLSA presupposes a free-labor situation constrained by the
Thirteenth Amendment."1'
4
But why would the FLSA protect only those protected by the
Thirteenth Amendment? Congress, after all, could provide a statutory
right to compensation even though the Constitution does not require
it.115 Contract provides this connection between voluntariness and
employment. 16 A prisoner has not "freely contracted.., to sell his
labor" when he has been "legally compelled to part with his labor as
111. But cf. DARIO MELOSSI & MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND THE FACTORY: ORIGINS
OF THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM 188 (Glynis Cousin trans., Barnes & Noble Books 1981) (1977)
(arguing that this distinction is "subtle" because "for the worker the factory is like a prison" and
"for the inmate the prison is like a factory").
112. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 160-62 (2007); STANLEY,
supra note 3, at 76; JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 33-36 (2004); Lea S. Vandervelde,
The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438 (1989).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; see also Colin Fenwick, Private Use of Prisoners' Labor:
Paradoxes of International Human Rights Law, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 249, 279-82 (2005) (examining
analogous penal exception to bans on involuntary servitude in international human rights
instruments). On the constitutionality of involuntary prison labor, see Loving v. Johnson, 455
F.3d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2001);
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809-10; Murray v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 911 F.2d 1167, 1167-68 (5th Cir.
1990) (per curiam); Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1988); Sigler v. Lowrie, 404
F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1968); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1963); Sims v.
Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 793 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 365, 369-72 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af/'d, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971).
114. Villarreal v. Woodman, 113 F.3d 202, 206 (11th Cir. 1997).
115. Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809-10.
116. Fenwick, supra note 6, at 302-05.
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part of a penological work assignment."117 In such circumstances, he is
not an employee but "truly an involuntary servant"118 whose labor
arises not out of contract but instead as "part of [his] sentence[] of
incarceration."'1 9 Involuntariness, in other words, is a marker of a
relationship that arises out of the institutions of punishment, not the
institutions of the labor market.
If involuntariness bears much weight, then there should be no
barrier to employment status for voluntary work by inmates.1 20 A few
cases have suggested this,1 21 but more often courts back away from a
Thirteenth Amendment involuntariness standard when adhering to it
would cut in inmates' favor. 122 For instance, a number of cases invoke
"involuntariness" to deny employee status in circumstances that
would not be considered "involuntary" under the Thirteenth
Amendment.1 23 In one scenario, inmates are required to work but have
117. Henthorn v. Dep't. of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
118. Id.
119. Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 810.
120. Additionally, other forms of involuntary labor would fall outside FLSA protections, but
instead the FLSA has been applied to involuntary work. See Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344 F.
Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (finding that workers were FLSA employees in a case
alleging human trafficking); Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1294 (N.D. Okla.
2006) (subsequently finding both FLSA violations and false imprisonment); Manliguez v. Joseph,
226 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384-85, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (allowing FLSA and Thirteenth Amendment
claims to proceed together in case brought by domestic worker); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F.
Supp. 445, 449-51 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (allowing FLSA and Thirteenth Amendment claims to
proceed together in case brought by residents of mental institution); KATHLEEN KIM & DANIEL
WERNER, CIVIL LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 29-41 (2005),
available at http://www.lafla.org/clientservices/specialprojects/VictimsTrfficking04O5.pdf
(discussing FLSA claims for victims of human trafficking).
121. See Henthorn, 29 F.3d at 686 (relying on involuntariness to find no employment and
distinguishing contrary cases as involving voluntary labor by inmates); Vanskike, 974 F.2d at
808-10 & nn.4-5 (same); see also Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554-56 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding employment status and distinguishing contrary cases as involving involuntary labor);
Hale v. Arizona, 967 F.2d 1356, 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1992) (same), vacated en banc 993 F.2d 1387
(9th Cir. 1993).
122. One condition of the PIE program, see discussion supra note 37, is that inmates
participate voluntarily. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(4) (Supp. II 2002). Nonetheless, both case law and
the applicable administrative guidelines suggest that PIE participation is not necessarily
employment. See Hale, 993 F.2d at 1397 (denying employee status to PIE participant); Prison
Industry Enhancement Certification Program Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,000, 17,008 (Apr. 7,
1999) (stating that payment of a minimum wage is not intended to imply that inmate workers
are employees).
123. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944, 952 (1988) (requiring "physical or
legal coercion" for involuntariness, and rejecting a broader standard based on the worker's lack
of meaningful choice). The Kozminski standard does appear to have been met in some cases
denying employee status on involuntariness grounds. See Henthorn, 29 F.3d at 683; see also
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 807 (characterizing inmate work as "forced labor"); McCaslin v.
Cornhusker State Indus., 952 F. Supp. 652, 654-55 (D. Neb. 1996).
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some choice over how they fulfill this requirement. 124 In another, the
prison does not require work but sometimes may prevent it.125 In these
circumstances, courts still find coercion one or two steps removed from
the particular job at issue. 126 Because the prisoner is "in no sense free
to bargain with would-be employers for the sale of his labor[,] his work
at the prison was merely an incident of his incarceration."
'1 27
Once the issue becomes whether the work was simply "an
incident of incarceration," voluntariness ceases to do analytical work
of its own. 128 Recognizing this, when faced with inmates pressing
strong arguments that their work was voluntary, some courts have
dispensed with an involuntariness criterion altogether. Instead, they




Again invoking contract, courts deciding prison labor claims
frequently identify employment with a "bargained-for exchange of
124. For instance, the plaintiff in Morgan v. MacDonald "chose to fulfill" his labor
requirement by working as a computer technician for the prison educational center run by a local
community college. 41 F.3d 1291, 1292 (9th Cir. 1994). The Thirteenth Amendment bars only
employer-specific coercion. Criminal sanctions for refusal to work do not give rise to involuntary
servitude when individuals retain choice among employers. See Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d
59, 66-67 (Cal. 1998) (upholding criminal contempt conviction based on failure to hold
employment while subject to child support order, and noting that order did not bind the parent to
any particular employment or type of employment); see also United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d
871 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding constitutionality of criminal conviction for failure to maintain
employment as required by a child support order).
125. George v. Badger State Indus., 827 F. Supp. 584, 588 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
126. Burleson v. California, 83 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the relevance of the
"voluntary nature of [the] assignment" primarily because the "consensual nature of a particular
work assignment in a hard-labor state does not remove the penological purpose from the work
relationship"); Morgan, 41 F.3d at 1293.
127. Morgan, 41 F.3d at 1293; George, 827 F. Supp. at 588 ("[L]abor performed in the prison
for the prison or even for a separate state entity operated by the Department of Corrections is
labor performed as part of a sentence of incarceration."). Contra Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524
U.S. 206, 211 (1998) (characterizing prisoners as participating in some prison activities
voluntarily).
128. Indeed, Robert Steinfeld persuasively argues that this problem plagues the
voluntary/involuntary distinction more generally. STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 239 ("[F]ree labor
is a political and moral conclusion (or a legal or constitutional one) rather than a thing, a
conclusion, moreover, that is subject to revision.").
129. See Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that voluntary work
"serves all of the penal functions of forced labor... and, therefore, should not have a different
legal status under the FLSA"); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding voluntariness irrelevant where "[i]nmates perform work for SUI not to turn profits for
their supposed employer, but rather as a means of rehabilitation and job training," and therefore
the prison has "a rehabilitative, rather than pecuniary, interest in [the inmate worker's] labors").
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labor for consideration"130 in which "[an inmate] and the prison...
contract with one another for mutual economic gain."131 This subpart
considers how prison labor might lack any exchange whatsoever; the
next subpart will address the specific bargain form of exchange
required in contract.
First, there might be no exchange if the inmate's efforts lack
economic value to the employer. 132 Courts frequently characterize
inmate labor as fundamentally rehabilitative and educative and,
therefore, not employment: "Inmates perform work for [the prison
industry] not to turn profits for their supposed employer, but rather as
a means of rehabilitation and job training [for themselves]."133 Insofar
as this statement speaks to the effects of inmates' work and not solely
to its purpose, the implication is that the prison got nothing out of the
arrangement.
134
Rather than focusing on whether employers receive something
of value, however, courts often conflate that issue with questions of
purpose. Thus, they conclude that rehabilitative effects on inmates
imply that the "[putative employer] has a rehabilitative, rather than
pecuniary, interest in [the inmate's] labors."135 Driving this argument
is the notion that rehabilitative or educational value to the inmate is
incompatible with economic benefit to the putative employer, that
penological and economic matters do not coexist. 136 This is the essence
of the exclusive market approach: reasoning from the presence of any
nonmarket dynamics to the absence of an economic relationship.
137
130. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992).
131. Morgan, 41 F.3d at 1293.
132. Outside of the prison context, such a theory is used to distinguish between employees
and students or trainees. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150, 153 (1947)
(holding that railroad brakeman trainees were not FLSA employees because their "work does not
expedite the company business, but may, and sometimes does, actually impede and retard it").
133. Harker, 990 F.2d at 133; accord Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 42; Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809;
George v. SC Data Ctr., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 329, 333 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
134. On this point, courts taking a productive work approach would agree that the inmates
must be doing work to be employees.
135. Harker, 990 F.2d at 133.
136. This tendency to lose sight of prison labor's productive character may be reinforced by
the discourse of rehabilitation itself, with its suggestion that inmates enter prison lacking the
skills and habits to perform useful work. See Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005)
(stating one goal of prison labor as "to equip them with skills and habits that will make them less
likely to return to crime outside"); Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43 (characterizing prison labor as
something that "trains prisoners in the discipline and skills of work"); see also discussion infra
Part IV.A.2.a.
137. Cf. Harris, supra note 25, at 1737-40 (discussing legal conceptions of whiteness defined
in terms of racial purity and the absence of African-American "blood").
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The second way that exchange might be lacking is if inmate
work, while productive, is in the prison's possession from the start,
rather than being transferred in an exchange between the parties. An
argument along these lines appears to underlie courts' frequent
assertion that inmates cannot be employees because "the economic
reality is that their labor belong[s] to the institution."'138 Not owning
the labor they perform, inmates have nothing to exchange. 139 Any




Courts also discern a noneconomic relationship based on
prisons' "rehabilitative or penological interest in inmate labor" in the
sense of prisons' motivations for instituting inmate labor programs.141
These nonpecuniary interests remove prison labor from "the
'bargained-for exchange of labor' for mutual economic gain that occurs
in a true employer-employee relationship."'142 Courts specifically
invoke the doctrine of consideration, according to which contract
formation requires that each party offer something of value to the
138. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993); accord Burleson v. California, 83
F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1996); Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994);
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809; Alexander v. Sara, 721 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1983); Young v. Cutter
Biological, 694 F. Supp. 651, 657 (D. Ariz. 1988); Hudgins v. Hart, 323 F. Supp. 898, 899 (E.D.
La. 1971); Huntley v. Gunn Furniture Co., 79 F. Supp. 110, 113 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
139. Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reasoning that an inmate
cannot "freely contracto with a non-prison employer to sell his labor" (emphasis added)).
Henthorn held that even when an inmate voluntarily works for a third party and is paid, there is
no employment relationship with the third party "where any compensation he receives is set and
paid by his custodian." Id. Apparently, an economic exchange exists only between the third party
(which receives the prison's labor) and the prison. But see Benavidez v. Sierra Blanca Motors, 922
P.2d 1205, 1207 (N.M. 1996) (rejecting analogous argument under state workers' compensation
statute).
140. Harris v. Yeager, 291 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D.N.J 1968) ("The moneys under
consideration are not wages in a realistic economic employer-employee relationship. They are,
rather, a gratuitous payment."), aff'd, 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam); McGinnis v.
Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1224 n.2, 1238 (Ala. 1975) (characterizing payment to inmate worker as
a "gratuity"). But see Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 261 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that state prison
regulations confer a property interest in inmate wages); Cal. Highway Comm'n v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 251 P. 808, 810 (Cal. 1926) (rejecting characterization of payments to inmates
working on public highways as gifts rather than wages). Cf. Zelizer, supra note 20, at 482-83
(contrasting compensations and gifts as payment forms, and associating "subordination and
arbitrariness" with the latter).
141. Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43-44; Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 1996);
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809.
142. Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993); accord Hale, 993 F.2d at




other in order to elicit the other's contribution to the exchange. Thus,
even if inmate labor incidentally confers an economic benefit on the
prison, there would not be a bargain if achieving that result was not
part of the prison's apparent purpose. 143
Courts rely on the mutual exclusivity of economic and
nonpecuniary goals in their interpretation of prisons' motivations.
Once a nonpecuniary motive appears, economic ones disappear from
view. 144 For instance, the Ninth Circuit's Burleson opinion cites the
existence of a "penological purpose" to overcome the work program's
explicit mandate to turn a profit. 145 There is no room in this view for
the coexistence of penological and pecuniary aims. 146 Once the prison
appears, the economy vanishes.
Making the penological context essential also underlies a
second way of separating inmate labor from the bargain form. A
corollary of contractual parties' wholly self-interested purposes is that
they encounter one another as strangers who engage in a discrete
transaction and then part ways. 147 In contrast, prison labor arises out
143. Arguably, insofar as the prison desired to secure the inmate's participation in a punitive
or rehabilitative activity, the inmate's agreement to do so would provide consideration. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. d & illus. 9 (1981); id. § 79 & illus. 4. In the
prison labor context, however, courts rely on a narrower understanding of consideration as
involving "economic gain" and do not consider the extent to which contract law itself is not so
limited.
144. A number of rough indicators suggest that most prison work programs are not designed
to maximize the financial benefit to the prison. First, inmate labor programs often operate at a
financial loss, or no significant profit, for prison authorities. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., supra note
30, at 124-25. Second, product lines and work organization often are selected to be relatively
labor intensive in order to increase the hours of inmate labor required. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRISONER LABOR: PERSPECTIVES ON PAYING THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE,
GAO/GGD-93-98, at 8-9 (1993). Third, prison industry programs typically have long waiting lists
for participation, implying that inmates would be willing to participate at lower wages. See
Glover, supra note 30, at 1112; FLORIDA CORR. COMM'N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT § 8.3.2 (1997),
http://web.archive.org/web/20001 102045827/www.fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/final97/97pub.html.
145. Burleson v. California, 83 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Villarreal v. Woodham,
113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997); George, 827 F. Supp. at 588 ('The voluntary nature of the
Prison Industries program does not manifest a bargained-for-exchange of labor. Instead, it
reflects the program's emphasis on rehabilitative objectives as opposed to the punitive ones
traditionally associated with forced labor in prisons.").
146. In contrast, standard contract doctrine would find consideration if eliciting the
exchange were some part of the prison's motive, even if not the exclusive or predominant one. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c.
147. In fact, contract doctrine does not require a discrete transaction between strangers, but
again, such transactions widely are taken to be paradigmatic. See Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay,
Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 569.
Expecting that employment matches this model of discrete contracts is particularly odd, given
that the distinction between the two is the central topic of economic analysis of the firm, see R.H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 53-54 (1988), and that ongoing subjection to
supervisory control, or subordination to the employer more generally, is essential to
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of an ongoing relationship of incarceration. Thus, courts conclude that
inmate labor is not a bargained-for exchange because the parties "do
not deal at arms' length."' 48 A criminal conviction brought them
together, not the prospect of exchanging work for pay. 149 As one court
put it, this "opportunity is open only to prisoners.' 50 Moreover, goals
incident to imprisonment-punishment, maintaining order,
preventing recidivism, changing attitudes or personality traits linked
to offending behavior-shape work programs.
51
At root, it is the ever-present mark of the prison context that
removes inmate labor from the market economy. According to these
courts, the prison and the economy are mutually exclusive.
B. Prison Labor as Economic: The Productive Work Approach
The exclusive market approach dominates the prison labor case
law, but courts sometimes analyze the economic dimension of
employment in a different fashion. The alternative focuses on inmates'
production and receipt of valuable resources, not on the bargain form.
Focusing on productive work supports classifying inmate workers as
employees. Where the exclusive market view sees economic
relationships as fundamentally incompatible with noneconomic
institutions, the productive work approach takes the opposite tack:
economic conduct has no intrinsic institutional form and may occur in
diverse contexts.
Among prison labor cases, the productive work approach is
most clearly articulated by Judge Norris's dissent from the Ninth
Circuit's en banc decision in Hale v. Arizona: "The economic reality is
distinguishing employment from "independent contracting" along the control dimension. See
discussion supra Part I.B.
148. Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993).
149. See, e.g., McCaslin v. Cornhusker State Indus., 952 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D. Neb. 1996)
('"The prisoner does not enter into a bargain with the prison to become a prisoner in order to be
able to work in the prison industries, as might a private individual who contracts with an
employer"; instead, the work "arises out of the prisoner's conviction for a crime .... ").
150. Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Williams v. Meese, 926
F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding no Title VII coverage because the "relationship... arises
out of his status as an inmate, not an employee"). Moreover, an inmate who leaves a prison work
program remains a prisoner. At a structural level, however, it is possible that levels of
incarceration will be determined, in part, by prisons' ability to utilize prisoners' labor or provide
it to outside interests. See GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE (1939); Garvey, supra note 29, at 397-98.
151. The same is plausibly true from inmates' perspectives, though courts show little interest
in them. In addition to cash and future marketable skills, work may relieve boredom, create




that [the inmates] work. Their labor produces goods and services that
are sold in the channels of commerce. And [the prison industry] pays
them for their efforts."152 Similar reasoning carried the day in Watson,
where the local sheriff farmed out inmates to his son-in-law's
construction company.
1 53
The productive work analysis plays some role even in opinions
that ultimately come down against employee status. Before ruling
against the plaintiff-inmate, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that
"[i]n general, work constitutes employment when there is an
expectation of [even] in-kind benefits in exchange for services." 154 The
recognizably productive character of inmates' work at least provides
initial plausibility to their employment claims.
As Watson and the Hale dissent suggest, arguments grounded
in production typically articulate the economic value of inmate work
by focusing on its effects on third parties, especially through the
putative employer's customers or its other workers. The basic
mechanism at work is the fungibility of inmate-produced goods and
services with those produced by ordinary employees or purchased in
ordinary consumer markets. Employers of prison labor can substitute
inmates for other workers, and consumers can substitute products of
inmate labor for those produced by other means.
Based on these points, most courts accept that inmates are
employees in at least some circumstances: when they voluntarily work
for and are paid by private firms that are located outside the prison
and are not in the business of supplying goods or services to the
prison. However, when inmates bring claims in scenarios that possess
some but not all of these factors-location, prison not private
management, voluntariness, prison not private consumption--courts
often turn the logic of fungibility against inmates' claims.
For instance, many courts differentiate between work for
private firms located inside prisons (not employment) versus outside
prisons (employment). 55 Watson suggested that work performed
152. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J., dissenting).
153. Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554-56 (5th Cir. 1990); see discussion supra Part I.D.
154. Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 205 (11th Cir. 1997).
155. See, e.g., Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Barnett v.
Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc., No. 98-3625, 1999 WL 110547, at *1-2 (8th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999);
Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1992); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931
F.2d 1320, 1330 (9th Cir. 1991) (Rymer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Banks v. Roberts, No. 1:06-CV-01232, 2007 WL 1574771 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2007); McCaslin v.
Cornhusker State Indus., 952 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D. Neb. 1996); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334
F. Supp. 774, 786 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Cal.
Highway Comm'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 251 P. 808, 809-10 (Cal. 1926); Manville v. Bd. of
Governors of Wayne State Univ., 272 N.W.2d 162, 165-66 & n.7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
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"within the confines of the prison" avoided "unfair competition among
workers in job markets outside the prison."156 But as one judge tartly
observed, "[T]he logic escapes me": regardless of where production
occurs, the competitive effects are the same if the products are then
sold in the same markets. 157 Thus, courts sometimes hold that work
outside prison walls cannot be distinguished from work on the inside
that previously had been classified as not employment.'
58
Similar problems plague another commonly cited factor-
whether inmates work for a governmental agency (including the
prison itself) or a private firm.159 Either way, that organization
produces widgets with fewer non-inmate workers and, if it sells the
widgets, competes with other widget makers who lack an inmate labor
supply. 160 Federal Prison Industries vividly makes this point in its
advertising, which promotes its data and communications services as
"the best kept secret in outsourcing. ' 61
Recognizing the force of these points, a few courts eschew
reliance on geography or organizational form and focus on whether the
goods or services in question are for the prison's use. In Danneskjold v.
Hausrath, the Second Circuit swept aside the plaintiffs arguments
that he was an employee because his labor was voluntary, not forced,
and was managed by a third party, not the prison. 16 2 Although other
courts had relied on such factors to rule against inmates, the Second
Circuit dismissed them as mere matters of organizational form that
made no material difference to the ultimate product. 16 3 Instead,
inmates cannot be employees whenever "their labor"-in this case,
work as a teaching assistant in a prison education program-"provides
156. 909 F.2d at 1555.
157. Gilbreath, 931 F.2d at 1334 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
158. Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (ruling against inmate workers,
but rejecting relevance of an inside/outside distinction); Henthorn v. Dep't. of Navy, 29 F.3d 682,
685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).
159. See Loving, 455 F.3d at 563; Barnett, 1999 WL 110547, at *2; Villarreal, 113 F.3d at
206; Gambetta v. Prison Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 1119, 1123
(11th Cir. 1997); Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 808-09; McCaslin, 952 F. Supp. at 657; George v. Badger
State Indus., 827 F. Supp. 584, 588 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
160. Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43-44; Henthorn, 29 F.3d at 685; Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d
1387, 1401-03 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J., dissenting). Presumably for this reason, the Ashurst-
Sumners Act, see supra notes 34-37, does not distinguish between publicly and privately
managed prison industries. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (Supp. II 2002).
161. Unicor Federal Prison Industries, Inc., http://www.unicor.gov/services/contact-helpdesk/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2008); see also Jon Swartz, Inmates vs. Outsourcing, USA TODAY, July 7,
2004, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/employment/2004-07-06-call-
centerx.htm.
162. 82 F.3d at 43.
163. Id. at 39.
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services to the prison."164 The reason offered was that such services
have no impact on the general labor market, in contrast to "prison
labor ... employed to produce goods or services that are sold in
commerce,"'165 as in Watson. Other courts apply similar reasoning to
goods and services consumed by government units other than the
prison itself.'
66
Labor's fungibility, however, also undermines this wall around
prison consumption. To the extent that prison laundry is cleaned by
prisoners, either the prison or its contractor need not hire employees
out of the ordinary labor market. 167 Moreover, inmates' contributions
toward prison operations typically come in those areas where large
institutions often face a decision between performing a function itself
and contracting out: laundry, food, and maintenance services are
classic objects of subcontracting, in prisons and elsewhere. 168 Without
inmate labor, firms providing these services would receive more
business.
69
164. Id. at 39.
165. Id. at 44.
166. In Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., Judge Nelson would have held that inmates
working inside a prison for a private plasma center were employees, based on their work's
economic significance in competitive product markets. 931 F.2d 1320, 1334 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Nelson, J., dissenting). She distinguished the case of "prison maintenance or produc[ing] goods
used solely by the state," because in such cases "economic fairness in a competitive market does
not come into play." Id.; see also Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1400 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that FLSA coverage should be triggered by the sale of prison labor products
in interstate commerce); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 134 (4th Cir. 1993) (reasoning
that goods sold only to government entities pose "no threat to fair competition"); Miller v.
Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("[T]he payment of sub-minimum wages to
[prisoners] poses no threat of unfair competition to other employees ... because the [prison] does
not operate in the marketplace and has no business competitors.").
167. See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Jovanovich v.
Angelone, 59 F.3d 175, No. 94-15015, 1995 WL 378678, at *2, (9th Cir. 1995) (table) (rejecting
plaintiffs' argument that, when inmates provide services that the prison is constitutionally
obligated to deliver to other inmates, "if no qualified inmates had been available in the inmate
population, the prison would have had to turn to the outside market").
168. See Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43 (noting functional interchangeability of laundering
prison garments in a prison-operated laundry and one operated by a subcontractor); Lockett v.
Neubauer, No. 05-3209-SAC, 2005 WL 3557780, at *5 (D. Kan. Dec. 28, 2005) (considering claim
by inmate who worked for private contractor that operated prison cafeteria); see also Henthorn v.
Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (considering claim by an inmate who was
used to provide maintenance services). Insofar as requiring free labor is a way for prisons to
make inmates bear the costs of confinement, note that the same end could be achieved by
charging all inmates, or all inmate workers, for prison expenses. See discussion infra at Part
IV.B.2.
169. See, e.g., Tracy Harmon, Inmates Build a Prison, PUEBLO CHIEFrAIN (Colo.), Dec. 29,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 22680979 (reporting that use of prisoners in constructing
additional prison cells saved Colorado millions of dollars, which presumably otherwise would
have been spent hiring a private contractor). An episode in the history of prison labor illustrates
the permeability of the line between internal government operations and market economic
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Stripped of arbitrary restrictions, grounding employment
status in competitive effects converges with grounding employment
status in productive work. As the Seventh Circuit observed in
Vanskike, "[C]arried to its logical conclusion, prisoners must be paid
minimum wage for anything they do in prison that can be considered
'work.' "170 For the Vanskike court, this conclusion proved the
weakness of the underlying argument. Nonetheless, it underscores the
coherence of this alternative account of employment's economic
character and the difficulty of limiting it to cases like Watson.
Returning now to the contractual heart of the exclusive market
account, we can see that each of its elements-voluntariness,
exchange, and bargain-is quite independent of the existence of
productive work. As Judge Norris's Hale dissent pointed out, "The fact
that a prisoner may lack the choice not to work does not reduce the
unfair competitive effect of his work product when it enters the
channels of commerce."'171 Similarly, the productive character of the
work does not depend on whether it arises from, is motivated by, or
advances the goals of penal incarceration. If a prison forces an inmate
to produce a widget and then pays him for it in order to teach the
value of obedience, to cause suffering, or to prepare him for post-
release employment, such penal or rehabilitative purposes do nothing
to stop the widget from being sold. As Judge Norris concluded, "[T]his
relationship is both penological and pecuniary."'
172
The productive work approach rejects the notion that economic
activity originates within a separate market economic sphere and
remains sequestered there. Instead, it emphasizes the ease with which
inmates' work products can move across boundaries between
activity. Early twentieth-century prison labor reformers sought to suppress the contracting out of
prison laborers to private firms in order to avoid competition with free labor. Instead, they
favored state-use systems like the chain gang. Within a few decades, however, the chain gang
itself was suppressed, in part because new constituencies realized that this work could be
reallocated to a non-inmate labor force, such as the unionized employees of private construction
firms or unemployed laborers who sought "work relief' on public works. LICHTENSTEIN, supra
note 36, at 158-59, 188-91; see also Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35(c) (2000) (barring use of
convict labor in federal contracts for the production of goods).
170. 974 F.2d at 811; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) ("Home-grown
wheat.., competes with wheat in commerce.").
171. 993 F.2d at 1403 (Norris, J., dissenting). As this quotation suggests, even when courts
insist on the economic character of inmate production, they usually focus on competitive effects
on third parties. This stands in some tension with the fact that employment law coverage
generally is not limited to employers whose labor practices affect competitors in product
markets. In particular, the FLSA applies across-the-board to state and local governments,





institutions that differ in their internal logic, linking them together
without rendering them the same.1 73
C. Generalizing From Prison Labor to Paid Nonmarket Work
As shown above, the prison labor cases consistently require an
economic relationship to establish employment, but they divide
between the exclusive market and productive approaches to assessing
this economic character. This Section shows that this pattern extends
well beyond both prison labor and the FLSA. The prison labor cases
present in microcosm a tension that runs throughout statutory labor
and employment law.
In varied settings, courts struggle with the employment status
of what I loosely term "paid nonmarket work."174 Adults often perform
productive work, and getare paid as a result, within institutions
structured by mechanisms and goals that differ sharply from those
conventionally associated with the labor market. To resolve this
apparent contradiction, courts turn to the exclusive market and
productive work approaches, with the respective restrictive and
expansive implications seen above.
In the interest of space and clarity, I do not provide a
comprehensive survey but instead offer a sampling of cases sufficient
to demonstrate the vitality of the pattern. Because the productive
work approach is less fully developed in the prison labor cases, I begin
with its more robust influence in other controversies over paid
nonmarket work.
1. Employment as Productive Work
In many cases involving paid nonmarket work, courts focus on
the economic benefits to the putative employer and, often, how access
to these benefits influences the employer's downstream participation
in labor and product markets. These cases do not treat institutional
specificity, or the relative absence of arms-length, financially
motivated bargaining, as a barrier to the existence of an employment
relationship. Instead, they see workers as simultaneously occupying
both employment and other social roles.
173. See generally Arjun Appadurai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in
THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Arjun Appadurai ed.,
1986); Viviana A. Zelizer, Circuits Within Capitalism, in THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
CAPITALISM 289 (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2005).
174. The phrase is imperfect because it elides the contested relationship to the market that is
central to my topic.
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The productive work approach dominates legal authority on the
FLSA employment status of civilly committed patients in mental
institutions, as we briefly saw above. 175 The workers' creation of
"economic benefits" for the institution provided the affirmative case
for finding employment status in Souder v. Brennan.176 Crucially,
though, the court had to confront the employers' objections that the
work programs in question had therapeutic value for the patients and
were instituted for that reason. 77 Analogous arguments usually carry
the day in prison labor cases, but not here. Souder reasoned that
accepting this objection "would be to make therapy the sole
justification for thousands of positions as dishwashers, kitchen
helpers, messengers and the like."'178 The court described patient-
workers based on what they do-"dishwashers" and "messengers"-
rather than by their relationship to the institution. 179 Like ordinary
employees, they productively wash dishes and carry messages.
80
Souder's emphasis on productive work, not institutional status,
echoes in a modern Supreme Court opinion that has received
surprisingly little attention in the case law and scholarship on
employment relationships. In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v.
Secretary of Labor, the putative employer was a not-for-profit religious
organization.' 8 ' It raised revenue by selling products and services to
the public through enterprises ranging from gas stations to hog farms
to candy stores. 8 2 These operations also "function[ed] as 'churches in
disguise'-vehicles for preaching and spreading the gospel to the
public."'8 3 The businesses were staffed by "'associates,' most of whom
were drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals before their conversion and
rehabilitation by the Foundation."'' 8 4 The Foundation provided the
associates food, shelter, and clothing, some of which were conditional
on work performance.
185
175. Supra Part I.D. Recent NLRA cases involving individuals with severe mental
disabilities have taken a different approach by emphasizing the rehabilitative nature of the
individuals' work. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
176. 367 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.D.C. 1973).
177. Id. at 813 & n.21.
178. Id. at 813.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 525.4 (2008) (defining activity by patient workers as producing
an "economic benefit" if it is "of the type that workers without disabilities normally perform, in
whole or in part in the institution or elsewhere").
181. 471 U.S. 290, 292 (1985).
182. Id. at 292.
183. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 298-99.
184. Id. at 292.
185. Id. at 292, 301 n.22.
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The Foundation opposed FLSA coverage with a "religious, not
pecuniary purpose," defense analogous to the one courts frequently
accept with regard to prison labor.186 Its operations were "infused with
a religious purpose" that shaped its relationship with the associates.
18 7
The Foundation "minister[ed] to the needs of the associates ... both
by providing rehabilitation and by providing them with food, clothing,
and shelter."188 The associates shared this understanding. They
viewed the work as " 'volunteering'... services to the Foundation" as
"part of [their] ministry" and not as motivated by "material
rewards."
1 89
Unanimously, the Court rejected these arguments because they
failed to account for how the associates' work was part of broader
circuits of exchange: "[T]he admixture of religious motivations does
not alter a business's effect on commerce."1 90 Those motivations,
"however sincere, cannot be dispositive" in the face of the substantive
economic character of what the associates produced and received. 191
Here, the Supreme Court applied precisely the reasoning that
underlies the productive work approach to prison labor, there a
minority view.
Recently, the Second Circuit relied on similar reasoning to hold
that welfare recipients could be Title VII employees when they worked
for local government agencies as a condition of receiving public
assistance. In United States v. City of New York, the city argued that
these "workfare" jobs were not employment because they were
integrated into a comprehensive relationship of assistance. 192 The
court, however, rejected any "artificial dichotomy" requiring that "one
must be either a welfare recipient or an employee and cannot be
186. Compare id. at 298 with Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(characterizing prison labor as "penological, not pecuniary").
187. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 298.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 300; see also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting a similar argument under Title VII).
190. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 299; see also Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396-97 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting similar "personal ministry" arguments
against FLSA coverage of teachers and support staff at a religious school).
191. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301. 'That the associates themselves
vehemently protest coverage" did not alter this analysis. Id. at 302. To explain why, the Court
turned to the no-waiver principle. Allowing coverage to require the consent of the workers could
permit employers "to use superior bargaining power to coerce employees to make such
assertions, or to waive their protections under the Act," which, in turn, "would be likely to exert a
general downward pressure on wages in competing businesses." Id.; accord SUPIOT, supra note 7,
at 5.
192. 359 F.3d 83, 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2004). In the interest of full disclosure, note that I co-wrote
an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs.
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both."'193 Instead, an employment relationship could exist because the
workers had received cash and other benefits contingent on their
performing labor that was "useful" to the city. 194 For the purpose of
establishing employment, this productive work provided the requisite
economic aspect, notwithstanding the nonmarket aspects of the
relationship that also shaped its character. 195
2. Employment as Exclusively Market Work
Notwithstanding these applications of a productive work
analysis, the exclusive market approach also has had its day outside
the prison labor context and beyond the FLSA. 196 These cases rely on
193. Id. at 94. In this regard, City of New York specifically repudiated the analysis of FLSA
coverage of workfare workers offered by the Tenth Circuit in Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544
(10th Cir. 1995); see also Elwell v. Weiss, No. 03-CV-6121, 2007 WL 2994308, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2006) (finding workfare workers to be FLSA employees primarily based on City of New
York, and distinguishing Johns); Stone v. McGowan, 308 F. Supp. 2d 79, 86 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)
(construing City of New York to dictate FLSA coverage of workfare workers); infra text
accompanying notes 207-209.
194. City of New York, 359 F.3d at 97. Relying directly on the work's value to the employer
reflects a difference in emphasis from Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation's focus on "effect[s] on
commerce," 471 U.S. at 299, but they amount to nearly the same thing. Workfare's benefits
lessen the city's demand for hiring in the regular labor market. See David T. Ellwood &
Elisabeth D. Welty, Public Service Employment and Mandatory Work: A Policy Whose Time Has
Come and Gone and Come Again?, in FINDING JOBS: WORK AND WELFARE REFORM 299, 300
(David E. Card & Rebecca M. Blank eds., 2000); Steven Greenhouse, Many Participants in
Workfare Take the Place of City Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998, at Al; see also Souder v.
Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 813 n.20 (D.D.C. 1973) (noting, but not relying on, the argument that
regular employees "who perform non-professional staff work at various institutions" face
downward pressure on their labor standards through "the use of unpaid and underpaid patient-
workers").
195. See also Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (relying on
City of New York to find Title VII employee status for a graduate student "even though [her]
course work obligations required her to complete a rotation in three laboratories and much of her
work ... was to fulfill the program's requirements").
196. The relatively few non-FLSA prison labor cases echo the familiar themes and results.
See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (denying employment status under
Title VII because the "relationship ... arises out of [plaintiffs] status as an inmate, not an
employee"); Rhodes v. Schaefer, No. 98-3323-GTV, 2002 WL 826471, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 20,
2002); McCaslin v. Cornhusker State Indus., 952 F. Supp. 652, 657 (D. Neb. 1996) (reasoning,
under Title VII, that "[tihe prisoner does not enter into a bargain with the prison to become a
prisoner in order to be able to work in the prison industries, as might a private individual who
contracts with an employer"); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 942 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Walton v.
Fed. Prison Indus., No. 89-3257-R, 1991 WL 126708, at *1 (D. Kan. June 13, 1991); see also
Kounelis v. Sherrer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533 (D.N.J. 2005) (denying an inmate coverage under a
state employee whistleblower statute because his "assignment arises from the custodial
relationship" with the prison).
Some courts have suggested that they rejected inmate FLSA claims in part because of FLSA-
specific concerns about workers' standard of living and downward competitive pressure on
wages, and thus that the result might differ under another statute. E.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974
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an opposition between market-driven economic relationships and
institutionally specific work arrangements governed by distinct goals
and structures.
The exclusive market approach has been particularly
prominent in a series of recent National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") rulings. In a case addressing the NLRA union organizing
and collective bargaining rights of paid workers in a special program
for individuals with severe disabilities, the Board denied employee
status on the ground that their work was "primarily rehabilitative"
rather than part of an "arms-length economic relationship 0.'"197 This
reasoning precisely tracks the dominant strand of prison labor cases,
and it accepts the employer arguments that courts rejected in Souder,
Alamo Foundation, and City of New York. 198 Similarly, the Board
recently held that graduate student teaching and research assistants
are not employees because they "have a primarily educational, not
economic, relationship with their university."199 In so doing, it
reversed its four-year-old decision that nothing prevented workers
from being employees "simply because they also are students."200
The exclusive market approach also won out in Marshall v.
Regis Educational Corp., another case involving an educational
setting. Before rejecting FLSA claims involving college students who
received rental and tuition assistance in exchange for serving as
residence hall assistants, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the
students' work "economically benefited [the college] ."201 Nonetheless, it
held that no employment relationship existed because the students'
work was an "isolated aspect[] of a total program which must be
F.2d 806, 810 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992). Such courts also typically cite the Ashurst-Sumners Act's
restrictions on commerce in prisoner-produced goods, reasoning either that FLSA coverage would
be superfluous or that the existence of the Ashurst-Sumners regulatory structure implies that
Congress assumed that that the FLSA did not apply to inmates. Gambetta v. Prison
Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters., 112 F.3d 1119, 1124 (11th Cir. 1997); McMaster v.
Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1397 (9th Cir.
1993); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 134 (4th Cir. 1993); Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 811-
12. But see Hale, 993 F.2d at 1404-05 (Norris, J., dissenting). As it turns out, however, the
absence of these considerations under different statutes has never made a difference.
197. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 985 (2004).
198. See also Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
worker in Salvation Army thrift store was not an FLSA employee because his "work therapy was
not performed in exchange for in-kind benefits, but rather was performed to give him a sense of
self-worth, accomplishment, and enabled him to overcome his drinking problems and reenter the
economic marketplace").
199. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004).
200. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1209 (2000), overruled by 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
201. Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 1981).
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considered within the full educational context." 20 2  The court
subsequently applied its Regis Educational approach to a workfare
program, holding that plaintiff welfare recipients were not employees
because the "overall nature of [their] relationship ... is assistance, not
employment."20
3
Similar points can be made about cases that are much closer to
prison labor. Relying explicitly on prison labor precedents, a body of
case law finds no employment relationship in paid work by persons
confined through post-incarceration civil commitment, 204 pre-trial
detention on criminal charges, 20 5 and non-criminal immigration
proceedings. 20 6 These relationships involve "a custodial relationship,
not an employment relationship."20 7 Insofar as the relationship is
custodial (or educational, or rehabilitative, or penological), it is not
employment. 2
08
Across a wide range of institutional settings, courts clash
repeatedly-and sometimes equivocate within a single opinion--over
whether someone paid by an employer and under its control is (a) an
employee because she performs productive work or (b) not an
employee because the relationship is not at root a free market
exchange. This pattern recurs not only broadly but also
spontaneously. Often without any apparent awareness of, or cross-
citation to, analogous cases in different institutional contexts, the
courts and parties repeatedly turn to the same competing ways of
understanding economic life. This recurrence suggests a problem
deeper than a technical doctrinal disagreement. The next Part plumbs
these depths.
202. Id. at 1327.
203. Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1558 (10th Cir. 1995).
204. See Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (applying "prisoner"
rather than "patient" precedents to civil commitment of persons previously convicted of a crime);
see also Shaw v. Briody, No. 2:02CV500FTM-33SPC, 2005 WL 2291711, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
20, 2005).
205. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 243-44 (3d Cir. 1999); Villarreal v. Woodham,
113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997).
206. Guevara v. INS, 902 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1990).
207. Villarreal, 113 F.3d at 207. These decisions show that the reasoning of the prison labor
cases has not, in fact, been limited by inmates' special status within the criminal justice system
or under the Thirteenth Amendment.
208. In one case, the court even found that a pre-trial detainee's FLSA claim failed because
his "employment bears no indicia of traditional free-market employment," even though his
Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude claim may have had merit. Tourscher, 184 F.3d at




III. How BOTH ACCOUNTS OF THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION FAIL
When deciding the employment status of paid nonmarket work,
courts largely talk past each other. Without acknowledging it, they
use two quite different ways of assessing whether the relationship at
hand is economic. Precedent supports both the exclusive market and
productive work approaches, and courts that rely on one generally still
recognize the other to some degree. In any particular case, giving
precedence to one analysis or the other will resolve the dispute in
opposite directions.
Where do we go from here? One way to resolve this impasse
would be to adopt and consistently apply either the exclusive market
or productive work approach. Rather than arguing over the true
meaning of the word "economic," we could simply select one approach
for the purpose of determining employment status. 20 9 Doing so would
require confronting basic questions about why employment protections
are warranted in the first place. An exclusive market analysis has
affinities with theories that justify employment law as a response to
injustices or other flaws that are specific to market mechanisms. 210 A
productive work analysis has affinities with theories that justify
employment law based on the importance of work in individuals' lives
and on the claims to belonging and support that arise from
contributing to one's community. 21
1
This Part tacks in a different direction, despite the genuine
appeal of resolving the dispute over employment's economic dimension
within its existing terms. Instead, I show that neither the exclusive
market nor the productive work account provides a viable method for
identifying employment relationships. Rigorously applying either one
would lead to results radically inconsistent with common
understandings of employment as a social category and, not
coincidentally, with settled law outside the confused domain of paid
209. Cf. Williams & Zelizer, supra note 17, at 371 (arguing that debates over
commodification should be refrained as disputes over how economic relationships should be
organized, not whether they should have any economic character).
210. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR
LAW, supra note 5, at 37, 53-57; Brian Langille, Labour Law's Back Pages, in BOUNDARIES AND
FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 5, at 13, 22-26.
211. See, e.g., Langille, supra note 210, at 32-35; Schultz, supra note 3, at 1886-92; Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1643, 1666-69 (2004). A third common view is that labor and employment laws protect
other workers and firms against unfair competition. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 80, at 99-141. I
doubt that this position can be anything but derivative of some combination of the first two;
otherwise, it begs the question of what renders the competition unfair. The most plausible
answers involve undermining the bargaining power of other workers or interfering with other
workers' access to substantive labor standards.
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nonmarket work. Either choice would both shift the law off the
foundation of a descriptive approach to employment status and yield
results incompatible with any plausible purposive alternative.
2 2
In brief, unleashing the restrictive tendencies of the exclusive
market approach would not simply defeat employment status for
contested paid nonmarket work. Instead, it would eat into, and
arguably devour, quite conventional employment relationships. In
complementary fashion, unleashing the expansive tendencies of the
productive work approach would not simply grant employment status
to paid nonmarket work. Instead, it would incorporate into
employment countless relationships that lie securely and sensibly
outside the reach of employment law.
These runaway tendencies have deep roots. They lie in the
familiar but troubled notion of the economy as a distinct sphere of
human activity, a sphere that operates separately from other
institutions and, therefore, that can be regulated separately. To make
this connection, I draw on two literatures that long have struggled
with the boundaries of the economy: economic sociology and
anthropology and feminist theories of work and family.
A. The Impossibly Restrictive Exclusive Market Standard
When courts define employment as economic in the sense of a
market relationship, they rely on a theory of separate spheres: the
economy is both internally coherent-defined by the market-and
fundamentally distinct from other institutions. This account of the
economy and its relationship to other social practices is commonplace.
It appears throughout popular discourse, political philosophy,213 and
traditional divisions of labor among social sciences. 214 It is no wonder
that courts and parties turn to it again and again.
Despite this familiarity, a number of scholarly traditions
sharply criticize the separate spheres model. The model ignores how
the existence and maintenance of these spheres depends on
entrenched but nonetheless contingent institutional arrangements
and cultural understandings, and it elides the ineluctably social
character of what we label market relationships.
212. See supra Part I.C.
213. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 16.
214. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin, The Sociological View of the Economy, in THE NEW ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY: A READER 1, 2-4 (Frank Dobbin ed., 2004).
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These difficulties doom any attempt to rely on market
exclusivity as a test for employment status.215 Paradigmatic
employment settings regularly possess the same "nonmarket"
characteristics that, when seen in prison labor and related cases,
courts sometimes take to negate the existence of an employment
relationship. Consistently applied, the exclusive market analysis
would leave little or nothing as employment.
1. The Embeddedness Critique of the Exclusive Market
When courts contrast prison labor with "traditional free-
market employment"216 that is a "true economic employer-employee
relationship,"' 217 they invoke the familiar picture of what economic
historian Karl Polanyi called the "self-regulating market."218 Polanyi's
widely influential work documents a "great transformation" in
Western economic thought and institutions during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. 21 9 Ascendant was the idea, and the
aspiration, of an economy in which individuals rationally and
separately pursue their self interest, particularly financial gain. Laws
of supply and demand govern resource allocations that emerge
through aggregations of individual bargains. Actors meet to conduct
discrete transactions, and any ongoing relationships simply are long-
term contracts. Matters of sentiment, intimacy, loyalty, morality,
spirituality, and kinship belong to other domains and interfere with
the smooth and proper functioning of markets. 220 The divide between
economy and society thus maps onto a divide between markets and
other institutions.
An account of what the market is not plays a crucial role in the
exclusive market approach to identifying employment relationships.
Linking prison labor to institutions and practices designated as
noneconomic distances it from market employment. The absence of an
economic relationship is established by locating prison labor in a
separate social sphere: the criminal justice system's institutions of
punishment. 22
1
215. Cf. MITCHELL, supra note 18, at 301 (arguing that an analysis of the particularities of
any specific market practice will "leadf away from a closed economy.., into farming,
households, family, state, and power. The closure unravels.").
216. Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997).
217. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 812 (11th Cir. 1992).
218. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 44-45, 74 (Beacon Press 2001) (1944).
219. Id. at 3.
220. See ZELIZER, supra note 27, at 20-32; Granovetter, supra note 13, at 53.
221. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 17, 282-83 (1990) (characterizing
"penality" as a distinct "social institution" such as "the family, the law, education, government,
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On what basis is punishment designated a noneconomic field?
For Polanyi, what he termed a "formalist" definition of economic
action linked the self-regulating market to a freestanding economic
sphere. 222  Formalism identifies the economic with means-ends
rationalizing behavior by individuals seeking to maximize the
realization of their discrete interests, construed narrowly to
emphasize material or financial concerns. 223 In other words, economic
action is the "economizing" behavior associated with conduct in the
self-regulating market of modern Western economies. 224 Insofar as
institutions are characterized by other forms of action, they are not
economic in nature.
This exclusive market view has been criticized trenchantly by,
among others, proponents of "the new economic sociology." This school
of thought has built a wide-ranging research program on Polanyi's
antiformalist idea that economic activity is necessarily "embedded" in
social relations. 225 Mark Granovetter's foundational article rejects the
claim that core economic institutions-including labor markets-can
be understood adequately based on models of "self-interested behavior
affected minimally by social relations."226 Instead, for Granovetter,
economic action is structured in fundamental ways by "ongoing social
relations." 227 A classic example is the structuring of job searches
the market, the military, and religion," but arguing that "these institutional worlds are only
partly self-contained"); Bernard E. Harcourt, Public Economy, Commerce, and Punishment: The
Birth of Natural Order 28-29 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Working Paper presented July 12, 2007, on
file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (critically exploring the intellectual history of economy and
criminality as separate spheres); see also Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of
Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 391-92 (1993) (advocating an economic approach to
crime).
222. Karl Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process, in SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE,
supra note 13, at 31; see also Frank Cancian, Maximization as Norm, Strategy, and Theory: A
Comment on Programmatic Statements in Economic Anthropology, 68 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 465,
465-69 (1966); Granovetter, supra note 13, at 51-52.
223. Without this last restriction, the "economic" threatens to expand to encompass all of
human behavior, as Gary Becker famously argues it should. See generally GARY BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976). Whatever the merits of Becker's approach in
other regards, it abandons any distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct. See
COASE, supra note 147, at 3 (noting that "economists have no subject matter," only "an
approach"); Cancian, supra note 222, at 466.
224. Cancian, supra note 222, at 466; Granovetter, supra note 13, at 53; Polanyi, supra note
222, at 31-33.
225. For a discussion of the relationship between economic sociology and developments in
institutional economics and behavioral economics, see Granovetter, supra note 13, at 52-55.
226. Id. at 51.
227. Id.; see also TILLY & TILLY, supra note 105, at 70-93; Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
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through social networks and affinity groups.228 Employers often invoke
similar notions when they assert that the firm is really "a family,"
suggesting that its relations are shaped substantially by trust, care,
and loyalty. 229 Other examples include the role of gender, race, and
marital status in influencing wage levels, employees' acceptance of
supervisory authority and relations with co-workers, and the influence
of class on occupational choice. 230
2. Employment's Embeddedness in Systems of Punishment
The embeddedness critique casts doubt on whether
circumstances that courts agree do constitute employment could
satisfy the exclusive market standard against which prison labor
regularly falls short. In fact, the judicial opinions analyzing paid
nonmarket work avoid this question by relying on strikingly abstract
characterizations of ordinary employment. They almost never ask
concretely whether the characteristics that allegedly mark work as
"nonmarket" are absent from employment. The signal exception to this
pattern is Souder, which classified institutionalized mental patients
as employees. 231 Responding to the argument that the patients' work
was not employment because it had therapeutic value, the court
observed that "the work of most people, inside and out of institutions,
228. MARK GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB (2d ed. 1995); TILLY & TILLY, supra note 105, at
190-93.
229. SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 49-52 (1985); TILLY & TILLY,
supra note 105, at 117; Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 818-19, 851-52
(1994); see also Olsen, supra note 16, at 1525-28 & n.101. This notion finds some expression
within labor law doctrines that obligate employees to display loyalty, deference, and respect to
their employers as part of their "common enterprise." JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 84-86 (1983).
230. See JACQUELINE JONES, AMERICAN WORK: FOUR CENTURIES OF BLACK AND WHITE
LABOR 14, 302, 310, 312, 349 (1998) (demonstrating historically how certain jobs and occupations
have been coded as "white" or "black" and how white workers have enforced racial restrictions on
black coworkers); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 2 (1990); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.
1683, 1748-55 (1998). Other critiques of the self-regulating model emphasize the foundational
role of state policies protecting private property and bodily integrity, enforcing contracts, and
promoting competition, see Block & Evans, supra note 16, at 505; Frank Dobbin & Timothy J.
Dowd, The Market that Antitrust Built: Public Policy, Private Coercion, and Railroad
Acquisitions, 1825 to 1922, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 631, 633, 651-53 (2000); Robert L. Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470-94 (1923), or the
importance of a variety of commitments other than maximizing compensation that influence
employees' motivations to work and choose among jobs. See TILLY & TILLY, supra note 105, at
115-16; Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment, supra note 5, at 387-89.
231. Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.D.C. 1973).
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is therapeutic in the sense that it provides a sense of accomplishment,
something to occupy the time, and a means to earn one's way. 232
Similarly, the penological character invoked to locate prison
labor outside the economy can also be found in forms of work accepted
as employment. The next section generalizes this point to
employment's embeddedness in a wide range of nonmarket
institutions. Thus, despite beginning with what arguably are marginal
cases, we arrive ultimately at the center. The difficulties of an
exclusive market approach cannot be confined to mere fuzziness
around the edges.
I begin with an unstable distinction among inmates.
"[P]risoners are not employees," Judge Posner explained recently,
simple as that.233 No matter what else one might say about inmate
work, "[t]he prisoner is still a prisoner."234 Nonetheless, Judge Posner
preserved Watson's and Carter's holdings that prisoners on work
release can be employees. In such cases, "prisoners weren't working as
prison labor, but as free laborers in transition to their expected
discharge from the prison. '235 These prisoners somehow shed their
"prisonerness" to become employees. How can this be so?
None of the factors cited to distinguish work release programs
from other inmate labor can survive rigorous application of the
exclusive market approach. Recall, for instance, how courts overcame
claims that some inmate labor was "voluntary." They reasoned that
voluntariness is impossible in the pervasively coercive context of
imprisonment, or that even voluntary work "serves all of the penal
function of forced labor ... and, therefore, should not have a different
legal status."236 These points apply to work release programs, too,
notwithstanding suggestions that their voluntary character
distinguishes them from nonemployment forms of inmate labor.237 For
instance, administrators typically tout work release as occupying
inmates' time, inculcating vocational skills and responsible habits,
and earning money that can defray prison expenses, support inmates'
232. Id. at 813 n.21.
233. Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005); accord Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d
562, 563 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
234. Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).
235. Bennett, 395 F.3d at 410.
236. Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43; see also discussion supra note 129.
237. See Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 42 (characterizing inmates participating in work release as
"free labor'); McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1994); Henthorn v. Dep't of
Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992);
see also Benavidez v. Sierra Blanca Motors, 922 P.2d 1205, 1209 (N.M. 1996) (classifying work
release as employment under state workers' compensation statute based on its voluntariness,
notwithstanding that all inmates had a statutory duty to work in some form).
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families, build savings for release, and enhance consumption during
confinement. 238 These are the same penal or rehabilitative purposes
cited to cast other inmate work as noneconomic. 2
39
Similarly, courts characterize work release as an arms-length
transaction in which participants "freely contract with a non-prison
employer to sell [their] labor."240 And yet the prison typically screens
inmates for eligibility, selects authorized employers, regulates pay and
other conditions, and strictly regulates inmates' disposal of their
earnings. 241 When applying an exclusive market approach, courts rely
on such features to conclude that prison labor arises out of "the
relationship between prison and prisoner"242 and thus cannot be
employment. 2
43
More generally, the goals and power of the criminal justice
system play an important role in employment relationships far beyond
the limited case of work release. Approximately five million adults in
the United States are under parole or probation supervision, 244 and
238. See Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 1996); SUSAN TURNER & JOAN
PETERSILIA, WORK RELEASE: RECIDIVISM AND CORRECTIONS COSTS IN WASHINGTON STATE 1
(1996); Jeanne Flavin, Work-Release Programs, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES 1055 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005).
239. See, e.g., Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43 (asserting that prison labor "occupies prisoners'
time that might otherwise be filled by mischief; it trains prisoners in the discipline and skills of
work; and it is a method of seeing that prisoners bear a cost of their incarceration"); Vanskike,
974 F.2d at 809 (characterizing prison labor as "rehabilitative or penological" in character based
on a state statute declaring prison labor's purposes to be "to equip such persons with marketable
skills, promote habits of work and responsibility and contribute to the expense of the
employment program and the committed person's cost of incarceration").
240. Henthorn, 29 F.3d at 686; see also McMaster, 30 F.3d at 979; Watson v. Graves, 909
F.2d 1549, 1555 (5th Cir. 1990); Barnett v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc., No. 98-3625, 1999
WL 110547, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999).
241. TURNER & PETERSILIA, supra note 238, at 3-4; Jeanne Flavin, supra note 238, at 1055;
Speedrack Prods. Group, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that
inmates in work release program were required to work overtime, forbidden to quit without good
cause, subject to prison discipline for workplace misconduct, and could be removed at the prison's
discretion). Income often must be allocated to the costs of incarceration, victim restitution, and
child support. See Reimonenq, 72 F.3d at 474-75; Watson, 909 F.2d at 1555; Carter v. Dutchess
Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Dan Gibbard, Jail Beefs Up Work-Release,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2006, Metro, at 1.
242. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
243. See discussion supra Part II.A. For cases rejecting arguments that these features of
work release programs preclude inmates from participating in NLRB elections at their worksite,
see Speedrack Prods. Group, 114 F.3d 1276; Rosslyn Concrete Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 713 F.2d 61
(4th Cir. 1983).
244. LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN:
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005, at 2 (2007), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/ppus05.pdf; see also MELOSSI & PAVARINI, supra note 111, at
6 (noting "penal control 'in liberty' such as that of the probation system widely practiced in the
United States").
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maintaining employment is a typical condition of release. 245 Not only
are these individuals subject to incarceration for failure to work
24 6-
not exactly the free agents that courts imagine as employees-but
they are subject to such coercion because work advances penological
and rehabilitative goals. The exclusive market approach would seem
to throw employment status into doubt in these circumstances.
Broader still, obligations to provide for family members
through direct provision, child support, and alimony are reinforced by
legal coercion. At the limit, failure to meet these obligations by
obtaining and maintaining employment can trigger dissolution of
family relations, criminal sanctions for neglect, or contempt
proceedings. 247 Employment under these circumstances is deeply
intertwined with institutions beyond "the market" and serves
interests-including the state's interest in ensuring private
responsibility for childrearing 248 -well beyond narrow financial
interests of employer and employee.
3. The Embeddedness of Employment More Generally
The criminal justice system is just one of many institutions
that weaves its distinctive goals and practices into ordinary
employment relationships. In Alamo Foundation, for instance,
associates' labor and the Foundation's support were incidents of a
larger relationship structured and motivated by shared religious
commitment.249 The arrangement was a far cry from the exclusive
market model of an arms-length wage bargain independent of any
other relationship. An exclusive market approach would have led the
Court to the opposite result.
245. See John Rakis, Improving the Employment Rates of Ex-Prisoners Under Parole, 69 FED.
PROBATION 7 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/jun2O05/employment.html.
246. ROBYN L. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: PROBATION AND
PAROLE VIOLATORS IN STATE PRISON, 1991, at 3 (1995), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/js/pub/pdf/ppvsp9l.pdf (reporting that in 1991 well over 1,000 persons
were reincarcerated due to failure to secure or maintain employment).
247. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 33-34, 179-80 (2002); see also cases cited
supra note 124 (upholding criminal contempt conviction based on failure to hold employment
while subject to child support order). Someone who takes a job in order to avoid such
consequences is in a situation similar in many respects to the prisoners who are subject to a
general work requirement but remain free to choose how they fulfill it. See supra text
accompanying notes 123-126. Of course, most workers desire to provide for their families
regardless of legal compulsion, cf. ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR
CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 54-56 (2004), but inmates' desire to work appears
similarly independent of legal compulsion. See sources cited supra note 144 (noting inmate
demand for voluntary labor assignments far in excess of supply).
248. See generally ALSTOTT, supra note 247.
249. 471 U.S. 290 (1985); see also supra text accompanying notes 181-185.
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Another unanimous Supreme Court decision illustrates similar
points in a more conventional workplace. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country
Electric, Inc. held that union "salts"-members and staff who took
electrician jobs with a target firm in order to organize its workers, and
who were paid by the union to do so-were employees under the
NLRA.250  These workers' primary motivation was to gain an
organizing advantage through their foothold in the workforce, not to
get paid by the employer. 251 Nonetheless, the Court held that these
nonfinancial goals did not undermine employment status.
More generally, many organizations hire exclusively or
preferentially from a limited pool of applicants with an ongoing non-
employment relationship to the employer: membership in a religion,
enrollment in a college, residence in specific neighborhood, possession
of a family connection, and so on.252 They do so in part because they
have goals for the employment relationship other than extracting
labor, including benefitting the individual workers or strengthening
ties within a particular community. Government and nonprofit
employers, as well as for-profit "social entrepreneurs," are
conventional employers, despite organizing work around the
achievement of nonfinancial goals. Many employees go to work
motivated in substantial part by contributing to others' well-being, by
furthering the interests of an employer they respect, or by establishing
their identity within an occupational community. 253  These
considerations pervade not just who works in what jobs but also how
pay is structured, how work is organized, how co-workers interact, and
what expectations exist between employers and employees. Indeed, in
other contexts, labor and employment law often characterizes workers'
loyalty, deference, and respect toward their employers as essential
aspects of an employment relationship. 254 An exclusive market
250. 516 U.S. 85, 96-98 (1995).
251. For organizers already on the union payroll, the union made up any difference between
their electrician's pay and their union salary, and it continued to pay their fringe benefits. Town
& Country Elec., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 34 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1994).
252. See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396-97 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding a Title VII employment relationship notwithstanding religious school's requirement that
workers share its specific religious creed); Rev. Rul. 55-500, 1955-2 C.B. 398 (ruling that, for tax
purposes, students were employed by a corporation notwithstanding that an agreement with
their college gave students exclusive access to all of the employer's production jobs).
253. See Zatz, What Welfare Requires, supra note 3, at 427-29 (discussing and collecting
sources).
254. ATLESON, supra note 229, at 84-86, 179.
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analysis would use all of these phenomena as indicators of a
noneconomic relationship.
255
Accepting these points does not require rejecting market forces
as illusory or irrelevant. 256 In Alamo Foundation, for instance, there
was evidence that meals and various perks were withheld from
associates who performed poorly, and it seems likely that hunger, as
well as religious conviction, helped motivate work effort.
257
By the same token, however, one also can see some market
dynamics at work in prison labor and other nominally "nonmarket"
work. For instance, prison industries routinely use wage differentials
and other perquisites to motivate inmate workers 258 and otherwise to
"simulate a real-world business environment."259 This is precisely the
point: Rather than an on/off switch between self-regulating markets
untouched by other social relations and noneconomic domains
untouched by market dynamics, various forms of co-existence and
interaction are the norm. In such circumstances, an exclusive market
test is never satisfied. Inversely, an inclusive market test that ties
employment to the presence of some market dynamics seemingly
would always be satisfied, again failing to differentiate among
relationships. 260
255. Indeed, it is partly to avoid such problems that contract law itself never requires the
absence of nonbargain aspects to a relationship, only the presence of some bargain aspect. See
supra note 146.
256. See Richard Swedberg & Mark Granovetter, Introduction to the Second Edition of
SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE, supra note 13, at 1, 13; see also ZELIZER, supra note 27, 21-22
(criticizing "Nothing-But" reductionisms).
257. Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 & n.22 (1985).
258. See Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).
259. Gambetta v. Prison Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 1119,
1121 (11th Cir. 1997) (describing Florida prison labor program); accord Harker v. State Use
Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 132 (4th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Maryland prison industry as
"resembling a 'private corporate entity as closely as possible"' (citation omitted)); see also
GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 25-26,
56-57 (1971) (describing "deals" or "trades" between inmates and prison officials, and the role of
incentives in prison labor); Bruce Western, Introduction, in SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 13 (2007)
(same); sources cited infra note 280. A similar analysis could be made of child labor within
families. Although it obviously does not fit a strict "free market" model, it is not uncommon for
children to be paid for performance of some of their chores. Parents may be motivated not only by
the educative functions of household labor and by its relationship to family solidarity, but also by
the value to the household economy of not having to do the work themselves or to hire it out.
Sampson Lee Blair, Children's Participation in Household Labor: Child Socialization Versus the
Need for Household Labor, 21 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 241, 256-57 (1992).
260. See generally BECKER, supra note 223.
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4. A Mostly Market Standard?
Perhaps a middle way can be found in which an economic
relationship requires more than just some market character and yet
less than an exclusively market character. The NLRB claims to take
such an approach, classifying an activity as employment based on
whether it is part of "a primarily economic relationship," as opposed to
one that is "primarily rehabilitative" or "primarily educational."
2 61
Unfortunately, the NLRB's actual decisions provide little guidance on
how one assesses this balance between economic and noneconomic
factors. Instead, they rely on distinctions that are at best obscure and
at worst bewildering.
262
Theoretically, a "primarily market" standard poses two distinct
difficulties: separating economic and noneconomic components and
assigning weights to each component. The first step falters on the fact
that even paradigmatic market relationships already incorporate
substantial elements of institutional specificity, nonfinancial goals,
and nonadversarial conduct. For instance, conventional contract
doctrine treats an agreement as a contract-not ninety percent of a
contract or ten percent of a contract-when the parties' commitments
take the form of a bargain, even if one party committed itself
primarily for reasons other than to secure the return commitment.
263
For example, in the Town & Country "salting" case discussed above,
264
do the workers' agreements with the employer count as "economic"
because they are conventional contracts? Or do they count as
"noneconomic" because they were motivated principally by worksite
access, not by the employer's promise to pay? Case law offers no clear
solution, and none is apparent.26
5
261. Brevard Achievement Cent., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 983-84 (2004); Brown Univ., 342
N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004).
262. Compare Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004) with Research Found. of the State Univ.
of New York, 350 N.L.R.B No. 18 (2007) (reaching opposite result from Brown University on
identical facts, except for existence of a nonprofit intermediary foundation that existed solely to
be the exclusive administrator of university research programs), and Research Found. of the City
Univ. of N.Y., 350 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (2007) (same, except that nonprofit intermediary existed
solely to administer research programs of several universities). Compare Brevard Achievement
Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, with Goodwill Indus. of N. Ga., Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (2007)
(reaching opposite result from Brevard on facts involving same federal program for workers with
severe disabilities).
263. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c. (1981).
264. See discussion supra note 250 and accompanying text.
265. Based on related concerns, some economic sociologists have begun to argue that
"embeddedness" does not go far enough in dislodging a separate spheres understanding of
economic action. The metaphor of one object embedded in another suggests that market and
social relations are conjoined but still distinct. Krippner, supra note 13, at 778-801. An
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Assigning relative weight to economic and noneconomic aspects
also raises serious problems. Consider a worker who accepts a job that
pays less than half what she could earn for similar work elsewhere,
but does so because of an ideological or religious commitment to the
employer. In one sense, these noneconomic commitments
predominated over financial gain, and yet a "primarily economic" test
seems unlikely to deny employment status. Compare a prison labor
relationship in which the prison creates a miniature labor market,
hiring inmates at the lowest wage possible but allowing inmates to
hold out for the highest wage available. Would work under such
conditions be more economic than in my first example because
financial motivations played a larger role, or would it be less economic
because the parties do not meet at arm's length?
The doubts I have raised here are not conclusive. Perhaps
future courts or commentators will be able to refine a primarily
market standard into a workable, non-arbitrary tool that does not
simply fall back on an exclusive market approach. The difficulties that
I have identified, however, create substantial doubt that such a project
even makes conceptual sense, 26 6 and they shift the burden of
persuasion to defenders of such a market-oriented test.
B. The Indiscriminately Expansive Productive Work Standard
The productive work approach to employment's economic
character also draws on a rich tradition of thinking about economic
life. Polanyi, and others who share his critique of market-oriented
formalism, developed an alternative "substantivist" tradition. 267 This
view takes markets not to define economic activity, including work,
but rather to offer one possible mode of organizing it. For better or
worse, slaves, prisoners, and children can produce widgets that are
sold in markets or that otherwise would have been bought in them.
268
As a means to identify employment relationships, however, a
criterion of productive work is insufficiently discriminating, even if it
does capture an important commonality among different relationships.
alternative account would treat market dynamics as a particular form of sociality, not something
"embedded" in social relations to some degree. Pierre Bourdieu, Principles of an Economic
Anthropology, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note 16, at 75, 84.
266. This claim receives further development infra notes 305-306 and accompanying text.
267. See sources cited supra note 222.
268. STONE, supra note 5, at 13-14; Keith Thomas, Introduction, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF
WORK xiii (Keith Thomas ed., 1999); Chris Tilly & Charles Tilly, Capitalist Work and Labor
Markets, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 283, 285 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard
Swedberg eds., 1st ed. 1994).
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Applied consistently, it sweeps in many recognizably productive
relationships that lie well beyond the frontiers of contested
employment status.269 The productive work approach provides no
account of how the different ways work can be organized might affect
the need for and the appropriateness of employment law's particular
regulatory forms.
1. Locating Economic Activity Outside Market Institutions
Within economic sociology, proponents of the embeddedness
concept largely apply new explanatory tools to familiar objects of
study. In terms irreducible to market mechanisms, these scholars
analyze the internal dynamics of large corporations, financial
markets, or relationships between suppliers and distributors. 2
70
Having eschewed defining economic life in terms of markets, what
makes these phenomena economic is that they are "concerned with the
production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of scarce goods
and services." 271 On this substantivist view, 272 institutions become no
less economic when our understanding of them becomes more social.
This point lies at the core of the productive work approach: an
economic relationship is perfectly compatible with a penological
relationship, an educational relationship, a rehabilitative relationship,
and so on.
273
Once the social and the economic cohabit, the door opens to
seeing the economic in social institutions conventionally located
outside the market economy. What remains to be seen is whether
these nonmarket activities are economically significant. That question
has not interested most practitioners of the new economic sociology,
274
269. This expansiveness also is the Achilles heel of the substantivist scholarly tradition. See
Cancian, supra note 222, at 465-66. A related difficulty is adequately specifying what constitutes
"production," but I leave that problem aside because my arguments here do not rely upon
resolving it. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 187-97 (2001) (questioning the distinction between production
and consumption); Micaela di Leonardo, The Female World of Cards and Holidays: Women,
Families, and the Work of Kinship, 12 SIGNS 440 (1987) (characterizing the maintenance of
kinship relations as productive work).
270. Swedberg & Granovetter, supra note 256, at 6.
271. Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg, Introducing Economic Sociology, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note 16, at 3, 3; accord Polanyi, supra note 222, at
31-32.
272. See sources cited supra note 222.
273. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 and text accompanying notes 172 and 200.
274. The field focuses principally on what it considers "bread-and-butter" economic
institutions, not "the boundaries of the economy." See Swedberg & Granovetter, supra note 256,
at 6. Doing so preserves the divide between economic and noneconomic spheres but now justifies
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but it has been central to the research of feminist scholars in sociology
and other disciplines.
Feminist scholarship has pioneered broader accounts of where
economic activity, and particularly productive work, occurs. This
research focuses principally on activities associated with the family-
sexuality, reproduction, housework, and caregiving. As an initial
matter, activity within the family directly affects what happens in the
economy as conventionally defined, not only through consumption but
also by directly affecting production. 275 Family labor reproduces
current market workers' capacity for productive work on a daily
basis-preparing meals, ironing clothes, providing emotional
support-and also provides children the physical, mental, and social
capabilities necessary for later market work.276 Moreover, these
productive activities can migrate between market-based and family-
based modes of organization, casting doubt on the usefulness of a
reproductive/productive distinction. 277 Over the last century, family
members, on the one hand, have taken on more responsibility for local
transportation (no more daily milk deliveries) but, on the other hand,
have shifted childcare increasingly onto paid providers. 278 Estimates of
the total economic contribution of household labor place it at a
substantial fraction of, perhaps even equal to, the entire economy
captured by conventional market-oriented measures like the Gross
Domestic Product.
279
it on empirical grounds: the latter institutions are unimportant as sites of production,
distribution, and consumption of scarce goods and services. See ZELIZER, supra note 27, at 44
(criticizing this tendency); Zelizer, supra note 17, at 336-37, 348 (same). Yochai Benkler's
important recent study of "commons-based peer production" of information products follows a
similar pattern. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). Although he identifies an important new sector of
nonmarket production, he also assumes that, until this recent development, nonmarket
institutions were not "an important modality of economic production." Id. at 98-99.
275. See ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 214; Lisa Philipps, Silent Partners: The Role of "Unpaid
Market Labor" in Families, 14 FEMINIST ECON. (forthcoming Apr. 2008); Silbaugh, supra note 3,
at 5.
276. See, e.g., FOLBRE, supra note 3, at 71-73; Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women
in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1633 (1991) (noting how the traditional
"breadwinner" himself depends on unpaid services provided by "dependent" wife). See generally
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 3; Rayna Rapp, Family and Class in Contemporary
America: Notes Toward an Understanding of Ideology, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME
FEMINIST QUESTIONS 49 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds., 1992).
277. BOYDSTON, supra note 3, at xv, 123-25, 131.
278. Abbott, supra note 18, at 308.
279. FOLBRE, supra note 3, at 66-67; Richard W. England, Measurement of Social Well-Being:
Alternatives to Gross Domestic Product, 25 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 89 (1998); Duncan Ironmonger,
Counting Outputs, Capital Inputs and Caring Labor: Estimating Gross Household Product, 2
FEMINIST ECON. 37 (1996). See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
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Characterizing family life as economic in the substantivist
sense does not entail explaining behavior in terms of market
transactions or self-interested maximization. 280 Instead, economic
transactions are perfectly compatible with, and indeed may be
constitutive of, social relations that are particularistic, intimate, and
non-fungible. Sociologist Viviana Zelizer's work has been especially
important in making this point, which is the embeddedness insight in
reverse. 281  Zelizer documents the pervasiveness of economic
transactions in intimate settings-income sharing among spouses, gift
giving among lovers, reciprocal labor among neighbors-and shows
how engaging in these transactions need not dissolve social ties or
introduce market dynamics. 282 To the contrary, economic relations,
including money transactions, help to establish and maintain these
relationships and to affirm their distinctive character: "[A]ll of us use
economic activity to create, maintain, and renegotiate important
ties-especially intimate ties-to other people."
283
Nothing limits these insights to family or other intimate
settings. Rather, they apply directly to prison labor and paid
nonmarket work in other large institutions. So long as productive
work provides the basis for classifying a practice as economic, then
prison labor becomes a straightforward example. This is self-evident
when inmates produce goods and services that circulate beyond the
prison. It remains true when, like the family housework examined by
BEYOND THE MARKET: DESIGNING NONMARKET ACCOUNTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (Katharine G.
Abraham & Christopher Mackie eds., 2005).
280. Nor does it preclude such analyses. See Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Gender and
Economic Sociology, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note 16, at 627, 639-42
(discussing how feminist economists have extended formalist perspectives to the family and used
models of self-interested economic rationality and bargaining to analyze household structure and
time allocation between housework and market work). See generally Becker, supra note 221.
Similarly, prison labor also may be analyzed fruitfully using market models, though courts
generally treat inmates as exercising no agency in their participation in prison work programs.
But see Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (briefly noting that prisons might
make labor programs voluntary in order to induce more productive work). Given the limits on
eliciting quality work through command, surveillance, and punishment, prison labor
administrators and advocates routinely cite some degree of implicit bargaining as one reason
why prisons bother to pay inmates for work that legally they could coerce. See AM. CORR. ASS'N,
A STUDY OF PRISON INDUSTRY: HISTORY, COMPONENTS, AND GOALS 48 (1986); Tara Gray & Jon'a
F. Meyer, Expanding Prison Industries Through Privatization, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PROVISION OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 125, 130 (G. Larry Mays
& Tara Gray eds., 1996) (quoting a prison industry supervisor as saying, "It doesn't matter how
well you treat them. These guys will never work hard unless they get paid. Would you?"); cf.
LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 129-33 (describing mixture of physical punishments and cash
incentives to elicit work effort in convict leasing system).
281. See ZELIZER, supra note 3; VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1997).
282. ZELIZER, supra note 3.
283. Id. at 3.
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feminists, prison housework yields goods and services consumed
within the institution28 4 and substitutes for what otherwise might
have been purchased in ordinary markets. 285 With respect to this
economic character, it simply does not matter whether the work is
directed toward non-acquisitive goals or whether it is structured by
and arises from a comprehensive penal relationship.
2. Productive Work Without Exchange: The Volunteer Problem
The productive work analysis of employment's economic
character thus represents a perfectly coherent application of major
schools of thought about the nature of work and economic life. But this
fact alone does not tell us whether the productive work approach
adequately captures the economic character of employment in the
sense relevant to a legal determination of employee status. This
subsection and the following one show why it does not.
The basic problem lies in the insight that work can be
organized through, and helps to shape, so many different
relationships. It would be surprising if we treated all of these
relationships the same simply because they involve productive work.
In fact we do not-in law or in other domains. I begin with an area
where, legally, the point is especially clear: volunteer labor.
284. This analogy is strengthened further by perspectives on the prison that treat it as an
institution designed to produce future citizens and workers. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage 1991) (1975); MELOSSI & PAVARINI, supra note 111;
RE-ENTRY POL'Y COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY
COUNCIL: CHARTING THE SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF PRISONERS TO THE COMMUNITY pt.
II.B (2005), available at http://www.reentrypolicy.org/reentry/thereport.aspx. This point applies
most easily to inmates working in programs that provide education or training to other inmates.
See, e.g., Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43; Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 10-12 (2d Cir.
1984). Additionally, it can be difficult to distinguish between prison housework and work that is
part of the process of producing goods or services for sale. See Prison Industry Enhancement
Certification Program Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,000, 17,010 (Apr. 7, 1999) (including as
"production of prison-made goods" those "services that are necessary to production, e.g. refuse
pickup").
285. To use terminology Zelizer introduces in her most recent work, social settings that often
have been conceptualized as separate spheres instead routinely are bridged by "circuits of
commerce," "differentiated ties that cut across particular social settings." Zelizer, supra note 173,
at 292. Despite often concerted efforts to keep them separate and declare their separateness,
these circuits inevitably intersect or interact. A purchaser of prison-made goods may participate
simultaneously in one circuit marked by the distinctive relationships, and legal restrictions,
associated with prison labor, and also in other circuits in which those goods are used for
transactions involving entirely different sets of actors and social meanings. Cf. Appadurai, supra
note 173, at 4 (tracing "the conditions under which economic objects circulate in different regimes
of value in space and time"). Even when particular goods or people do not migrate across circuits,
they still interact when actors are able to choose among circuits to achieve particular ends, such
as when a private sector firm decides between "outsourcing" production to prison labor or to
another standard firm.
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Unpaid volunteer labor can be employment, according to a
productive work analysis.28 6 When volunteers adopt a stretch of
highway, staff a firefighting company, distribute programs at a
performance, or manage an on-line chat room, they perform valuable
work, often of the sort that hired employees otherwise would do. 287 On
this point, the productive work approach contradicts the well-
established legal principle that uncompensated volunteers are not
employees. Alamo Foundation took care to stress this point,
explaining that the FLSA does not apply to "[o]rdinary volunteerism"
that proceeds without "expectation of compensation."
288
The problem with treating volunteers as employees is most
obvious in wage and hour law. In many cases, the whole point of the
volunteer relationship is to do something valuable for an organization
or its constituency but not get paid for it. And yet tying employment
status to productive work would eliminate the possibility of such
arrangements. 28 9
Employment law constrains the ways in which productive work
may be organized within employment relationships. Insofar as those
constraints are incompatible with aspects of a relationship that
incorporates productive work, either the employment category must be
narrow enough to exclude those relationships or those relationships
must be assimilated to the standards of employment. Without
attempting to explain exactly how or why we ought to distinguish
employees from volunteers, 290 it suffices for my purposes that some
such distinction commands universal assent, both legally and in
common parlance. The productive work approach, however, lacks the
286. This assumes that control-related tests are satisfied, as they often will be in highly
structured volunteer programs. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(b) (2006)
(defining employment, for purposes of respondeat superior, solely in terms of control, and
stipulating that "the fact that work is performed gratuitously does not relieve a principal of
liability").
287. See Janelle Brown, Must AOL Pay "Community Leaders"?, SALON.COM, Apr. 16, 1999,
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/1999/04/16/aolcommunity.
288. Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302-03 (1985); accord WBAI Pacifica
Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1999) (NLRA); York v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, 286
F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002) (Title VII); see also sources cited infra note 293. See generally Rubinstein,
supra note 11.
289. Similar dynamics apply beyond the wage question. Insofar as an important aspect of
volunteering is asymmetry of obligation more generally, there necessarily will be a tension with
imposing employment law obligations on organizations that benefit from volunteer labor.
290. The distinction is troubled by the difficulty distinguishing between paid and unpaid
work, a line that turns out to be fuzzy in practice and unsatisfying in theory. See Rubinstein,
supra note 11, at 153-57 (discussing the distinction between "pure" volunteers and those who
receive reimbursement for expenses); Yamada, supra note 11, at 215-38 (discussing professional
benefits of "volunteering").
2008] 919
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:3:857
resources to differentiate among forms of work in this way. For
regulatory purposes at least, it renders fungible all relationships in
which work occurs, driven by the fungibility of the goods and services
that the work produces.
291
To preserve space for volunteerism, courts generally require
both valuable production by the worker and valuable benefits to the
worker. One influential Title VII opinion from the Eighth Circuit
echoes Alamo Foundation by stating the requirement this way: "[A]n
employer is someone who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a
salary or other compensation to the person who provides services-
that person being the employee." 292 In short, courts require that
productive work be part of an economic exchange, though not
necessarily a bargain. 293 This exchange criterion requires that the
291. Notably, work that implicates the economic dimension of employment status frequently
also generates limitations on the fungibility of its work products. Cf. Appadurai, supra note 173,
at 24-26 (describing "enclaving"). In addition to restrictions on the circulation of inmate-produced
goods, see supra notes 34, 38, and 160, "displacement" protections routinely limit the work that
may be performed by inmates and other "nonmarket" workers, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 607(f) (2000)
(welfare work programs); Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program Guideline, 64
Fed. Reg. 17,000, 17,002, 17,010-11 (Apr. 7, 1999) (Prison Industry Enhancement program);
Archie v. Grand Cent. P'ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 519-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (trainees), or limit
the institutions for which they may work, see, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48c (2000) (granting federal
procurement priority to goods manufactured by severely disabled individuals but only when they
work for nonprofit firms). Both mechanisms create distinctions among workers, either by
blocking their shared membership in the class of "employees" or by preventing their functional
interchangeability to an employer.
292. Graves v. Women's Profl Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990). Although
"compensation" could be understood narrowly to refer to payment as part of a bargained-for
exchange, cf. Zelizer, supra note 20, at 482 (using "compensation" in roughly this way), in
practice, courts often characterize payments as "compensation" simply because they are
contingent on productive work. The Supreme Court did so in Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 301,
as have courts finding employment relationships with workfare workers, United States v. City of
New York, 359 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he relationship alleged here-which includes the
cash payment, the related benefits, and the requirement that the plaintiffs' work be useful-if
proved, establishes the plaintiffs' as employees for the purposes of Title VII."), with "volunteer"
firefighters who receive death and disability benefits, Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of
Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1999), and with "volunteer" choristers who
receive an "honorarium," Seattle Opera v. N.L.R.B., 292 F.3d 757, 760-63 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
293. This leaves considerable room to refine just what counts as compensation that
completes this exchange. Compare Hallissey v. Am. Online, Inc., No.99-CIV-3785, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12964, at *39-40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2006) (holding that AOL "community leaders"
were FLSA employees where unpaid "volunteering" was a prerequisite to future consideration for
paid positions); cases cited supra note 292 with Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, 388 F.3d 522,
529 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that gaining experience necessary to maintain licensure is
insufficient to create employment rather than volunteer relationship); City of New York, 359 F.3d
at 107 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (concluding that benefits received by a workfare worker "cannot be
deemed compensation in lieu of wages"); Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir.
2002) (data for a dissertation not "compensation"); York, 286 F.3d at 126 (holding that no Title
VII employment relationships arose when a bar association volunteer received only
reimbursement for actual expenses and administrative support to enable her to carry out her
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relationship be economic (in the substantivist sense) in both
directions. 2
94
3. Differentiating Among Forms of Exchange
Requiring an economic exchange addresses the volunteer
problem, but the underlying difficulties persist. Under the productive
work approach as now modified, employment exists regardless of the
relationship in which the exchange is embedded and regardless of the
role that work plays in that relationship. Were that so, all paid
nonmarket work would be employment.
Such a capacious account of employment leaves nothing to stop
employment law's march into all institutions that organize economic
exchange. That approach arguably produces the correct result in the
cases discussed thus far, but additional examples will exhaust even
the most voracious appetite for granting employment status. Jurors
compensated for their time would become employees of the courts,295
minor children working in a family business would become employees
of their parents,296 "volunteer" ushers who receive free admission to
the show might become employees of the venue, and so on.297 All of
these activities may well be described as "economic," but allowing that
duties); Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 713-15 & n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (classifying
member of Civil Air Patrol as volunteer, not employee, despite receiving free military "hops,"
discounted airplane use, training, and death benefits); Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996,
1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that title of 'Visiting Lecturer"
and library privileges are insufficient to create employment relationship).
294. Thus, the mirror image of the volunteer problem arises when a "worker" receives
economic benefits without being productive. The usual problem in employment law involves
students and trainees who may receive funding or other financial support in connection with
some form of "learning by doing." In such circumstances, their physical tasks may be
indistinguishable from other employees'. The common denominator of such cases is that to be an
employee, the worker must provide services of value to the employer, even if she also improves
her own skills in the process. Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947) (holding
that railroad brakemen trainees were not employees because "the railroads receive no
'immediate advantage' from any work done by the trainees"); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d
1207, 1209-11 (4th Cir. 1989); Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271-73 (5th Cir.
1982); see also Archie, 997 F. Supp. at 532-35; Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 813 & n.21
(D.D.C. 1973).
295. But see Brouwer v. Metro. Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding
that jury duty is not employment).
296. But see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (excluding from NLRA definition of "employee" "any
individual employed by his parent"); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (same for agricultural employment under
the FLSA); 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 213(c)(1)-(2) (excluding from the FLSA's child labor provisions
most employment of a minor child by his parent or guardian).
297. Indeed, a provision of the FLSA clearly anticipates and blocks this sort of result in one
narrow situation: 'The term 'employee' does not include individuals who volunteer their services
solely for humanitarian purposes to private nonprofit food banks and who receive from the food
banks groceries." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5).
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label to decide their employment status requires us to ignore
everything else that might matter about them.
With regard to employment status, the economic exchange
becomes the essence of the relationship. Such an analysis is the formal
opposite of the exclusive market approach, which ignores any
economic aspect of the relationship-and thus excludes it from
employment-once it finds some noneconomic aspect. The productive
work alternative ignores any noneconomic aspect of the relationship
once it finds an economic exchange-and thus classifies the
relationship as employment.
This economic reductionism represents a failure to embrace the
insight that multiple social frameworks can motivate and structure
economic exchange. A productive work analysis of employment thus
becomes an example of what Zelizer criticizes as a "Nothing But"
approach. Such an approach would infer from the economic character
of family life that the family is, at root, fundamentally an economic
institution.298 Applied to paid nonmarket work, such an analysis
would conclude that beneath all the rubbish about penological purpose
or vexed souls lies a brute "economic reality."
299
In this vein, some critics argue that prison labor is
fundamentally an economic institution.300 But a clear-eyed awareness
of its economic aspects does not compel that conclusion. Instead, the
prison's economic processes may be partially constitutive of, and not
necessarily subordinate to, its distinctively penal functions.
30 1
298. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 21, 214. Such an analysis might, for instance, treat a stylized
breadwinner/housewife marriage as nothing but a relationship of employer-
housekeeper/nanny/prostitute. See Hasday, supra note 3, at 495-96 (discussing this analysis in
both feminist and law and economics literatures); see also GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY 30-79 (1981); Nancy Folbre, Exploitation Comes Home: A Critique of the Marxian Theory
of Family Labour, 6 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 317 (1982).
299. This reductionist tendency is visible in Alamo Foundation's ambiguous usage of
concepts of "exchange" and "compensation." The associates specifically denied that they were
participating in a bargain in the sense of an agreement in which each party's action stands in "a
reciprocal relation of motive or inducement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71, cmt. b
(1981). They testified that "no one ever expected any kind of compensation, and the thought is
totally vexing to my soul." Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985). Despite
crediting this testimony, the Court nevertheless later characterized the in-kind benefits they
received as "in exchange for their services" pursuant to an "implied" "compensation agreement."
Id. This interpretation rested on the fact that the benefits were contingent on the services. But
that could be true without a bargain, if the benefits were not offered to induce the service or vice
versa.
300. Cynthia Young, Punishing Labor: Why Labor Should Oppose the Prison Industrial
Complex, 7 NEw LAB. FORUM 41-52 (2000); RUSCHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 150.
301. See GARLAND, supra note 221, at 108; Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability:
Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1147
(2006) (arguing for prison labor as a centerpiece of "accountability-reinforcing" sanctions). As an
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The difficulty, then, is that when employment law intervenes
in an economic relationship, even with regard to its economic terms, it
necessarily also intervenes in the relationship's noneconomic aspects.
Returning again to prison labor, consider the issue of inmate labor
unions, a focal point of prison activism during the 1970s.30 2 Prison
authorities' fierce resistance met Supreme Court approval in Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.303 North Carolina
justified suppressing the union on the ground that organized inmate
workers would threaten prison discipline, especially through possible
work stoppages. 3 4 In such a case, union activity cannot sensibly be
designated either an economic or a penological aspect of the
relationship between inmates and the prison.30 5 A strike's obvious
example, consider how access to prison labor programs may be used as a tool to promote prisoner
discipline more generally. See George v. Badger State Indus., 827 F. Supp. 584, 588 (W.D. Wis.
1993) (observing that "the labor relationship may be terminated for violating a prison
disciplinary rule"); GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 28 (1971) (describing how
participation in prison labor may act as a perk that rewards good behavior but can be taken
away for bad). Thus, the prison's decisions about inmate participation may not be motivated
principally by the economic consequences of those decisions, real as those may be. But cf. TILLY &
TILLY, supra note 105, at 98 (arguing that "organizations built around nonmarket goals"
approach their workers in the same way as profit-making firms do, concerned strictly with
"quality, efficiency, and power" in the production process). Of course, the reverse also might be
true. See Leah Rupp, Skilled Inmates to Stay at Penal Farm: Decision Keeps County from Hiring
Outside Employees, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Nov. 2, 2006 (reporting decision to
exempt some inmates from a planned transfer in order to avoid having to replace their labor with
outside hiring).
302. See Maiwurm & Maiwurm, supra note 11; Comeau, supra note 11; see also Sidney
Williams, MPLU Missouri Prison Labor Union (Feb. 14, 2003),
http://www.infoshop.org/prisons/public html/article.php?story=03/02/14/9836866; Texas Prison
Labor Union, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, May 1, 1998, available at
http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=861.
303. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
304. Id. at 123. The main legal issues in the case concerned the level of deference to give to
the state's judgment of this risk and the weight to give to inmates' countervailing expressive and
associational interests. Id. at 125.
305. Some courts attempt to disaggregate relationships into corresponding employment and
non-employment components. For instance, Stilley v. University of Pittsburgh, 968 F. Supp. 252,
261 (W.D. Pa. 1996), distinguished a graduate student's relationship to her university in its
employment aspects (sexual harassment suffered while performing paid research assignments)
from her relationship to her university in its academic aspects (such as an advisor's judgments
about satisfactory progress on a dissertation). The faculty member who harassed Stilley "on the
job" was also her dissertation adviser, however. Id. at 256. It seems fanciful to imagine that she
had two independent relationships, one economic and the other educational, to this one person.
In the social science literature, Tilly and Tilly take a similar approach, with similar problems.
They emphasize that work occurs "within" social relations of "friendship, kinship, religion,
ethnicity, class, schooling, informal communication, sexual relations, taste, political affiliation,
sports, and shared avocation," but nonetheless treat the "creation of use value" as a "production"
component separable from "nonproduction" components of the relationship. TILLY& TILLY, supra
note 105, at 71, 79 (analyzing "family relationships" as "bundl[ing] together... both work and
nonwork transactions").
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economic significance cannot be hermetically sealed off from other
aspects of imprisonment, in particular considerations of authority and
discipline. 30 6 Inmates might strike, for instance, over prison conditions
outside the workshop. 30 7 And even a strike over working conditions or
wages could alter the dynamic between inmates and prison authorities
by asserting prisoner power and fostering organization and
solidarity.
308
Whether welcome or not, such shifts in the relations of
imprisonment would be intertwined inextricably with the regulation of
prisoners' work. This is the core insight of opinions that dismiss
inmate employment claims for lack of a market-economic character,
opinions that often are concerned ultimately with the impact of
employment regulation on penal policy and administration. 30 9 Those
concerns may be misplaced, but the productive work approach cannot
tell us why. 310 Instead, it ignores them.
306. A disaggregation strategy thus reintroduces a separate spheres analysis at the level of
the relationship's discrete elements.
307. Cf. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 704-
07 (1982) (considering a dockworkers' strike against handling cargo in commerce with the Soviet
Union as protest against its invasion of Afghanistan). Conversely, prison officials might
terminate or modify a work assignment in response to inmate behavior that was not work-
related.
308. Justice Marshall's dissent suggests precisely this, characterizing the majority opinion as
a "manifestation of the extent to which the very phrase 'prisoner union' is threatening to those
holding traditional conceptions of the nature of penal institutions." Jones, 433 U.S. at 147
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Striking might also help inmates lay claim to a social identity as
"workers" and, collectively, a "union," rather than solely "prisoners," and in so doing generate
claims to respect and solidarity from workers beyond prison walls. Cf. Chad Alan Goldberg,
Contesting the Status of Relief Workers During the New Deal, 29 Soc. SCI. HIST. 337, 355 (2005).
309. See, e.g., Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005) ("People are not
imprisoned for the purpose of enabling them to earn a living [but to] offset some of the cost of
keeping them, or to keep them out of mischief, or to ease their transition to the world outside, or
to equip them with skills and habits that will make them less likely to return to crime outside.
None of these goals is compatible with federal regulation of their wages and hours."); Hale v.
Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
310. The same theoretical problem arises with regard to child labor. Imagine a child whose
parents pay her for work in a family business or for household chores. The parents also use this
pay to enforce disciplinary rules, docking it for poor grades or staying out past curfew. A
productive work view would cast this arrangement as an employment relationship, and under
the FLSA these pay deductions would be illegal. The FLSA's mandatory economic terms would
preclude maintenance of certain kinds of authority relations. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 608(c) (2000)
(providing that monetarily penalizing a workfare worker for a welfare rule violation shall not be
deemed a wage reduction for FLSA purposes). That might be for better or for worse, but simply
acknowledging the relationship's economic aspect hardly seems to supply the answer.
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IV. How LAW CONSTITUTES EMPLOYMENT AS ECONOMIC
The previous Part argued that neither the exclusive market
nor the productive work account adequately captures employment's
economic character. This Part argues that these failures counsel
against using an economic/noneconomic distinction to implement a
descriptive account of employment relationships. 311 Instead, before
reconstructing legal definitions of employment, we must rethink the
descriptive relationship between employment law and employment.
The legal regulation of employment relationships ordinarily is
understood as a matter of classification followed by intervention. The
law first identifies an extra-legal social phenomenon (employment)
and then intervenes to modify it (e.g., mandating higher wages).
Neither process affects the type of phenomenon being regulated (still
employment, but better paid).
Against that view, this Part offers a constitutive account of
employment law as itself shaping what employment is and, most
important, what practices are employment. This constitutive
argument begins in Section IV.A by characterizing employment as a
"relational package," again drawing from Zelizer. Rather than being
reducible to any single characteristic, employment is a contingent
collection of particular practices, actors, meanings, and institutional
contexts. This concept allows me to specify the role of employment law
in Section IV.B. Rather than being a spectator to the process by which
elements are assembled into the employment relationship and then
reacting to that finished product, employment law actively contributes
distinctive elements to the package, shapes their interaction, and
reinforces their coherence as a package.
A. Employment as a Relational Package
As we saw in Part III, employment relationships always are
embedded in and shaped by particular institutional contexts and
social relations. On the one hand, employment is irreducible to the
arms-length financial bargains envisioned by the exclusive market
approach. On the other, it does not arise entirely without distinctions
among social contexts, as the productive work approach would
suppose. When seeking to capture this specificity, courts return
repeatedly to certain features of work relationships-voluntariness,
311. On employment law's descriptive approach, see discussion supra Part I.C. For an
analogous critique of distinctions between free and unfree forms of labor, see STEINFELD, supra
note 24, at 239.
20081 925
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
payment, location, and others-in their attempts to categorize the
relationships as economic or not. Although courts fail in their efforts
to analyze these factors as manifestations of a single master criterion
of market work, or to combine them in a consistent formula, their
decisions are patterned nonetheless. 312 Moreover, some outcomes are
relatively stable, particularly in the prison labor cases.
This Section develops the analytical device of relational
packages as a way to characterize these patterns in employment. It
examines how they achieve this stability and how law becomes one
site of conflict over their boundaries. Some elements of a relational
package, "relational markers," become focal points for attempts to
establish or deny the existence of a relationship, or to alter its scope. I
illustrate this general framework with the relational markers that
recur in the prison labor cases.
1. Relational Packages and Relational Work
An ordinary employee and an inmate worker both participate
in economic relationships with the organizations that supervise their
work. 313 Nonetheless, these relationships are not the same. So, too, are
there differences between any two "ordinary" employees, such as a
veteran mineworker in a coalmining community and a recent college
graduate at an internet startup. To understand how these
relationships are, and come to be, treated as the same or different for
particular purposes, we need analytical tools to characterize these
commonalities and distinctions and to relate these to processes of legal
categorization. This subsection introduces the concept of a relational
package as a way to do so.
One of Zelizer's crucial insights is that, while many varied
relations involve economic transactions, this commonality need not
lead to confusion among, or conflation of, these relations. 314 Instead,
specific variations among these economic transactions help to signify
the relationship's distinctive nature. For instance, Zelizer examines an
312. Cf. Harris, supra note 25, at 1740 (noting the failure of "blood" quantum to serve as an
objective basis for racial determinations).
313. "Economic" in the production-oriented sense.
314. In this regard, Zelizer's work provides a powerful challenge to the inevitability of the
"domino effect" that figures prominently in Margaret Radin's critique of commodification.
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 95-101 (1996); see Margaret Jane Radin &
Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 17, at 8, 17; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL
JUSTICE 290 (1999) (criticizing anticommodification arguments along similar lines). For an
illuminating discussion of the harms of relational confusion, see Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat,
80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1129 (2005).
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array of finely differentiated, and historically shifting, categories of
sexual relationships. 315  Prostitution, dating, engagement, and
marriage all involve both cross-sex sexual intimacy 31 6  and,
traditionally, direct or indirect income transfers from men to women.
Among other things, a specific type of sexual conduct may be
appropriate to a specific relationship, and engaging in that conduct
also helps establish the type of relationship in question. The same is
true for specific types of economic transactions. For example, handing
over cash immediately after having sex is not the same as sending an
expensive gift several days later or helping to pay the mortgage. 317
Each of the relationships that Zelizer describes is recognizably
economic, but this economic character is situated within and helps to
constitute distinct "relational packages."318 These packages link
together particular types of economic transactions, particular types of
sexual conduct, and other relational features (frequency of seeing one
another, other activities done together, expected longevity of the
relationship, degree of publicity, integration into relationships with
friends and family, etc.). 319 Additional elements implicit in Zelizer's
account are questions of identity and status. For instance, familiar
struggles contest whether intimates' race and gender are essential
components of marriage, as well as other socially legitimated
relationships.
Applying the relational packages concept to employment is
helpful in two ways. First, it characterizes relationships as
aggregations of discrete elements. But these elements acquire their
distinctive meaning, and their coherence, from their interaction. They
are not separate components that simply add up to one outcome.
Second, it follows that when two packages share a common element,
they need not be treated as analytically the same, even in that one
respect. As a result, we can now pose as a question whether any two
315. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 94-157.
316. Zelizer's examples are all cross-sex, and she does not pursue the sensitivity of these
relational packages to variations by gender and sexual orientation.
317. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 117 (discussing the importance of timing).
318. Although the substance of this concept comes directly from Zelizer's work, my
terminology differs slightly. I use "relational package" the way Zelizer uses a cluster of terms
interchangeably: "relations," "social relations," and "social categories." Id. at 37, 56-57. She uses
"relational package" more narrowly, to refer to a specific instance of a social relationship in all its
particularity, rather than to conventional or institutionalized categories. Id. at 56. My usage
captures both the specificity to relationships and their structure of linked elements. Cf. ERNESTO
LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY 93-148 (1985) (developing an
antiessentialist social theory organized around the "articulation" of "elements" into larger
discursive structures).
319. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 94-157.
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economic relationships are instances of a single relational package.
The answer does not follow from labeling them economic. Instead, the
economic aspect may connect to other elements in varied ways, each
characteristic of different relational packages.
In the relational package of employment, there must be
productive work performed under the control of and redounding to the
economic benefit of another actor: an employer. The worker, moreover,
receives economic benefits from the employer. This much is
uncontroversial. But clearly employment is a much richer package
than this, notwithstanding controversy about precisely what elements
define it.
Envision an employee, and additional elements reinforce those
already stated-elements that recur in the case law. Employees work
for corporations. Employers distribute their employees' work product
and are paid for doing so. Employees work in a place separate from
where they live and commute twice a day. They work most but not all
days each week. They support family members, especially spouses and
children. They are adults, not children, but not elderly either.
Employees identify with their work and are so identified by others,
even though work is burdensome and competes with other uses of
time. And so on.
This description is not meant to be comprehensive or precise,
but it surely is familiar. 320 The difficult part is that an element may
regularly be present in a relationship, and even contribute toward its
recognition as a conventional package, without being essential to it. In
the contemporary United States, most employees work primarily
during daylight hours, but no one would think that working the night
shift is not employment. Such elements often are not unique to
employment. Many of those above might apply to an owner of a
business or to a volunteer.
Actors care about the relational packages into which their
relationships fit. One reason is that classifications matter legally by
triggering or avoiding specific statutory requirements. Zelizer applies
the term "relational work" to the practices that maintain and
demarcate these packages:
For each meaningfully distinct category of social relations, people erect a boundary,
mark the boundary by means of names and practices, establish a set of distinctive
understandings and practices that operate within that boundary, designate certain sorts
of economic transactions as appropriate for the relation, bar other transactions as
320. Cf. Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing




inappropriate, and adopt certain media for reckoning and facilitating economic
transactions within the relation. All these efforts belong to relational work.
3 2 1
Relational work is necessary because the elements of relational
packages often overlap. Confronted with such ambiguities, efforts
must be made to emphasize elements associated with one package and
deemphasize those associated with another.322  Moreover, as
relationships exist over time, efforts are made to incorporate or
exclude elements with relational consequences. 323
2. Prison Labor's Employment Status as an Object of
Relational Work
When courts in prison labor cases explain what makes
employment "economic," they invoke the market economic form of
contract. Nonetheless, when determining whether a particular work
situation fits within this form, they look for particular kinds of actors
that interact not just in a specific way (contract) but also in a
particular place. In other words, courts present employment as a
relational package.
To illustrate how this packaging occurs, I again draw from
feminist scholarship on separate spheres. This literature explores how
the market/family divide relies not just on abstract accounts of how
markets and families operate according to different rules, but also on
gendered distinctions between men and women, citizen and
dependent, and public work and private home. In the prison labor
context, these tropes often reappear in modified form. Relative to most
discussion of the family, sentimentality is less prominent and racial
difference is more so.32
4
321. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 35.
322. See id. at 187 (noting that, to differentiate themselves from nurses, physicians "typically
wear white coats or scrub suits, carry stethoscopes, and insist on being called 'Doctor' ").
323. See id. at 118 (illustrating how the early twentieth century relationship of "treating"
was distinguished from both dating and prostitution with the example of a woman who "rejected
certain gifts from men, such as silk stockings, 'because they'd want to put them on [me]' ").
324. Regarding sentiment, see generally BOYDSTON, supra note 3, at 148.58 (describing the
"pastoralization" of housework in the nineteenth century); Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and
Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997); Silbaugh, supra note 3; cf. Anthony
Kronman, Op-Ed., Are Graduate Students Workers?, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2001, at A13 (arguing
that graduate teaching assistants should not be considered NLRA employees of a university
because doing so would "compromise the culture and values they share" in which the school
nurtures students' development as "individuals with distinctive views and voices"). Regarding
race, see generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); Angela Y.
Davis, Race, Gender, and Prison History: From the Convict Lease System to the Supermax Prison,
in PRISON MASCULINITIES 35 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001); LoIc Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass
Incarceration: Rethinking the 'Race Question' in the US, NEW LEFT REV., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 41.
Imprisonment rates for black men are seven times that for white men and for black women are
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a. Free Labor, Independence, and Competence
One way that courts position inmate workers outside
employment is to characterize employees as "free labor."325 In the
United States, free labor and related concepts historically have formed
an important framework that links political standing, economic
participation, and social status. 326  Participation in wage labor
organized through contract has been one defining feature of free
labor, 327 but free labor also has been constituted through opposition to
and distinction from subordinated categories of slaves, paupers, and
housewives. 328 These relational contrasts have been articulated
through ideas of the working person's economic independence from
employers and the state, in combination with a family's economic
dependence on the worker.3 29 This independence, in turn, is grounded
in particular personal competences, including rationality, discipline,
intelligence, and strength. Ascribed race and gender differences help
mediate the distinction between the competent, independent citizens
four times that for white women. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 210677, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2004, at 8 tbl.11 (Oct.
2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf. These disparities cumulate over
a lifetime, leading to estimates that one in three black men born in 2001 will be incarcerated at
some point in his lifetime, compared to one in seventeen for white men. THOMAS P. BONCZAR,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197976, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT,
PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 8 tbl.9 (Aug. 2003),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf. Both race-centered analysis of
incarceration, which focuses on men of color, and gender-centered analysis of family, which
emphasizes white women's experiences, benefit from attention to race-gender intersectionality.
See generally JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW (1985); ALICE KESSLER-
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK (1982); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Davis, supra; Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and
Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 1 (1993).
325. Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005); Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d
202, 206 (11th Cir. 1997); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Harker
v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993).
326. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN (1970); EVELYN NAKANO
GLENN, UNEQUAL FREEDOM (1998); STANLEY, supra note 3.
327. STANLEY, supra note 3, at 61.
328. Id. at 60-61; Goldberg, supra note 308, at 338; Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth
Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1669 (2001); VanderVelde,
supra note 112, at 438.
329. STANLEY, supra note 3, at 138-64; Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of
"Dependency'" Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, in FRASER, supra note 3, at 121, 142-
44; see also BOYDSTON, supra note 3, at 44 (describing similar pattern in early nineteenth




of free labor and incompetent, dependent others. 330 This history
continues to resonate widely today.
331
Beyond simply using the phrase, courts tie employee status to
many of these familiar features of free labor that situate wage
contracts as just one aspect of a more fully elaborated social position
and way of life. Portraying inmates as dependent, courts emphasize
prisoners' reliance on the state for the provision of food, housing, and
other basic needs:332 "So long as the [prison] provides for these needs,"
inmate workers do not fall within the employee class protected by the
statute.333 Somewhat less frequently, courts also suggest that, were
they not imprisoned, inmates would not be able to hold down jobs on
330. BOYDSTON, supra note 3, at xviii; GLENN, supra note 326; JONES, supra note 230;
LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 180-84; CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Ann
Shola Orloff & Renee A. Monson, Citizens, Workers, or Fathers? Men in the History of US Social
Policy, in MAKING MEN INTO FATHERS: MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF
FATHERHOOD 61 (Barbara Hobson ed., 2002); Schultz, supra note 3; Wendy W. Williams, Firing
the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment
Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981). I am here specifically referring to
competency for market work. On the complementary role played by gendered ascriptions of
competence at familial roles like caregiving, see SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS
OF MOTHERHOOD 99-107 (1996); Williams, From Difference to Dominance, supra note 3, at 1448-
52.
331. See, e.g., MICHtLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN 24, 57, 61, 132 (2000)
(exploring how white men link race, work discipline, unemployment, and public benefits receipt);
Fraser & Gordon, supra note 329 (tracing the evolution of "dependency" discourse to the
present); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563
(1996).
332. See Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 206 (11th Cir. 1997); Gambetta v. Prison
Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 1119, 1124 (11th Cir. 1997);
Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1996); McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976,
980 (8th Cir. 1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1396 (9th Cir. 1993); Vanskike v. Peters, 974
F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1992); Gilbreath v. Cutter
Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1991). In doing so, courts systematically ignore the
question of how inmates use their earnings from prison labor, whether as remittances to family,
for purchase in prison of consumer products or services beyond basic prison provisions, or
savings that are used after release. See DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE 140-42
(2004); Michael G. Santos, Commissaries, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 100 (Marilyn
D. McShane & Frank P. Williams eds., 1996); David B. Kalinich, Contraband, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN PRISONS, supra, at 111.
Notably, opinions supportive of inmate employment claims do not challenge this portrayal of
inmates as radically unlike "free labor." Instead, they accept the dichotomy but argue that
protecting inmate working conditions is necessary to protect free labor. See Hale, 993 F.3d at
1403; Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1555 (5th Cir. 1990); Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735
F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1984).
333. Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993). But see Carter, 735 F.2d
at 12-13 (rejecting this argument). This argument draws on one of the FLSA's statutory
purposes: to provide a "decent standard of living for all workers." Gambetta, 112 F.3d at 1124;
accord Harker, 990 F.2d at 133.
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their own due to their lack of skills or self-discipline. 334 The ubiquitous
invocation of prison labor's rehabilitative function suggests something
similar.
By highlighting economic dependence on the prison, courts
place inmates in opposition to the "free citizens in the labor market"
who are self-reliant, independent, and competent wageworkers.
335
Instead, judicial images of inmate workers evoke both the figure of the
welfare dependent-defined as reliant on state support by virtue of
inability or unwillingness to participate in market labor 336-and also
that of the slave or servant who, while economically productive, is
incorporated into the master's household, rather than using his wages
to act as an independent consumer in his own home.
337
The wage earner's independence from state and employer is
closely related to family members' dependence on this breadwinner.
3 8
Drawing on a framework of radical separation between the prison and
the rest of society, courts place inmate workers outside this
masculinized provider role by characterizing them as lone individuals
and ignoring their ongoing ties, and financial obligations, to family
members outside the prison.33 9 Thus, the prison's provision of food,
shelter, and medical care to the prisoner is taken as meeting inmates'
334. See Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005) (asserting that prison labor
"equip[s] [inmates] with skills and habits that will make them less likely to return to crime
outside"); Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43 (asserting that prison labor "trains prisoners in the
discipline and skills of work"); Hale, 993 F.2d at 1398 (explaining that the work inmates do
provides valuable skills and job training). In fact, most inmates were employed full-time prior to
their arrest. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 195670, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 10 tbl.14 (Jan. 2003,
rev. Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ojp.govfbjs/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. That said, relative to the
remainder of the population, inmates in aggregate have lower levels of educational attainment,
id. at 2 tbl.1, and, were they not incarcerated, would be substantially more likely to be
unemployed, Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market?
The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 AM. J. SOC. 1030 (1999).
335. McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1239 (Ala. 1975). Ironically, when evaluating
employment's control dimensions, workers' dependence on and subordination to their employers
is taken to be the very essence of the employment relationship. See supra Part I.B.
336. STANLEY, supra note 3, at 98-137; Fraser & Gordon, supra note 329, at 121; Goldberg,
supra note 308, at 338.
337. STANLEY, supra note 3, at 18, 166; VanderVelde, supra note 112, at 439, 459.
338. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 230, at 36-37; STANLEY, supra note 3, at 138-64; Williams,
From Difference to Dominance, supra note 3, at 1445. Enabling (at least some) wage workers to
fulfill this role often has been one explicit purpose of labor and employment regulation. EILEEN
BORIS, HOME TO WORK 31, 201, 216, 314 (1994); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 230, at 68-72;
WITT, supra note 112, at 35, 127-33. Characterizing non-wage earners as dependent erases their
unpaid contributions both to other household members' earnings capacity and to household life
more generally. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.




basic needs, without considering how family members may have lost
access to the inmate's wages. 340
Both free labor and contemporary incarceration are intensely
racialized terrain, and this racial dimension seemingly bolsters the
accounts of prison labor described above.3 41 Characterizing inmates as
in need of rehabilitation into disciplined workers evokes longstanding
racist discourses-from Reconstruction to contemporary welfare
reform-that attribute laziness, unreliability, and incompetence to
people of color, especially African American men. In turn, these have
been used to justify labor coercion toward those deemed unsuited to
the institutions of free labor and to explain away labor market
disadvantage.3 42 Additionally, African American workers have been
assumed to possess, or be entitled to, lower material needs than
whites. 343 In part, this assumption reflects the racialization of the
male breadwinner ideal. Insofar as African American women, unlike
their white counterparts, long have been expected to work in the labor
market, 344 African American men were not always included in policies
designed to allow white men to maintain households with nonmarket-
working wives.3 45 And to this day, portrayals of African American men
as disconnected from the labor market are closely linked to portrayals
of disconnection from family responsibilities.
346
340. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1396 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Harker v. State Use
Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 132 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus, courts dismiss as inapposite the FLSA's goal of
guaranteeing a basic standard of living.
341. See Wacquant, supra note 324, at 52-53 (arguing for the existence of racialized "carceral
continuum" between the prison and jobless urban neighborhoods that places African-Americans
in opposition to "working families").
342. See LAMONT, supra note 331, at 24, 57, 61, 132; LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 180-84;
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 113, 118 (1996); Fraser & Gordon, supra note
329.
343. GLENN, supra note 326, at 82, 154; LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 47-48
(1994); cf. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 230, at 15 (discussing linkages among gender, perceived
need, and wages).
344. See GORDON, supra note 343, at 275-76; SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS 172
(1998); STANLEY, supra note 3, at 148, 188; Roberts, supra note 3, at 875 ("The conception of
motherhood confined to the home and opposed to wage labor never applied to Black women.").
345. See METTLER, supra note 344, at 186; William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare
Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1831-38 (2001); see
also GLENN, supra note 329, at 82.
346. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 342, at 91-92, 104-07; Ronald B. Mincy, Charles E. Lewis,
Jr. & Wen-Jui Han, Left Behind: Less-Educated Young Black Men in the Economic Boom of the
1990s, in BLACK MALES LEFT BEHIND 1, 1 (Ronald B. Mincy ed., 2006); Ron Haskins, Poor
Fathers and Public Policy: What Is To Be Done?, in BLACK MALES LEFT BEHIND, supra, 249; cf.
Kimberlb Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 195, 210-11 (Daivd Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990) (criticizing this tendency for
pathologizing African American single motherhood).
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Put simply, courts imply that, absent imprisonment, inmate
workers would be single, unemployed, and adrift. Their distinction
from free labor, in other words, inheres not just in the present
organization of their work but also in their persons more deeply. In an
analysis that equates employees with free labor, the market becomes
an arena inhabited by specific sorts of people leading specific sorts of
lives. Insofar as courts imagine prisoners to be quite different, it
buttresses the conclusion that their work is not market work.
b. The State as a Nonmarket Entity
Just as courts imagine market workers to be certain sorts of
people, they also imagine market employers to be particular types of
organizations, specifically nongovernmental ones. In other words, they
draw on that component of the self-regulating market ideal that
opposes the economy to the state.
Many prison labor cases give weight to whether a
governmental entity versus a private firm supervises inmate workers
and controls their work product.3 47 The watershed Vanskike opinion,
for instance, set aside prior pro-coverage opinions like Carter and
Watson because those cases involved inmates working for "private,
outside employers."348 Similarly, Gambetta v. Prison Rehabilitative
Industries held that plaintiff inmates were not "employees" because of
a threshold determination that they worked for "an instrumentality of
the state."349 Florida law established the entity in question, the Prison
Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc. ("PRIDE"),
as a nonprofit corporation mandated to "simulatef a real-world
business environment" and managed independently of the prison
system by a gubernatorially appointed board.350
The involvement of a state institution functions to cast the
relationship as "penological, not pecuniary,"35 1 even in a case like
Gambetta that involved "prison industries which generate income for
347. For the weaknesses of this approach, see discussion supra Part II.B.
348. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992).
349. 112 F.3d 1119, 1123 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Larum v. Silver State Indus., 46 F.3d 1142,
1995 WL 29484, at *1 (9th Cir. 1995) (table) ("In order to establish a claim under the FLSA, an
inmate must demonstrate that he is working with a private person, corporation, association or
firm.").
350. Id. at 1121.
351. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Sims v. Parke
Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 787 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affid, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) (per




the prison."352 In contrast, inmates working for outside entities "[are
not] working as prison labor, but as free laborers in transition to their
expected discharge from the prison."35 3 Again, the identity of the
actors involved strongly influences how the relationship is interpreted.
That interpretation draws on a pre-existing opposition between
market economies and state mandates and further deploys it to
entrench a more specific division between market employment and
penal labor.
c. The Labor Market as Public Space
Work within the prison complex serves as a marker of
nonemployment. 354 Vanskike consistently fused institutional and
physical locations, opposing "private, outside employers" to work
"within the prison and for the prison."355 Some cases specifically
invoke the image of prison walls as a relevant demarcation. 35 6 The
prison is a confined, particular place, in contrast to an
undifferentiated economy, open to all comers.
This spatial contrast bears striking similarity to the way that
physical separation between a public workplace and a private home
has facilitated the opposition between (market) work and family
life.35 7 This familiar contrast can be extended to the prison labor
context. Punishment scholars have identified a process of spatial
privatization in which "offenders are now routinely sequestered from
the sphere of normal social life, and the 'problem' that they represent
is managed 'off-stage,' in a discrete institutional setting which
carefully controls its impact upon the public consciousness." 358 This
separation and privatization of punishment, and of offenders,
facilitates categorizing prison labor as "noneconomic"; doing otherwise
would require integrating offenders into the same institutional
mechanisms and legal categories that govern ordinary citizens' daily
352. Gambetta, 112 F.3d at 1124.
353. Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 155-157.
355. 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992); see also sources cited supra note 155.
356. Sims, 334 F. Supp. at 786; Manville v. Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ., 272
N.W.2d 162, 165-66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
357. See generally BORIS, supra note 338; BOYDSTON, supra note 3. Labor performed by
women within a family home, even if it is paid directly or is part of the operations of a family
business, often has been classified for various regulatory or statistical purposes as part of their
family responsibilities, rather than as market participation. See STANLEY, supra note 3, at 175-
217; Nancy Folbre, The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth-Century Economic
Thought, 16 SIGNS 463 (1991); Siegel, supra note 3, at 1077.
358. GARLAND, supra note 221, at 235.
2008] 935
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
lives. It is not surprising, then, that courts endorsing employment
status for work release sometimes go beyond physical location to
assign participants a liminal social location as "free laborers in
transition to their expected discharge from the prison."
359
In the instances discussed above, courts engage in relational
work (as did the parties before them), invoking the presence or
absence of various relational markers and assembling them into a
coherent picture of the relational package that best fits prison labor.
The premise throughout is that employment exists as a relational
package, that these markers clump together, and that when one is
absent, it indicates something about the relationship as a whole.
As we have seen already, an actor's relational work need not
succeed. For instance, although Gambetta found work for a
governmental entity to be an essential marker of an employment
relationship, other prison labor opinions refuse to place much weight
on this marker. 360 Prison labor aside, governmental and nonprofit
organizations are commonplace employers, and the statutes at issue in
these cases specifically recognizes them as such.
361
I make no attempt here to explain why in some cases, but not
in others, an actor's relational work succeeds in achieving recognition
of a relationship as an instance of one relational package rather than
another. 362 Of greater interest is that it can succeed at all, that the
terms are so consistent even if the outcomes are not, and that
sometimes the outcomes do stabilize. Today, patient-workers at
mental institutions are employees, but inmate workers doing similar
work for a prison are not.
More importantly, the coherence of employment itself endures.
Productive work may be found in many relationships, but such
relationships are not infinitely varied. Employment is one of them,
and the law is not alone in treating employment as a single category
that hangs together, even if it may be rough around the edges. 363 This
359. Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005).
360. See sources cited supra note 160.
361. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s)(1)(C) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (h) (2000); see YMCA of Pikes
Peak Region, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 914 F.2d 1442, 1447-49 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying same standards
to nonprofit and for-profit employers).
362. For an explanation of the outcome of conflicting efforts at relational work concerning
the employment status of New Deal "work relief," see Goldberg, supra note 308, at 345-48.
363. On the consolidation of the modern employment relationship within corporate personnel
practices, see JACOBY, supra note 229.
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coherence is particularly remarkable because so much variation exists
in the relational markers that seem significant and because actors
interested in doing relational work can generate that variation self-
consciously. Work can be contracted out or brought in-house, it can be
located on prison grounds or off, products can be consumed or sold,
and so on. This variability is what makes classification so difficult,
and yet it seems neither to shake our confidence in the coherence of
the categories nor to overwhelm our ability to use them. Employment
law itself is an important part of how this happens, as I argue in the
next Section.
B. Employment Law's Role in Packaging Employment
Judicial examination of employment's economic character
proceeds against the background assumption that employment is an
extra-legal category. The law may be called on to sharpen up some
fuzzy boundaries, sometimes to carve out exceptions for distinctively
legal reasons, and to adjudicate disputes over classification in
particular cases, but at root it is building on a pre-existing category,
just the way it would for a law about cats or carrots or carbon. The
point of legal classification is to decide whether legal institutions
should do something, and so of course, in that sense, the law affects
what employment is. That, however, is a matter of what happens to
instances of employment, not whether they are employment in the
first place. A law requiring cats to wear collars affects cats, but it does
not turn cats into dogs, let alone carrots.
This Section argues for a different account of the relationship
between employment law and employment as a social phenomenon,
specifically with regard to differentiation between employment and
noneconomic relationships. Insofar as employment exists as a
relatively coherent, stable relational package, employment law plays
an important (but not all-important) role in achieving and
maintaining this state of affairs.36 4 This argument proceeds first by
reviewing recent sociolegal theory and research on the relationship
between legal regulation and regulated institutions. In particular, I
draw on a useful typology of facilitative, regulatory, and constitutive
roles that has been developed by sociologist Lauren Edelman and her
collaborators. Next, I illustrate employment's constitutive role vis-A-
364. Cf. Carbado, supra note 25, at 967 (arguing that "in the Fourth Amendment context, the
[Supreme] Court both constructs race (that is, produces a particular conception of what race is)
and reifies race (that is, conceptualizes race as existing completely outside of or apart from the
very legal frameworks within which the Court produces it)").
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vis employment's economic character, showing a number of ways in
which employment law helps to generate the relational markers of
employment as a distinct relational package.
1. Law's Facilitative, Regulatory, and Constitutive Roles
Legal disputes are an important forum for relational work. In
individual cases, courts decide the category into which the parties'
relationship fits for specific legal purposes. That adjudicative process
becomes a site in which the parties seek to place themselves into one
relational package or another. 365 In this way, law provides a
"facilitative environment" for relational work.
366
More importantly, law helps to determine the elements of these
relational packages through its operation as a "regulatory
environment." 367 As Jill Hasday has argued, the law differentiates
among various intimate relationships in order to forbid, permit,
mandate, or enforce particular types of economic exchange. 368 In this
way, law affects the content of a relational package by inserting
specific legal consequences among the various elements making up the
package. So, for instance, the legal distinction between marital and
nonmarital relationships means that agreements to exchange
household services for money or other resources are unenforceable
within marriage but enforceable outside of it; an agreement involving
sex may be criminal outside marriage but permissible (though not
enforceable) within it.369
This regulatory aspect extends beyond formal legal mandates.
Hasday argues that these relationally specific regulations of economic
transactions are "mechanisms to mark and uphold the importance and
distinctiveness" of particular relationships.3 7 0  In other words,
substantive legal mandates also influence the meaning and normative
status of other elements of the relational package, in part by
differentiating them from similar elements of other relationships. So,
for instance, different meanings may attach to payment from patient
to doctor versus from customer to plumber, in part because of how the
365. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 39, 49.
366. Edelman & Stryker, supra note 23, at 535-36; Edelman & Suchman, supra note 23, at
482-83.
367. Edelman & Stryker, supra note 23, at 535, 537; Edelman & Suchman, supra note 23, at
483, 496.
368. Hasday, supra note 3, at 492-94.
369. Id. at 502-11.
370. Id. at 522.
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doctor-patient relationship is legally regulated.37 1 Similarly, Edelman
and Suchman differentiate among coercive, normative, and cognitive
mechanisms of law's regulatory facet.372
Insofar as these normative and cognitive aspects of legal
regulation are distinctive in character, they help to mark the
relationship's boundary in addition to shaping its substance. That is,
they may communicate that the relationship is of this and not that
sort. These are examples of what I have called relational markers
more generally. Borrowing again from differentiation among intimate
relationships, the exchange and wearing of engagement or wedding
rings may both be elements of particular relational packages-acts
that are expected in and impart specific meanings to a relationship-
and also relational markers. These acts clarify what type of
relationship is at hand, both for participants and for observers.
Helpful as it is, Hasday's expressive account of law and
economic relationships leaves out the very problem that is so vexing in
the employment law cases involving paid nonmarket work: What type
of relationship is it in the first place? Before the law can "mark and
uphold the importance and distinctiveness" of particular
relationships, 373 it must know how to tell them apart. 374
Similarly, judicial analyses of employment largely reflect a
view of law as playing a facilitative role in individual disputes and a
regulatory role at a structural level. The law attaches certain
consequences-rights to minimum wages or against discrimination,
and a litigation vehicle to enforce them-to being in an employment
relationship. Before triggering such consequences, the law first must
determine whether the parties exhibit the extra-legal relational
package of employment. According to this view, the law may add
elements to the package and shape how the elements interrelate, but
these additions do not change the category into which the underlying
relationship fits. That determination can be (and must be) made prior
to regulation.
Likewise, scholarship on the contemporary employment
relationship largely treats it as an extra-legal category arising out of a
particular set of economic relations. Consider analyses of the control
dimension of employment. One influential approach sees employment
law as having more or less "fit" the real relationships that existed
371. Id. at 522-24.
372. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 23, at 496.
373. Hasday, supra note 3, at 522.
374. This may represent a more general weakness with expressive accounts of legal
distinctions among relationships characterized by different forms of valuation. See, e.g., CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 70-107 (1997).
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during the New Deal, but subsequently having "lagged" behind
changes in the nature of employment and the organization of work
more generally.375 A more cynical view sees employment law as unable
or unwilling to see the real employment relationships that are being
disguised by evasive employers' manipulation of organizational
form. 376 Either way, employment law's job is to identify correctly the
real relationships out there in the economy, relationships that exist
exogenously but require regulation.
377
A more robust view of law's role, but still a regulatory one as I
use the term here, appears in the tradition of critical labor law
history.378 Take, for instance, Christopher Tomlins's important work
on nineteenth century U.S. employment law.3 7 9 Tomlins argues that
"the relations of parties to employment contracts were construed to be
relations of domination and subordination."380 During the period in
question, "work in America had become a far less heterogeneous
relationship ... , acquiring a uniform definition and set of
characteristics as a single universal and impersonal relation founded
on wage labor."38' Tomlins emphasizes the emergence of the new legal
category of employment, but in his account, the scope of that category
appears to track external shifts in the organization of productive
labor. "Disciplinary power" was "implanted in the employment
relationship" by courts that applied the common law of master and
servant to this new employment relationship. 38 2 This analysis focuses
on how law shaped the rules, norms, and meanings operative within
employment, not on how law determined which activities were
employment in the first place.38 3 Applying Edelman and Suchman's
375. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 5.
376. See Linder, supra note 5. Seeing past such manipulations to what lies beneath is the
conceit of the "economic reality" concept under the FLSA.
377. Cf. Carbado, supra note 25, at 978 (criticizing the Supreme Court's racial jurisprudence
for producing "the notion that race is already 'out there'; the [Court's legal] project is thus to
determine what race is").
378. See generally Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of
Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450 (1981).
379. TOMLINS, supra note 24.
380. Id. at xi.
381. Id. at 260.
382. Id. at 261 (emphasis added); see also ATLESON, supra note 229, at 90 (arguing that
contemporary labor functions "to structure or fill out" the content of "the employment
relationship"); TILLY & TILLY, supra note 105, at 132 (characterizing the state's role in the labor
market as "specifying rights and authority within the employment relationship" (emphasis
added)).
383. Likewise, Karen Orren, despite developing an elaborate analysis of the "workplace as a
jurisdiction" ruled by employers whose authority was enforced by courts, never addresses how it
was determined who was subject to this jurisdiction. KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM:
[Vol. 61:3:857940
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typology of how law regulates, Tomlins's great contribution is to go
beyond an analysis of employment law's coercive possibilities38 4 in
order to explore its normative 38 5 and cognitive 38 6 influence on
employment relationships.
38 7
What remains to be done, particularly in research on the
modern statutory schemes, is to examine the constitutive operation of
employment law. 388 In Edelman and Suchman's formulation, as a
"constitutive environment... the legal system constructs and
empowers various classes of organizational actors and delineates the
relationships between them."38 9 They suggest as an example that
LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 102-05 (1991); cf. Dobbin &
Dowd, supra note 230 (arguing that a variety of social process, including antitrust policy, shaped
the particular form that competitive markets took, without addressing how they identify market
activity). Insofar as Tomlins addresses the scope of the employment relationship, he focuses on
the distinction between employees and independent contractors. See TOMLINS, supra note 24, at
231, 267-68; see also STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 129, 302. Atleson criticizes labor law's
exclusions of managerial and supervisory employees from the legal definition of employment, but
he does so by contrasting such artificial distinctions to the underlying unity of workers in a well-
defined, extra-legal relationship with employers. See ATLESON, supra note 229, at 173 ("[The
managerial exclusion] represent[s] an attempt to mask or avoid the recognition that a clear
confrontation exists between owners, on one hand, and workers, on the other. To blur the
confrontation, a vaguely defined group was created composed of those who are neither traditional
blue-collar workers nor owners.").
384. Cf. TOMLINS, supra note 24, at 292 (characterizing courts as "[t]urning aside challenges
from employees to employers' disciplinary power"). In particular, Tomlins rejects the view that
employment law should be seen either as failing to intervene (coercively) in power relations
originating elsewhere, including in basic inequalities of property, or simply as actively
reproducing those power disparities. See TOMLINS, supra note 24, at xiii; Tomlins, supra note 18.
385. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 23, at 496 (describing law as a source of "values,
ethics, and role expectations, which organizations (and their members) then elaborate and, to
various extents, internalize").
386. Id. (describing law as "mak[ing] certain forms of action seem more natural, plausible,
and fitting than others").
387. In this sense, and in keeping with a critique of legal classification as a purely
descriptive exercise, see supra Part I.C, Tomlins insists that "[legal discourse does not simply
catalogue social relations received from elsewhere" and instead "helps determine.., the very
nature of social relations." TOMLINS, supra note 24, at 226.
388. There is some risk of terminological confusion here. Tomlins characterizes his work as
showing "how the postrevolutionary legal order was constitutive of social relations." TOMLINS,
supra note 24, at xiii; see also FORBATH, supra note 24, at x. As I read Tomlins, what Edelman
and Suchman call the regulatory character of law includes what he labels "constitutive." To be
sure, Tomlins's usage is hardly idiosyncratic. Cf. FORBATH, supra note 24, at x. Indeed,
Edelman's later work with Robin Stryker uses "regulatory" in a somewhat narrower fashion
more akin to the "coercive" component of regulation in her prior work with Suchman, see
Edelman & Stryker, supra note 23, at 537 (at one point equating the "regulatory environment"
with "substantive rules"), and, citing Tomlins's work as an example, uses "constitutive" in a
broader fashion that seemingly includes the "normative" and "cognitive" aspects of regulation,
see id. at 540-41.
389. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 23, at 483; accord Edelman & Stryker, supra note 23,
at 540-42; see also Tomlins, supra note 18, at 67 (discussing "subjection").
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"[1]aw generates understandings. . . [of] who is or is not an employee,"
but they do not elaborate.390 Insofar as scholars have pursued this
question, they have done so historically and with regard to
differentiation among employment, work performed within the
household, and involuntary servitude. 391 But the differentiation of
employment, and in particular its differentiation as quintessentially
economic, is an ongoing process in the present. Moreover, it implicates
a whole host of institutions positioned as outside the economy, not just
the family household.
2. A Constitutive Analysis of Law and Employment
Employment law helps to constitute employment as a
relational package. I mean this not just in the regulatory sense of
adding to, subtracting from, or otherwise influencing the content of
employment relationships, but in the more fundamental sense of
giving employment a separate existence and differentiating it from
other relationships. Nor do I mean this in the trivial sense that legal
institutions decide the legal definition of employment. Instead,
employment law influences the "facts on the ground" to which legal
classification responds. By saying "influences" rather than
"determines," I mean to leave room both for the mediation of legal
doctrine by other institutions and for reciprocal influence on that
doctrine.392 Indeed, I have shown already how employment law draws
on and rearticulates extant institutional forms and cultural categories
in its analyses of employment's economic character. 393 On display here
is "the endogeneity of both law and the economy." 394
390. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 23, at 503; accord Edelman & Stryker, supra note 23,
at 540. Critical Race Theory engages analogous issues in studies of judicial racial
determinations. See LOPEZ, supra note 25; Harris, supra note 25, at 1736-41.
391. See BOYDSTON, supra note 3; STEINFELD, supra note 24; Siegel, supra note 3; Tomlins,
supra note 18.
392. See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406 (1999).
393. See supra Part IV.A.2.
394. Edelman & Stryker, supra note 23, at 542. Such an argument necessarily stretches
beyond what can be studied directly with the doctrinal materials I have emphasized thus far,
and so below I integrate examples from and analogies to others' social scientific research and
readily available sources. Additional research using different methods will be able to go much
further than what I begin here, as a rich literature already does with regard to how
organizations and employees respond to, implement, and reshape antidiscrimination law. See,
e.g., Albiston, supra note 320; Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional
Construction of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203 (2007); Edelman et al.,
supra note 392; Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees' Rights Consciousness and the
Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 83 (2005).
942 [Vol. 61:3:857
PRISON LABOR
This subsection identifies several mechanisms through which
this constitutive process operates with respect to employment's
economic character. First, the behaviors mandated by regulation may
serve as relational markers. Second, organizations' efforts to avoid or
comply with these mandates may have secondary effects on behaviors
that are relational markers. Third, the normative and cognitive
dimensions of regulatory action may alter how existing elements of a
relational package are interpreted in ways that influence their
availability as regulatory markers. Fourth, by promoting regularity of
institutional form and differentiation between employment and other
work arrangements, employment law promotes the impression that
this regularity arises from some intrinsic connection among elements
of the relational package.
395
a. Regulatory Mandates as Relational Markers
Employment law sometimes differentiates employment from
other relationships by mandating practices that themselves serve as
relational markers. For instance, to distinguish inmate labor from
employment, courts often cite prisons' control over inmate wages-
such as diverting them to victim restitution 396 and routing the
remainder into restricted accounts or scrip 397-- and their direct
provision of many of inmates' basic needs.398 Inmates thus lack one
relational marker of employment: work performed for cash by an
independent consumer.3
99
What complicates matters is that the FLSA itself mandates
that employees ordinarily receive minimum wages in the form of cash
395. These mechanisms focus on bottom-line legal outcomes with regard to familiar
categories (like employment) and on organizational interactions with substantive legal
requirements (like the form and amount of payment) rather than on the rhetorical strategies or
conceptual apparatus of the judicial opinions themselves. In this way, I mean to address apt,
though sympathetic, criticisms leveled at constitutive claims made in the Critical Legal Studies
tradition and to draw on the empirical resources of Law and Society scholarship. See generally
Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and
the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 903 (1996); see also Gordon, supra note
147, at 575-76 (providing a Critical Legal Studies reading of contract law as a "theatre... for the
expression of ideology").
396. See 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2) (Supp. II 2002) (authorizing deductions of up to 80% of wages
in PIE program); sources cited supra note 241.
397. See Mary Bosworth, Commissary, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES, supra note 238; 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 127 (1995) (describing federal system of
managing prisoners' funds); 28 C.F.R. § 545.11 (2006) (specifying inmates' obligatory payment
schedule out of prison-managed funds, with variation by participation in labor programs);
ZELIZER, supra note 281, at 17 & n.37, 203.
398. See Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
399. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.a.
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"free and clear."40 0 Therefore, were inmate workers classified as
employees, the absence of this particular relational marker would be
an FLSA violation. Inmates would have a right to retain the same
control over their wages as over any outside income and subject to the
same restrictions. Moreover, to offset the increased payments, prisons
likely would start charging inmates for food and lodging40 1 or seek to
count their direct provision as an in-kind wage permitted by the
FLSA.4 02
FLSA compliance-triggered by legal classification as
employees 4 03-thus would have a recursive effect on the threshold
400. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.27-.35 (2006) (interpreting the statutory definition of a "wage"
under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2000)).
401. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 144. Thus, inmates' wage income might
revert to the prison through general mechanisms requiring inmates to contribute toward the
costs of their incarceration. The FLSA would require simply that the prison not single out prison-
labor wages as the only resource subject to this reimbursement requirement, and that it
distinguish between the two capacities in which the prison and inmate interact. Though the
practice may be expanding, currently jurisdictions rarely assess inmates for the costs of
incarceration. When they do, the efforts typically target only those who are most able to pay,
rather than assessing an across-the-board fee, and governments make only limited efforts to
collect unpaid fees after release. BARBARA KRAUTH & KARIN STAYTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FEES PAID BY JAIL INMATES: FEE CATEGORIES, REVENUES, AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES IN A
SAMPLE OF U.S. JAILS 33 (2005), available at http://nicic.org/Downloads/PDF/Library/021153.pdf;
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS PROGRAM STATEMENT 5380.06, at 4 (1999),
available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5380_006.pdf; Fox Butterfield, Many Local
Officials Now Make Inmates Pay Their Own Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at Al.
402. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (including in calculation of "wages" the "reasonable cost... to
the employer of furnishing such employee with board, lodging, or other facilities"); Hale v.
Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Norris, J., dissenting); Vanskike v.
Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1992); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 144. Using
in-kind provision to satisfy wage obligations would raise difficult questions about valuation,
including whether to credit the prison with costs associated with security and confinement. Such
costs would be excluded if they are deemed to be "primarily for the benefit or convenience of the
employer." 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.3(d)(1), 531.32(c). Moreover, lodging and food costs might fail the
requirement that acceptance of in-kind over cash wages must "be voluntary and uncoerced." Id. §
531.30. Cf. Walter M. Luers, Note, Workfare Wages Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 203 (1998) (analyzing analogous issues for treating welfare benefits as wages
in workfare programs). A final problem is that the prison's provision of basic needs is not
conditional on the inmate's work; inmates would not be starved or evicted if they refused or were
unable to participate in a work program, even if they might suffer other punishment.
403. A legal ruling on the applicability of the FLSA to prison labor is the sort that is
especially likely to produce a widespread, proactive, and relatively consistent institutional
response. Prisons are large institutions with relatively high organizational capacity; they operate
in a highly legalized environment in which inmates can be expected to sue if possible; and they
are well organized in a way likely to promote diffusion of "best practices" in response to legal
changes. Once FLSA applicability was established, any violations likely would be very easy to
detect and very widespread. Payment practices are transparent and systematic, and the FLSA's
substantive requirements are quite clear. See Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, The Diffusion of
Rights: From Law on the Books to Organizational Rights Practices, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 493,
503-06 (2006); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992).
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issue of coverage: the inmates now would look more like employees. 40 4
In this way, the absence of important relational markers sometimes
can be interpreted as proof of employment law violations, not as the
absence of an employment relationship itself.
40 5
A related point applies to the presence of relational markers. In
the paradigmatic relationships that courts use as a foil to prison labor,
employers already largely accept and comply with their employment
law obligations. In addition to unconditional cash payment, the FLSA
requires certain record-keeping practices.406 An organization asserting
that a worker is not an employee may exclude her from the employee
payroll system or not maintain any records at all.40 7 Doing so makes
the relationship look less like ordinary employment, but ordinary
employment looks the way it does in part because it already has been
subjected to employment law.
40 8
404. See Friedman, supra note 87, at 576 (noting that paying wages to mental patients and
then requiring them to pay for food and lodging creates a new situation where "they are earning
their room and board, and are not mere wards of the state, knowledge which carries a sense of
accomplishment, self-respect, and dignity"). Zelizer's work consistently emphasizes the role that
distinctive types of payments and economic media play in differentiating among relationships.
See, e.g., Zelizer, supra note 20. This example shows, however, that determining the type of
payment at issue (a wage versus something else) may itself follow from the type of relationship,
rather than vice versa.
405. At the extreme, consider cases of involuntary servitude or forced labor involving severe
abuse of farm workers, domestic workers, or garment workers. See Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F.
Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Samantha C. Halem, Slaves To Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment
Litigation Strategy to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 397
(1999); Used and Abused: Five Recent Cases with Slavery Convictions, PALM BEACH POST (Fla.),
Dec. 7, 2003, at 2. It would be most perverse for the extremity of mistreatment to strip these
workers of employment law protections by removing the voluntariness ordinarily ascribed to
employment. Cf. Fenwick, supra note 6, at 313 (voicing similar concern about the role of
voluntariness in the employment status of prison labor).
406. 29 U.S.C. § 211 (2000); 29 C.F.R. pt. 516 (2006).
407. See, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel, 355 F.3d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting district
court's reliance on the absence of employment records to determine no employment relationship
existed); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1057-59 (2d Cir. 1988) (dual record-keeping
system for acknowledged employees and those misclassified as independent contractors).
408. JACOBY, supra note 229, at 153, 225, 260-61; Michael J. Piore & Sean Safford, Changing
Regimes of Workplace Governance, Shifting Axes of Social Mobilization, and the Challenge to
Industrial Relations Theory, 45 INDUS. REL. 299, 304 (2006). Similarly, regular payment on a
time, rather than task, basis is one factor courts use to distinguish employees from independent
contractors. State employment statutes played a crucial role in producing this feature of modern
employment by mandating payment at regular intervals and based on time worked. STEINFELD,
supra note 24, at 294, 311-15. Although I do not pursue the point here, the employee/contractor
distinction appears amenable to the same sort of constitutive analysis that I develop with regard
to the distinction between employment and noneconomic activity.
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b. Indirect Influence of Regulatory Mandates on Relational Markers
Once an organization concludes that particular workers will be
legally classified as employees, it may make various changes beyond
the minimum necessary to comply with specific regulatory
mandates. 4 9 When these changes touch on relational markers, the
relationship's distinctiveness as employment again may follow, rather
than precede, legal regulation. For instance, classifying homeworkers
as "employees" under wage and hour law puts a greater premium on
employer control and monitoring of workers' time; it also encourages
regularity of working hours.410 As regulators stepped up application of
employment laws to industrial homework throughout the early
twentieth century, many employers responded by reducing reliance on
the entire homework model and shifting production into more
regimented factory settings. 411 Doing so further consolidated the
association of employment with large-scale industrial, rather than
domestic, sites.
Inversely, organizations seeking to avoid some regulatory
mandate may restructure work to remove a relational marker and
thereby forestall their workers' classification as employees. 412 Recall
courts' reluctance to find an inmate employment relationship when
409. Here it is important to investigate how the demands of compliance are mediated by
organizational actors and may be inflected by a variety of other institutional goals. See Edelman
et al., supra note 392; Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).
410. BORIS, supra note 338, at 278-90; see also JACOBY, supra note 229, at 260-61. Overtime
rules create incentives against irregular schedules. Under the FLSA, no overtime is owed when
80 hours of work are split into two forty-hour weeks, but 10 hours of overtime is owed when 80
hours are split into one 50-hour and one 30-hour week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(1)(a) (2000); 29 C.F.R. §
778.104 (2006). For a contemporary example, consider a recent description of hours regulation at
the worker-owned restaurant Colors. See Emily Vasquez, A Post-9/11 Dream Turns into a
Struggle to Fill Tables, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at B1. The restaurant management insisted
that employees not work a minute past 40 hours in order to avoid overtime. Interestingly,
however, the workers in question adhered to this rule in part because the cooperative structure
of the business contributed to their identification with organizational interests. See id. In this
way, one can see that while employment law matters, workers' and their organizations'
understanding and practice of their relationship draw heavily on other sources, including ones
that may resist conformity to legal categorization. See Albiston, supra note 320.
411. BORIS, supra note 338, at 340.
412. See Randall W. Roth & Andrew R. Biebl, A Taxing Matter: When is a Worker an
Independent Contractor: How To Avoid Getting Caught in the IRS Crackdown, J. ACCT., May
1991, at 35, 39 (suggesting steps employers can take to avoid having workers classified as
independent contractors); Vicki Smith, The Fractured World of the Temporary Worker: Power,
Participation, and Fragmentation in the Contemporary Workplace, 45 SOC. PROBS. 411, 417
(1998) (describing various strategies firms use to distinguish temporary workers on assignment
from their own employees); cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799,
801-05 (1941) (arguing that the contract doctrine of consideration "channels" agreements into
certain forms with recognizable legal consequences).
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prisoners work directly for a governmental agency. Several states that
are committed to running prison labor programs that replicate private
sector employment nonetheless place the programs in government
corporations, albeit highly independent ones. 413 One likely explanation
is that they seek to avoid application of federal employment law.
414
c. Normative and Cognitive Influences of Legal Classification
The packaged nature of employment 4 5 means that treating a
relationship as employment in one respect yields significant-though
not necessarily decisive-pressure to bring other elements into line. In
light of the expected congruence between legal and social
understandings of employment, legally classifying a relationship as
employment in one respect provides a resource for relational work
with regard to other aspects of the relationship. 41 6 Among other
things, it may provide leverage for modifying discordant relational
markers that had made the classificatory decision ambiguous.
Historical sociologist Chad Alan Goldberg analyzes this
dynamic in controversies over the political and legal status of workers
in contemporary "workfare" programs and in the "work relief'
programs of the New Deal. 41 7 WPA work program participants sought
to leverage the program's avowed purpose of providing meaningful
jobs to the unemployed-as opposed to stigmatizing cash relief-into
further claims to be treated like other workers, including wage parity,
413. See Gambetta v. Prison Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 1119,
1120 (11th Cir. 1997); Burleson v. California, 83 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1996).
414. Additionally, a number of states use governmental intermediaries as nominal managers
of inmates working under the direct supervision of private employers; these intermediaries
function much like temp agencies. See SEXTON, supra note 32, at 10-11 (describing "manpower"
model of prison-corporation collaboration). Ordinary temp agencies relieve user companies of
employer obligations by taking on employer status themselves. These prison intermediaries also
relieve user companies of employer obligations by taking on employer functions, but the prison
intermediary, unlike the ordinary temp agency, itself avoids employer status due to its
governmental character. See Weiss, supra note 42, at 274-75.
415. Cf. TILLY & TILLY, supra note 105, at 162 (discussing "a labor market segmentation
perspective [in which] particular sets of characteristics or governing rules [of work relationships]
travel in bunches").
416. See Janet Walsh & Stephen Deery, Refashioning Organizational Boundaries:
Outsourcing Customer Service Work, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 557, 567-69 (2006) (presenting evidence
that, relative to in-house employees, workers nominally employed by a subcontractor display
lower levels of commitment to the organization for which they work and are less responsive to
factors that increase commitment); Dick de Gilder, Commitment, Trust, and Work Behaviour:
The Case of Contingent Workers, 32 PERSONNEL REV. 588, 599 (2003).
417. Goldberg, supra note 308; Chad Alan Goldberg, Welfare Recipients or Workers?
Contesting the Workfare State in New York City, 19 SOC. THEORY 187 (2001); see also Krinsky,
supra note 17.
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job security, and the right to organize. 418 Critics of FLSA employment
status for prison labor worry about a similar dynamic: "[Playing
prisoners the minimum wage opens the door for prisoners claiming
unemployment compensation, worker's compensation, vacations,
overtime, and incentive pay."419 Notably, this concern is not limited to
congruence in employee status across statutes but extends to
conventional features of employment-like vacations and incentive
pay-that are not legally mandated. 420 Insofar as any of these
elements are added, doing so would only further entrench the
relationship's identification as employment. 421
This dynamic interaction among elements of relational
packages extends beyond matters of formal institutional design. Also
at stake are informal norms and expectations governing workers' and
employers' relations to one another and to other actors, including the
state.422 Such changes in the meaning and relative salience of the
418. Goldberg, supra note 308, at 355; see also Goldberg, supra note 417, at 205-07.
419. Wellen, supra note 11, at 328; accord U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 144.
The addition of one element of a relational package does not automatically lead to others, but it
increases the relational work necessary to justify splitting apart elements of the package or
settling on an unfamiliar hybrid. See Goldberg, supra note 417, at 207 (arguing that the
introduction of workfare in New York City opened up a new zone of contestation over the
boundaries between opposed social categories of dependent welfare recipients and independent
wage workers).
420. Formally, a worker's employee status may vary across different employment, tax, and
social insurance laws, as well as voluntary employer-provided benefits like paid vacations and
leaves, pensions, health care, and job security. Nonetheless, there is a strong tendency to assume
that these elements will be present or absent as a single package-employees get all of them,
independent contractors get none of them. See, e.g., Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054,
1057-59 (2d Cir. 1988) (describing how an employer treated one group of workers as "employees"
for both FLSA and payroll tax purposes and another group as nonemployees for both); JACOBY,
supra note 229, at 254-58 (describing how rise of various New Deal regulatory regimes promoted
growth of corporate personnel management departments and policies that also implemented and
addressed employee benefits not mandated by law); Smith, supra note 412, at 417 (describing
how workers classified as employees of a temp agency not only did not receive benefits from the
client firm but also wore different identification badges and were excluded from company social
events).
421. Inversely, courts sometimes cite the absence of various fringe benefits as a reason to
deny employee status, even though such benefits are not legally mandated and many employees
lack them. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing
district court decision that had relied in part on "plaintiffs' non-receipt of benefits such as
pensions, survivors benefits, sick pay, and health insurance"); Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp.
996, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affld, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the "volunteer" "received
no salary, no health or dental benefits, no insurance or retirement benefits, no office space, no
secretarial help, and no regularly assigned work hours").
422. See Albiston, supra note 320; Loril M. Gossett, Kept at Arm's Length: Questioning the
Organizational Desirability of Member Identification, 69 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 385, 399 (2002)
(discussing how the lack of an employment relationship dampens norms of mutual responsibility
and thereby facilitates termination of workers assigned to the firm by a temp agency); Marshall,
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relationship's constituent parts may be significant for ongoing
relational work. Research on workfare, work relief, and public job
creation programs is again instructive here. Paying participants with
a standard paycheck from the agency supervising the work, rather
than through a public benefits transfer from the welfare agency, leads
to participants' productive work becoming more central to their, and to
others', understanding of the relationship. 423 They become more like
workers and less like welfare recipients. 424 Attention shifts from their
poverty, their children, or their prior job loss-some or all of which
controlled entry into the program-to their work and the wage they
receive for it. Associated with this shift are what Goldberg calls the
'"material and symbolic profits' that correspond to the name
'worker."' 425 Participants can move from the stigma of "welfare
dependency" to the dignity of "work."
Thus, legally classifying payments as an employee's wage may
alter the parties' and others' understanding of what the relationship is
really about. 426 These understandings are themselves markers of
employment's economic character when, for instance, courts consider
the purpose or nature of the relationship.
427
d. Institutionalizing and Differentiating Employment as a Package
Thus far, I have described mechanisms through which
employment law helps to constitute employment by affecting whether
relationships contain the elements, the relational markers, that
signify employment. There remains one final and more fundamental
constitutive mechanism. The processes described above can help
reinforce and give substance to the very existence of "employment" as
supra note 394, at 388; Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of
the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
423. This effect reflects the crucial role that particular economic media play in
differentiating specific relational packages. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 37, 105-07.
424. This occurs even when a worker gets a job because the welfare agency refers the worker
to the employer and supplies funds to cover the costs of employing the worker. See CLIFFORD M.
JOHNSON & STEVE SAVNER, FEDERAL FUNDING SOURCES FOR PUBLIC JOB CREATION INITIATIVES
(1999), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/federal-funding-sources.pdf; SONDRA
YOUDELMAN & PAUL GETSOS, WAGES WORK! AN EXAMINATION OF NEW YORK CITY'S PARKS
OPPORTUNITY (POP) AND ITS PARTICIPANTS (2004), available at http://cvh.mayfirst.org/files/
Wages%20Work%2OLayout.pdf.
425. Goldberg, supra note 308, at 355; see also Deborah C. Malamud, "Who They Are-Or
Were: Middle-Class Welfare in the Early New Deal, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2019 (2003).
426. See Zelizer, supra note 20, at 487-89; see also Anna-Maria Marshall, Injustice Frames,
Legality, and the Everyday Construction of Sexual Harassment, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 659
(2003) (showing how the legal category of sexual harassment influenced but did not determine
how women workers interpreted unwanted sexual attention at work).
427. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
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a discrete social category. They do so both by creating regularity in
elements of work relationships that cluster together in a single
package and by discouraging the existence of partially overlapping
packages that would blur the boundary between employment and
other relationships.
Take, for example, Eileen Boris's study of wage and hour
regulation of industrial homework, such as cigar rolling, garment
production, and nut sorting, from the late nineteenth through the mid-
twentieth centuries. 428 Some reformers attacked the practice for
defying a basic incompatibility between the family home and the
workplace, thereby corrupting youthful innocence with child labor and
interfering with maternal caregiving. 429 Although the application of
employment law to industrial homework might seem to recognize the
home as a workplace, in practice it actually reinforced the gendered
opposition between caregiving and paid work. It did so because
subjection to employment law contributed to suppression of industrial
homework. 430 Employment became more firmly associated with work
in large, nonresidential facilities and thereby differentiated from
family relations at home. Today, it is commonplace-and not without
reason-to make arguments about paid employment (often in contrast
to unpaid caregiving) that rely in part on this contrast between
leaving the intimate home and going to a structured workplace shared
with many other workers. 431 But this now intuitive and familiar
contrast is partly the product of employment regulation itself.
Another example is the distinction between volunteers and
employees. The FLSA and other employment laws encourage a sharp
divide between the two categories. Absent a minimum wage, there
might well be a compensation continuum between unpaid volunteers,
those who work for a token amount such as $1 an hour, and those who
work at the minimum wage. The FLSA, however, bans this
transitional zone, with the result that workers work either for free or
for at least $5.85 an hour.432 This sharpens the distinction between
employees working for wages and those donating their time and labor.
In these and other ways, employment law contributes
simultaneously to the differentiation of employment from other
428. BORIS, supra note 338.
429. Id. at 84-85, 122, 299; see also VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD
(1985).
430. See BORIS, supra note 338, at 3, 350.
431. See WILSON, supra note 342, at 74-75; Schultz, supra note 3, at 1883.
432. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000) (setting out schedule of minimum wage increases
culminating in $7.25/hour in July 2009).
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relationships and also to the homogenization of employment. 433 In so
doing, it encourages the notions that some essential logic holds these
elements together and produces this regularity and that judges should
resolve classificatory disputes by seeking this essence.
CONCLUSIONS
Employment is specifically an economic relationship.
Controversy over this economic character erupts when individuals
work in institutional settings, such as prison labor, that readily split
apart two senses of the economic that widely are presumed to coincide:
the economic as market interaction and the economic as production,
distribution, and consumption of goods and services. Upon closer
inspection, however, deep problems foil the designation of an economic
sphere, one separate from other social institutions and structured by
its own internal logic. Distinguishing employment from other
relationships does not proceed simply by discerning the presence of an
economic character. Instead, distinction emerges out of political
contestation in which varied elements are knit together into a
contingent and not entirely stable configuration labeled employment.
Employment law plays a crucial role in constituting this relational
package. In doing so, it makes a difference in ways that go well beyond
its direct regulatory mandates. Employment law helps to
institutionalize and make real some of the most basic categories
through which we organize our lives.
Employment relationships also are building blocks and
reference points for broader social fields like "the labor market." Thus,
we measure labor market trends by counting employment
relationships and their distribution, hours, wages, and so on. And the
labor market is taken as one essential component of "the economy" at
large. Wage trends and unemployment levels are mainstays of
economic indicators, and employee wages are a major component of
that snapshot of the economy as a whole, the Gross Domestic
Product. 434 Thus, employment law helps to constitute the market
economy.
So what? As generally is true for social constructionist
analyses, specific prescriptions for law and policy do not follow directly
433. See JACOBY, supra note 229, at 152-53, 248-49, 260-61 (describing role of federal
regulation, including the FLSA, in creating a standardized employment relationship within and
across firms).
434. See MITCHELL, supra note 18, at 98-99, 262-63; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADS., supra note 279, at 40-43.
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from my arguments here. 435 They do, however, widen the range of
plausible responses to old problems and direct our attention toward
new ones. I conclude with some preliminary thoughts about what
these new directions might be. I address three general topics,
beginning with the disputes over employment status that have been
this Article's focus, then broadening out to consider the implications
both for "ordinary" employment and for nonmarket work like parental
caregiving, which is not employment by any account.
A. The Employment Status of Paid Nonmarket Work
A constitutive view does not deny that employment
relationships have an artifactual quality, solid enough that changing
the legal definition of employment could leave it fitting a real
phenomenon quite badly rather than simply remaking it by fiat.436 For
this reason, we should continue to ask how best to identify
employment relationships. 437 Nonetheless, additional questions and
considerations come into view once we see law as participating in the
maintenance and policing of employment's coherence and stability,
and in its inclusion or exclusion of particular practices.
First, this perspective should affect how we allocate
responsibility for delineating the employment relationship, as among
courts, executive agencies, and Congress. Insofar as this classificatory
task comes to look more political and less an exercise in factfinding,
there might be greater reason to structure the judicial inquiry in a
way that channels disputes into the political branches. Individual
cases still will have to be decided in the meantime, so we might
consider reasons for courts to lean in one direction during the judicial
phase of a larger decisionmaking process.
One pertinent consideration is parties' institutional capacity
and motivation to manipulate organizational form. Many
organizations have substantial and systematic incentives to structure
a workforce in ways that avoid the strictures of employment law. This
provides a reason for judges to err on the side of inclusiveness and,
more specifically, to evaluate employment in ways that cannot be
manipulated easily. Moreover, these same organizations are well
positioned to seek legislative or administrative relief, more so than the
relatively disorganized and often politically marginalized persons
435. See Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1251 (2007).
436. Cf. Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAW &
SoC'Y REV. 1243, 1246, 1248 (1994).
437. See Davidov, supra note 79.
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whose work often is at issue. In these respects, the productive work
approach begins to look more attractive, not as an adequate account of
who ultimately should be subject to employment law protections but
instead as a judicial default rule.
Second, once we see employment as something quite real but
also contingent, and in particular as a relational package bound in
part by law, then we can interrogate not just the package's boundaries
but also its continuing integrity.438 Rather than proceeding directly to
the question courts take up-under what circumstances should
inmates or other workers be classified as employees?-we should
question the use of employment as a singular category through which
we recognize, protect, organize, and support valuable work. 439
Instead, we might consider a proliferation of employments. A
categorical divide between employees and nonemployees is not the
only plausible way to manage tensions between employment
protections and other valuable features of work relationships.
Different forms of employment might vary according to the
institutional context of work, allowing for greater protections to those
currently excluded from employment without denying the need to
accommodate institutionally specific concerns. 440 To take just one
example, religious organizations generate now-familiar tensions
between respecting work's religious significance and acknowledging
the integration of such organizations into wider economic networks.
Current law manages that tension by, on the one hand, permitting by
statute a religious school or hospital (unlike other employers) to
discriminate among its workers based on their religion while, on the
other hand, otherwise applying employment discrimination law to the
relationship. 44
1
Instead of threatening employment status, the contextual
specificity of work could instead help to shape its character. The
438. A similar project is well underway among family law scholars who are questioning
whether the rights and responsibilities allocated through marriage ought to be disaggregated.
See, e.g., Laura Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007).
439. Cf. Lester, Unemployment Insurance, supra note 3, at 391 (suggesting multiple benefit
programs serving different groups of workers); Zatz, What Welfare Requires, supra note 3
(suggesting multiple transfer programs addressing different reasons for promoting work).
440. Cf. Davidov, supra note 79, at 136-37 (discussing proposals for a continuum of labor
protections beginning at their maximum in the core of employment and weakening with
movement toward a periphery of independent contractors or beyond to all citizens); Judy Fudge,
Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of Employment and the Scope
of Labour Regulation, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 609, 637-46 (2006) (suggesting a fragmentation of
labor law in which different types of protections apply to different sets of work arrangements,
without necessarily establishing any consistent continuum from greater to lesser protection).
441. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000).
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appeal of such refinements, rather than crude all-or-nothing
categorization as an employee or not, again recommends relying less
heavily on courts' threshold determinations of employee status as the
mechanism through which to strike the appropriate balance. There
certainly are competing considerations, but for now the point is that a
foundational commitment to the coherence of the employment
relationship (defined by markets or by work) need not be among them.
B. Revisiting the Market Character of Ordinary Employment
My analysis also suggests new ways to think about the
paradigmatic cases in employment law, not just the marginal ones. By
rejecting a "market essentialism" 442 that reduces typical jobs to an
"undersocialized"443 conception of the labor market, we might come to
see all work as socially situated, and differentially so. 444 Doing so
opens up a broader view of work's multiple roles in people's lives and
in their relationship to the state.
445
Our employment laws routinely embrace, however imperfectly
and haltingly, a vision for work's place in our lives that has its own
substance-one that links work to some level of material well-being
(the minimum wage), democratic organization (labor law), race and
gender equality (antidiscrimination law), some balance among
different life activities (hours regulation and family leave), and social
contribution and mutual support (social insurance). Market
mechanisms certainly play a role in this scheme. They can help
promote these goals 446 and also help manage some tensions between
them.
Thus, we might think of employment law as selectively
incorporating and channeling market processes, rather than as
fundamentally oriented toward counteracting markets. 447  This
reinforces the familiar, but too often forgotten, Legal Realist point
442. John Lie, Sociology of Markets, 1997 ANN. REV. Soc. 341, 342-43
443. Granovetter, supra note 13, at 54.
444. See Zelizer, supra note 20 (proposing a mode of analysis that applies across contexts of
families, large bureaucracies, and sexual intimacies).
445. Cf. Zatz, What Welfare Requires, supra note 3 (arguing that distinct reasons for valuing
work vary in relevance across policy contexts and may lead to different legal definitions of work).
446. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER 4 (2003) (arguing that market
pressures (in conjunction with employment law) help make the workplace an important site for
fostering democratic dialogue and solidarity).
447. See Piore & Safford, supra note 408; cf. PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL
(1995) (arguing for a fundamental role for market mechanisms in conceiving and achieving an
egalitarian approach to distributive justice); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality
of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 284 (1981) (same).
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that markets are our creation and should remain our servant. It also
adds a complementary insight: the market is not the only source of
unjust working conditions, 448 and therefore employment law need not
limit itself to rectifying the market's failures. 449 Among other things,
this means resisting the persistent notion that the balance of economic
terms between employer and employee (pay, hours, benefits, and so
on) is more centrally the concern of employment law than questions of
dignity, authority, respect, and equality among workers, and that
these matters can be held apart.
A more critical perspective on employment law also emerges
once we take seriously its constitutive role. Market skeptics typically
embrace labor and employment law as a way to temper the
instrumentalism, individualism, and adversarial stance associated
with economic bargains and to infuse other values. 450 From this
perspective, employment law's failings stem from not going far enough
toward displacing markets. But my analysis suggests a less sanguine
view.
In various respects, employment law actually may help to
promote market dynamics, embed them in employment relationships,
and entrench the idea that they form these relationships' essential
core. The FLSA may place a floor below wages, but it also dictates a
cash form. 451 The NLRA may facilitate workers' collective action and
power, but it also channels this into the form of adversarial
bargaining. 452 Employment discrimination law sometimes demands
that equality trump the bottom line, but it also can be enlisted to help
police a "sanitized workplace" organized around the strict separation
of professional relationships from those thick with desire, antagonism,
or solidarity. 453 In each case, we face a more complicated picture than
the law heroically restraining the market. For better or worse, the law,
in part, is producing the market as a force in need of restraint, at once
448. Cf. Michele Goodwin, Tissue and Organ Taboos 21 (unpublished manuscript, presented
at the University of Chicago Law School, Oct. 29, 2007, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review)
(criticizing claims that gift relationships necessarily avoid the harms associated with markets).
449. See ORREN, supra note 383, at 3-4 (characterizing the growth of labor law as displacing
feudal hierarchy within employment relations); STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 314 (arguing that
"modern free wage labor was not the product of the rise of free contract in free markets but of the
social legislation and court decisions" in the decades spanning the start of the twentieth
century).
450. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 108-10 (1996); Barenberg, supra
note 5.
451. See supra text accompanying note 400.
452. See ORREN, supra note 383, at 217.
453. Schultz, supra note 409; see also Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEF T
LEGALISM/LEF CRITIQUE 80-104 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
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offering itself as the source of that restraint but also stripping others
away.
C. Rethinking the Significance of Pay in the Analysis of
Nonmarket Work
Throughout this Article, I have drawn heavily on feminist
scholarship that criticizes the evolving institutional forms and modes
of thought that distinguish market work from family life, generally
privileging the former and tying women to the latter. In this
conversation, it is commonplace to equate "market work" with "paid
work" and to contrast these with the equivalents "nonmarket work"
and "unpaid work."454 We must be more cautious in mapping a
market/nonmarket divide onto a paid/unpaid distinction. 455 This is not
simply a point of terminological tidiness but instead a substantive
point about whether monetary transactions drive the structure,
meaning, and social recognition of the relationships in which they
occur.
45 6
In prison labor and related cases, work is paid but nonetheless
may be classified as nonmarket work and, as a result, placed outside
the scope of protections and support gathered around the honored
figure of the worker. There are complex implications for ongoing
feminist debates about family labor. On the one hand, in line with my
earlier suggestions about multiplying employment, disaggregating
money and markets opens up possibilities for attaching economic
entitlements to nonmarket work without thereby transforming it into
market work, or commodifying it, in terms of its social meaning to
those performing the work or benefitting from it.457 If the degraded,
penological character of prison labor can survive the payment of
hourly wages to inmates, then surely the intimate, spiritual character
of care work 458 can survive the provision of financial support to
parents. On the other hand, and less optimistically, paying nonmarket
caregivers also may do less than we hope to change the social meaning
454. See, e.g., Orloff, supra note 3; Williams, From Difference to Dominance, supra note 3; see
also Abbott, supra note 18. I certainly have done so myself. See Zatz, What Welfare Requires,
supra note 3.
455. See Philipps, supra note 275.
456. See generally ZELIZER, supra note 3; ZELIZER, supra note 281.
457. Hasday, supra note 3; Williams & Zelizer, supra note 17, at 370-71.
458. See Roberts, supra note 324.
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and status of their work.459 The reason again is that getting paid for
work is compatible with a wide range of relationships.
These points suggest that a type of shell game often is played
with the concept of work. Practices that purport to recognize and
support "workers" in fact are much more partial than the term
suggests. To put it crudely, the welfare state purports to follow a
neutral principle of supporting productive workers and disclaims the
notion that full citizenship is reserved for men and those who follow
conventionally masculine life courses; it just so happens that those
identified as workers are disproportionately men, thereby
systematically leaving women marginalized and insecure. 460 Feminists
rightly have called this bluff by demanding a more inclusive account of
what activities constitute productive work. Unfortunately, the force of
this demand still relies on the principle that productive work begets
full citizenship. Once the bluff is called, however, the criteria may
shift so that social citizenship no longer relies on productive work 461
but instead on market discipline, self-sufficiency, or getting out of the
house. 462 Notwithstanding my continuing frustration with the initial
bluff, it seems right that production alone is not enough, at least some
of the time. Recall here the absurdity of the view that productive work
is always employment and thus that organized, unpaid volunteering
always violates the minimum wage.
This underdetermination by work and by pay appears clearly
in recent feminist scholarship examining monetary transactions
within family relationships 463 and also paid work involving practices
associated with the family, including housework, caregiving, sexuality,
and reproduction. 464 What this literature shows is that whether work
459. Cf. Nancy Fraser, After the Family Wage: A Postindustrial Thought Experiment, in
FRASER, supra note 3, at 41, 57-60. This pessimistic point about paid nonmarket work is
somewhat mitigated by the further pessimistic observation that even acknowledged market work
may not achieve much recognition or support in a highly stratified labor market. See Zatz, What
Welfare Requires, supra note 3, at 424-35.
460. SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC
POLICY 186-87, 209 (1998); Fraser, supra note 459; Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare
State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 231 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988).
461. For a fascinating and depressing empirical study of how the criteria for inclusion may
shift in order to preserve male privilege, see Michael Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category
Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817 (2004).
462. See WILSON, supra note 342, at 72; Schultz, supra note 3, at 1899-1900. See generally
Zatz, What Welfare Requires, supra note 3 (distinguishing among arguments for privileging
market work).
463. See ZELIZER, supra note 3; Hasday, supra note 3.
464. Peggie Smith's work has been consistently important in this regard. E.g., Peggie Smith,
Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas of Reform, 48 AM. U. L.
REV. 851 (1999); see also Silbaugh, supra note 3; Noah D. Zatz, Sex Work/Sex Act: Law, Labor,
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is incorporated into and recognized by "market" institutions varies
with race, gender, class, and kinship position (both among workers
and among those for and with whom they work), and with type of task,
place of work, and structure of supervision and payment. Where the
carework literature began-unpaid work in one's own home and
directed toward one's immediate family-is just one configuration that
brings these dynamics into play.
This Article opens the door onto an even wider field. The
politics of market versus nonmarket work are not limited to the family
or to tasks associated with it. Once we begin to look, we can see them
in the prison and in the school, in the asylum and in the church; they
lurk in the rehab center and in the military, in the factory and in the
fields. Work is everywhere, but that barely begins to tell us who the
workers are.
and Desire in Constructions of Prostitution, 22 SIGNS 277 (1997). There is also a growing
literature outside of legal scholarship. See, e.g., Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Organizing Home
Care: Low-Waged Workers in the Welfare State, 34 POL. & SOCY 81 (2006); Paula England et al.,
Wages of Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work, 49 SOC. PROBS. 455 (2002); Cameron Lynne
Macdonald & David A. Merrill, 'It Shouldn't Have to be a Trade': Recognition and Redistribution
in Care Work Advocacy, HYPATIA, Spring 2002, at 67.
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